IRAN, RELATIONS WITH

Persian-Russian relations date to the 18th century as theRomanovEmpire began to expand south of theCaucasus. During the 1800s, Russia annexed Persian-heldAzerbaijanand displaced Iranian influence inCentral Asia. During the Russian Civil War, a Soviet Republic was briefly established in the north of the country; though the Moscow-backed regime quickly collapsed, Tehran was left wary of Soviet influence.

During World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) andGreat Britainstaged a joint invasion of the officially neutral country, occupying the north and south, respectively.Joseph Stalinreneged on a commitment to evacuate Persia within six months of cessation of hostilities, instead creatingseparatist, pro-Soviet states in the north of Iran with the help of local Azeris and Kurds. Soviet forces finally left in 1946 with promises ofoilconcessions from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which were soon withdrawn by the shah, Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi. Outraged by the so-called Iranian method employed by the Americans and the British to limit Soviet influence, Stalin moved quickly to consolidate power in Eastern Europe, refusing to give even an inch to London or Washington. Fearing that leftist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh might bring Iran into the Soviet sphere of influence in the early 1950s, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored a royalist coup d’état, allowing Pahlavi to rule the country as a dictator until he was removed by the 1979 Islamic Revolution. As part of the American-allied “green belt” of Muslim states between the USSR and the Persian Gulf, Iran was stalwart in its anti-Soviet orientation, though economic relations were resumed after 1962.

While the Soviets were happy to see the shah go, the ascendency of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did little to improve relations; in fact, Moscow viewed the spread of revolutionaryIslamismwith such dread, it invadedAfghanistanwithin the year to put down an Islamist government on its long Central Asian border and when the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) broke out, Moscow liberally supplied Saddam Hussein with conventional arms until 1986 when relations between Moscow and Tehran improved.As the Soviet Union lurched toward denouement, Khomeini encouragedMikhail Gorbachevto considerIslamas a substitute for the “failed” ideologies ofatheismandCommunism. While Russia did not adopt Islam en masse, the country markedly improved its relations with the Islamic Republic during the 1990s.

Economic and scientific exchange formed the core of this new relationship, with Russia agreeing to help develop the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr in 1995. Involvement in supplying nuclear technology to a “rogue state” has been one of the most controversial aspects of Moscow’s postindependence foreign policy. With the ascendency ofYevgeny Primakov, the Russo-Iranian relationship developed a political component, as the foreign minister sought to counteract American hegemony. UnderVladimir Putinand his successor,Dmitry Medvyedev, Russia has made cooperation rather than confrontation with Iran on the nuclear issue the policy standard, often using the country’s permanent seat on theUnited NationsSecurity Council to scuttle or veto resolutions directed against Tehran. Russian intransigence on Iranian nuclear issue has negatively impacted relations with the international community (especiallyFranceandGermany), particularly since it has become obvious that Russia’s relationship with Iran is not simply an economic one, but also a geopolitical strategy directed against theUnitedStates’ interests in theMiddle East(particularly against American alliesIsrael,Turkey, and Saudi Arabia).

Russia is one of Iran’s largest trading partners, with a turnover of more than $2 billion per year (much of it in the form ofarmsandmilitaryhardware, sales of which were resumed in 1989 and expanded after 2000). While Russia and Iran do not share a territorial border, both states are washed by theCaspian Sea, a shared status that has led to competition over access to natural resources (oil andnatural gas), shipping, andfishingrights. While the two countries have sparred over routes for transshipment of Caspian hydrocarbons, their deepening “strategic partnership” in the 1990s was a critical factor in developing the U.S.-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that skirted both countries. The two countries share common goals inCentral Asiaand Afghanistan. Despite its history of sponsoring transnational Islamism, Tehran is loath to see Saudi-influenced Sunni fundamentalism on its borders, a sentiment shared by the Russian Federation; similarly, both countries seek to limit America’s extension of its influence into the region.