The beginnings of phenomenologyHusserl and his predecessorsRichard Cobb-StevensEdmund Husserl was the founder of phenomenology, one of the principal movements oftwentieth-century philosophy. His principal contribution to philosophy was hisdevelopment of the concept of intentionality. He reasserted and revitalized the premodernthesis that our cognitional acts are intentional, i.e., that they reach out beyond sensa tothings in the world. When we think or speak about things, and when we perceive them,we deal with those things and not with mental intermediaries. Intentionality is ouropenness to the world, our transcending mode of being. Husserl also developed theimplications of this fundamental thesis. He repudiated Locke’s interpretation of ‘mind’ asan inner space set off from the rest of nature, and he rejected Kant’s distinction betweenphenomena and things-in-themselves. He also rejected the view that the task ofphilosophy is to guarantee that our concepts and theories somehow mirror the world.These themes brought a sense of liberation to many philosophers who by the earlydecades of the twentieth century had become weary of the insoluble problems generatedby the modern account of cognition. Husserl’s analysis of signs and semantic systems hada similar effect in the fields of linguistics and logic which had been dominated byassociationist and psychologistic accounts of the production of meaning. Hisinterpretation of the complementarity of pre-scientific and scientific modes of rationalitycontributed to the demise of positivism and inspired new and fruitful approaches in thesocial sciences. His theories of time and ego-identity provided much-needed correctivesto reductionist tendencies in psychology. Finally, his balanced interpretation of theinterplay between historical horizons and the drive fortruth offers a reasonable alternativeto the contemporary tendency to regard all truths as relativized by their historicalconditions.It is unfortunate that Husserl’s writings had little influence on the development of thetradition of analytic philosophy, the other major movement of twentieth-centuryphilosophy.Husserl himself engaged in spirited but amicable debate with Gottlob Frege,who is generally considered to be the proximate founder of analytic philosophy.However, such exchanges became increasingly rare among their followers who havetended on the whole to ignore one another’s works. This breakdown of communicationwas due in part to an early misunderstanding. Frege thought that Husserl was a proponentof psychologism, i.e., the view that numbers, propositions and logical laws are reducibleto mental states. Frege’s critique of Husserl’s alleged psychologism was decisive for awhole generation of analytic philosophers whose goal was to defend rationality fromrelativism by detaching logic and semantics from all dependence on what they took to beirremediably subjective intuitions. On the other hand, Frege’s decision to divorce logicalanalysis entirely from cognitive intuition alienated philosophers within thephenomenological tradition who saw in this strategy only a revival of Hobbes’spreference for an exclusively calculative rationality. Ironically, Husserl’s critique ofpsychologism was in fact more coherent and more complete than that of Frege and hisfollowers, for he showed how propositions are grounded in cognitive intuitions withoutthereby being reduced to merely subjective phenomena. In recent years bothphenomenological and analytic traditions have found themselves increasingly vulnerableto contemporary forms of historicism and relativism. This situation has had the felicitouseffect of encouraging within both traditions a reappraisal of the reasons for their mutualdistrust. Considerable progress has been made of late in restoring a climate conducive torenewed dialogue.In the judgment of many, the originality of Husserl’s thought and the rigour of hisanalyses guarantee him a place among the greatest of philosophers. However, his writingstend to be excessively abstruse and technical. As a result, his readership has generallybeen limited to professional philosophers. By contrast, Martin Heidegger’s moreevocative philosophical style and Jean-Paul Sartre’s literary brilliance assured for thesubsequent phenomenological tradition a wider audience and an unusually immediatecultural influence. This is not to say that these thinkers were merely commentators onHusserl (indeed, many regard Heidegger as a more profound and original thinker), butonly that they often succeeded in communicating the basic insights of Husserl’sphenomenology more clearly and forcefully than did Husserl himself. There is anotherreason why Husserl’s writings often failed to convey to his readers the full force of hiscriticism of the modernepistemological perspective. It seems clear, in retrospect, that hewas not sufficiently sensitive to the gravitational pull that the language of modernphilosophy exercised on his thought. He explicitly modified the senses of such keymodern terms as ‘presentation’, ‘content’, ‘immanence’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘phenomenon’,but he never completely jettisoned the lexicon of modern philosophy. Indeed, he alwaysmaintained a conservative stance with regard to innovative philosophic language,preferring to take familiar terms to their limits rather than to introduce unusual metaphorsand neologisms. He therefore failed to appreciate the extent to which the familiarlinguistic matrix of modern philosophy conceals a long history of accumulated premiseswhich determine the kinds of questions that readers would bring to his texts. His goal wasto call those premises into question, but his philosophical vocabulary tended too often toreinforce them. It is unfortunate, too, that Husserl seems to have had little first-handfamiliarity with ancient and medieval philosophic texts. He was always more at homewith the traditions of British empiricism and Kantian criticism. Had he been more attunedto the weight of words in the development of philosophic concepts, and better informedabout the ancient and medieval traditions, his breakthrough would no doubt have beenless plagued by ambiguities and less subject to misinterpretations.Husserl was born in Prossnitz, a town then located in Austria. He took courses inmathematics at the universities of Leipzig, Berlin and Vienna. In Berlin, he studied withthe renowned mathematicians Leopold Kronecker and Karl Weierstrauss, and alsoattended occasional lectures in philosophy by Wilhelm Wundt. He received his Ph.D. in1882 from the University of Vienna for a dissertation entitled ‘Contributions to theTheory of the Calculus of Variations’. After a year in Berlin as assistant to Weierstrauss,he returned to Vienna to study philosophy with Franz Brentano, who had recentlyresigned his chair of philosophy. In 1886, on Brentano’s recommendation, Husserl wentto Halle to work with Karl Stumpf, who supervised the thesis submitted for hisHabilitation,a study of the concept of number. From 1887 to 1928, Husserl held teachingpositions at Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg im Breisgau.As a Jew, Husserl was increasingly the subject of harassment during his retirementyears in Freiburg. It must have been an especially cruel blow to have found himselfdenied access to the library of the university he had served so well. After his death in1938, Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts were saved from destruction by Hermann VanBreda, a Belgian priest and philosopher, who also arranged for Husserl’s wife anddaughter to be sheltered in a Belgian convent during the occupation. Van Bredasubsequently founded the Husserl Archives at Louvain.Husserl was a person of high moral character and of impeccable intellectual integrity.He looked upon philosophy as a vocation, and felt personally called upon to defendreason against the various forms of relativism prevalent in his day. However, his wasnever a merely defensive or narrowly conservative project. Indeed, he often expressedadmiration for the sceptical tradition in philosophy, and thought that Hume’s radicalcritique of presuppositions made him the greatest of modern philosophers. He alsorejected the arrogance and chauvinism of those who claimed that philosophy hadachieved its culmination in German thought and expression. Philosophy, he argued,cannot be the exclusive property of any single culture or language, for the emergence ofthe philosophic spirit introduced a new mode of teleology characterized by thecomplementary traits of universality and infinity. The telos of philosophy is universal inthat it strives to attain an identical truth which is valid for all who are no longer blindedby traditions, and infinite in that this goal of truth can never be fully realized and thusremains always a regulative idea. By reason of its universality, therefore, philosophycannot be limited to a particular period or people, and by reason of its infinity philosophyremains always an unending process ([1.33], 286; [1.89], 151–60).During his lifetime Husserl published several books and also left an extraordinarynumber of manuscripts, lecture notes and working papers. Both the published works andthe unpublished materials contain many repetitive passages, tantalizingly unfinisheddescriptions, and agonizing reappraisals of earlier positions. As a result, it is oftendifficult to co-ordinate earlier and later works, or even to be sure of the directionultimately taken by his thought. Husserl would not be entirely displeased by thissituation, for he concluded finally that there can be no totalizing syntheses. We muststrive for objectivity, and hope for progress towards that goal, but we must alsoacknowledge all the while that the goal of truth functions always as ‘the idea of aninfinite task’ ([1.33], 291).EARLY WORKS: INFLUENCE OF FREGE BRENTANO, HERBART, STUMPF AND LOTZEHusserl’s first published work,Philosophy of Arithmetic(1891), was a revised version ofhis earlier analysis of the concept of number. Adopting a distinction first made byBrentano, Husserl distinguishes between intuitive presentation and symbolic intention ofnumbers. He describes how our primitive intuitions about numbers and theirinterrelationships are based upon the experiences of counting, comparing and collecting,and how we think in symbols of more complex numbers for whichthere can be no suchauthenticating intuitions. Unfortunately, he makes several remarks which give theimpression that he conflated numbers and their presentations. For example, he refers tothe unity of a number as a psychic relation, and claims that understanding the concept ofa number requires reflection on its presentation in relevant acts of collective combination.In 1894, Frege called attention to these compromising remarks in a critical review ofHusserl’s book. He objected that Husserl’s analysis blurs the distinction betweensubjective and objective domains, and concluded that his work was a typical example ofpsychologism ([1.65], 200–1). While Frege’s critique finds some justification inHusserl’s text, this extreme conclusion is unwarranted. Frege was inclined to regard aspsychologistic any attempt to relate the status of numbers to the activities of counting andcollecting. Hence, he was not likely to be attuned to the nuances of Husserl’s intentionwhich was surely not to collapse the objectivity of numbers into their acts of presentationbut rather to describe just how their objectivity manifests itself to us. At any rate, Husserllater distinguished clearly between numbers and their presentations, and between theconcept of number and the concept of collective combination ([1.35], 784; [1.86], 24).Frege also criticized Husserl for holding the view that numbers are totalities (determinatemultitudes) comprised of mere ‘somethings’ having no specific content and yet somehowdiffering from one another. However, this is a caricature of Husserl’s position, for heclearly maintains that objects are always identified by way of their features. His point issimply that, once we have identified objects to be counted, we prescind from thedeterminate content of those objects in the instance numbering them.It took some time, however, for Husserl to clarify the ambiguities generated by hiscontinued dependence on the linguistic and conceptual framework of the empiricisttradition, which was the remote forerunner of late nineteenth-century psychologism. Inhis essay ‘Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic’ (1894), he makes theunequivocal claim that our cognitive intuitions truly present the things intended by ourspeech acts. Moreover, he distinguishes clearly between mental acts and their contents, adistinction that had been blurred by the empiricist notion of a mental ‘process’, which ineffect reduces cognitive acts to the mere having of associatively modified impressions.Nevertheless, he constantly uses the term ‘contents’ in an ambiguous fashion, sometimesto refer to ill-defined mental representations and sometimes to refer to things in the worldin so far as they are known. Hence he does not yet make it clear that the intended objectsof both our signitive and intuitive acts are, ordinarily at least, things in the world ratherthan mental substitutes ([1.40], 126–42; [1.122], 34–8).These ambiguities testify to the influence of Brentano on the earlyHusserl. Brentanorejected the empiricists’ reduction of mental acts to associative reactions, reaffirmed atleast vaguely the medieval distinction between acts and contents, and retrieved in part theancient thesis that cognitive acts reach out to the intended objects themselves. He istherefore rightly celebrated for having revived the theory of intentionality. However, hisinterpretation of this notion intermingled modern and premodern themes. His earlywritings described intentional contents in ways that evoke the modern notion thatimpressions and ideas function as intra-mental substitutes for inaccessible real objects ofreference. He said, for example, that every intentional experience ‘contains something asits object within itself, and referred also to this ‘immanent objectivity’ as the ‘intentionalin-existence of an object’ ([1.45], 88–9).Although Brentano explicitly related his account of intentionality to the scholastictradition, and traced its origin to Aristotle’s books on the soul, he unfortunately tended toread the modern interpretation of immanence into the medieval theme ofesseintentionale. It is true that the Scholastics used the term ‘intentional’ (and morefrequently the term ‘objective’) to refer to the mode of being had by things known, in sofar as they are present in the knower. The point of the medieval distinction betweenintentional (objective) being and real being was to clarify Aristotle’s claim that theknower ‘is somehow’ the form of the thing known, without thereby entering into physicalidentity with the thing. It was thought that the intentional object (‘inner word’, ‘formalconcept’, ‘expressed species’) functions as a unique sort of intermediary, i.e., as atransparent sign through which the mind is related to reality ([1.101], 62 n. 3). Althoughthis emphasis on the mediating function of formal concepts may well have prepared theway for the modern thesis that to know is to have a representation of something (its ‘idea’or ‘concept’) within the mind’s interiority, the medieval thinkers themselves clearlymaintained that the intentional object is the very thing itself, considered as known(Aquinas,De Veritate,iv, 2 ad 3).Aristotle does not seem to have thought it necessary to postulate any intermediary,however special, between intellect and thing known. Indeed, he suggests that the intellectmust itself be free of formal structure, and hence empty of content, so that it can becomethe forms of all things. The intellect, says Aristotle, possesses the same son ofadaptability as the human hand. It takes on the forms of things in the way that the humanhand grasps tools (Aristotle,De Anima,423a 1–3; [1.90], 132–7). Thus, the intellectoperates within the realm of nature itself rather than within some subjective enclosure. Itsmode of being is its transcending function. Aristotle further describes a thing’s form as itssortal feature, its ‘look’(eidos). The look iswhatwe know when we knowthisparticularthing. Although there is a difference between intuiting an individualquaindividual (theprimary substance), and intuiting its species-look (the secondary substance), these modesof intuition are complementary and interdependent. We grasp the species-look both as asurplus whose sense exceeds the particularity of this instance and as a condition for themanifestation of the particular (Aristotle,Metaphysics,1042a 17–49). Aristotle alsoemphasizes the continuity between perception and predication. Predicative discoursegives syntactical articulation to the inarticulate nuances of intuition (Aristotle,OnInterpretation,16b 25–6). Judging is therefore directed primarily upon things and theirperceived features, not upon propositions as such.Brentano revived the Aristotelian notion that the intellect’s intentional targets arethings in the world, but he imagined the intellect’s grasp of forms as taking place withinthe mind’s inner space. He therefore concluded that the intellect could never effectivelyreach those targets. Brentano also subscribed wholeheartedly to the modern interpretationof perception. He claimed that our perceptions yield merely subjective appearances, andhe appealed to physical causality alone in order to account for the relationship betweenthese appearances and real objects. Corresponding to perceived colours, he claimed, thereare only the ‘vibrations’ which emanate from the interaction of atoms, molecules andforces. A thing’s true being, therefore, is its hidden quantifiable reality accessible only tothe methods of the natural sciences. Perceived objects do not exist really outside of us;they aremerephenomena ([1.45], 9–10). In his later works, Brentano neverthelessclaimed that linguistic references are ordinarily directed upon transcendent real entities,rather than upon mental contents. However, there is no indication that this new positionentailed a critique of the empiricist account of intuition. Everything suggests acompromise: we refer to real things, but we see only phenomena. Moreover, Brentanoadopted the modern interpretation of the relationship between assertive and predicativemoments of judgment. Judgment, he says, is an act of acceptance or denial directed uponsome presentation. This definition implies that judging is not primarily directed uponthings and their perceived features, but upon intra-mental or ideal contents ([1.45], 198–9).Dallas Willard’s historical research has demonstrated how the influence of JohannFriedrich Herbart, Karl Stumpf and Hermann Lotze helped Husserl to make a moredecisive break with the empiricist tradition than that achieved by Brentano ([1.122], 30–4). Herbart defined ‘apperception’ as the ‘awareness of what is going on in us’, andsubsequently distinguished clearly between awareness of the activity of thinking andawareness of its content ([1.72], v, 43). Stumpf, to whom Husserl dedicated hisLogicalInvestigations,held that second-order representations (such as the idea of a causal nexus)may arise out of first-order representations, and that the former are not reducible toassociative manipulations of the latter. In short, he held that we somehow perceive causalconnections ([1.112], 5). Lotze broke away even more completely from the empiricistposition. Whereas Hume had claimed that the impression of the mind’s transition (whichaccounts for the idea of necessary connection) is reducible to the process of transitionitself, Lotze asserted unequivocally that ideas of relations depend on a reflexiveawareness of the mind’s transitions. Moreover, he drew a distinction between the objectof the reflexive act (a second-order mental content) and the relationship represented asobtaining between the transcendent objects of the first-order impressions ([1.78], 537–8).Willard points out that these distinctions are unthinkable within the context of the usualempiricist account of cognition. There is no way, for example, of reducing Lotze’srelating activities to the mere having of automatic transitional processes, or of reducinghis second-order contents to faded and less forceful copies of impressions. On the otherhand, these authors continue to interpret mental activities as purely inner psychologicalhappenings, and they do not explicitly call into question the empiricist description ofmind as a theatre of representations. Hence, their modifications of the Humean accountdo not constitute a full fledged revival of the premodern notion of cognition. None theless, once the distinction between activity and content had been re-established, and oncethe notion of irreducible second-order operations and contents had been elaborated, thestage was set for a comprehensive reappraisal of the modern thesis that the terminus ofour knowing is located within the mind’s inner space.LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONSHusserl was the first to challenge the modern position squarely. During the period from1894 to 1900, further reflection on the incoherence of psychologism and on the need for anew foundation for logic led him to make a more decisive break with the modernepistemological model for mind. There is no evidence that he engaged during these yearsin any prolonged study of medieval or later scholastic literature on the topic of cognition,or that he was markedly influenced by a reading of the relevant texts of Aristotle. Yet hewas able to achieve what amounts to a reconstruction of the premodern notion of theintentional continuity between mind and nature. His reflections during this periodculminated in the publication of his greatest work,Logical Investigations(1900–1). Thisbook begins with a series of prolegomena which make a powerful critique of the tenets ofpsychologism. The rest of the work develops a more positive account of how ourcognitive acts have the capacity to yield access to objective truths. Its six investi-gationsare devoted to the following related topics: signs and signification, universals andparticulars, parts and wholes, logical grammar, intentionality, evidence and truth.In the prolegomena, Husserl demonstrates the incoherence of trying to reduce theobjectivity of numbers, propositions, and truth itself to subjective states or activities. LikeFrege, he calls attention to the self-contradiction involved in every attempt to defend thethesis that truth is reducible to our acceptance of it. One cannot coherently propose atheory that subjectivizes truth and then go on to make objective claims for that theory. Tomake any statement whatsoever, including a statement in defence of relativism, is tomake a claim that something is the case independently of one’s making that claim. LikeFrege, Husserl also contends that the principles of logic cannot be regarded as provisionalgeneralizations because inductively derived laws could never serve as standards foradjudicating between valid and invalid arguments. It would make no sense to criticizesome individual’s thinking as illogical or inconsistent on the basis of inductivegeneralizations about how thinking occurs. The idiosyncratic thinking in question mightlegitimately be characterized as unusual, but not as invalid. Husserl holds thatpsychologism also fails to account for the kind of evidence belonging to principles oflogic, such as the laws of the syllogism. He criticizes John Stuart Mill’s description oflogical laws as inductive generalizations on the grounds that the evidence for logical lawsis absolutely certain rather than merely probable and provisional ([1.35], 187–96). Thissort of argument would be unacceptable to Frege, who insisted that any appeal toevidence blurs the distinction between a proposition’s truth and its being recognized astrue. According to Frege, a proposition is simply true or false in itself. He argued thatgenetic accounts of how people come to think of propositions as true are irrelevant to theissue of truth ([1.64], vi; [1.66], 133; [1.86], 32–8). Husserl contends, on the contrary,that there is no reason why an appeal to evidence should email the reduction of truth to itsrecognition. When the objective truth of a proposition makes itself manifest to the seekerof truth, it does not thereby become subjective.The first investigation opens with a discussion of two kinds of signs: indications andexpressions. Indications either stand for what they signify (a flag as the sign of a nation)or point to the existence of some absent reality (smoke as a sign of fire). In both cases,association provides the link between sign and signified. As opposed to indications,linguistic expressions introduce a stratum of meaning. Their use requires acts ofinterpretation on the part of speakers and listeners. A speaker’s words ordinarilyaccomplish three functions: they express meanings, refer to objects, and ‘intimate’ to alistener the intellectual activity of the speaker. Husserl observes that the ‘intimating’function of expression is a kind of indication, in the sense that spoken or written wordsare indices of the existence of the speaker’s hidden and therefore ‘absent’ thoughts. Headds that many philosophical errors arise from the failure to distinguish properly betweenindication and expression. He takes Mill’s account of naming as an example. Mill heldthat proper names denote but do not connote. They point to an object without in any waypresenting or conveying information about the object. Proper names, he added, are likethe distinctive chalk-marks made by the robber (of a popular tale) on a house that heintended to plunder at a later hour. Husserl observes that this comparison unfortunatelysuggests that proper names function only as indications. It is true that when the robberlater sees the chalk-marks, he recalls by association his earlier thought ‘This is the houseI must rob’. But in relation to its object a name does not function as an indication orsignal. An indication always motivates belief in the existence of whatever it indicates.However, a names does not similarly entail the existence of the object named ([1.35],295–8). Named objects may be real, ideal, imaginary or even impossible. Thus,meaningful reference to an object does not perforce entail the existence of the object. Thecontext of its use determines the kind of ontological commitment entailed by a linguisticexpression. Husserl thus elegantly avoids the paradoxes that Bertrand Russell laterdiscovered were implicit in Mill’s view that names are like purely indexical signs.The second investigation makes a convincing critique of the empiricist reduction ofuniversals to blurred particulars. Husserl contends that recognition of some particularfeature requires a grasp of the primitive relationship between species and instances. Wecould not discern a distinctive particular feature as such (e.g., this particular red) if we didnot also intuit the corresponding universal (the species, Red). The two modes of intuitionare interdependent. We grasp the particular feature as an instance of a range of similarinstances in which the species is realized, and we grasp the identity of the species as thecondition for the possibility of identifying the particular as such an instance.The third investigation deals with the relationships between parts and wholes. Husserlfirst distinguishes between independent parts, or ‘pieces’, and non-independent parts, or‘moments’. Pieces are parts that are separable from their wholes. Moments are parts thatare so interrelated with one another, or with their wholes, that they cannot be givenseparately. We learn to recognize the various relationships between parts and wholes byattempting successfully or unsuccessfully to vary these relationships in imagination. Forexample, we may conclude that the colour of a thing is inseparable from its surface (orextension) because we cannot successfully imagine eliminating one without alsoeliminating the other.The fourth investigation discusses the relationship between grammar and logic. Husserlcontends that grammatical laws governing distinctions between complete and incompleteexpressions, and senseless and absurd expressions, are grounded in ontological structures.Laws governing the compounding of meanings are also similarly grounded in the waythings are. All such rules have their origins in the interplay of parts and wholes given inperception. Husserl acknowledges that various languages may organize perceptual partwholecomplexes differently. He suggests, however, that a study of the different ways inwhich various languages accomplish this task will reveal common categorial structuresconcealed by empirical differences ([1.35], 526; [1.100], 206).In the fifth investigation, Husserl objects to the above-mentioned expressions thatBrentano had used to describe the status of intentional objects (‘immanent objectivity’,‘intentional in-existence’). He points out that these phrases suggest that the intentionalobject enters into consciousness as a component of the flux of experience and that itfunctions within the enclosure of the mind as a substitute for the object of reference.Husserl insists, on the contrary, that the intentional object and the object of reference areone and the same: ‘It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object ofa presentation is the same as its actual object…it is absurd to distinguish betweenthem’ ([1.35], 595). He thus affirms unequivocally that our intentional acts target thingsin the world. Husserl also clarifies the relationship between intentional contents andintentional objects. He says that the term ‘intentional content’ may legitimately beinterpreted in the following ways: (1) as the intentional object (either the objecttoutcourt,or the object considered as it is intended); (2) as that feature (the act’s ‘matter’) invirtue of which the act achieves determinate reference; (3) as the ‘intentional essence’ ofthe act, i.e., the ‘matter’ combined with its ‘quality’. The term ‘quality’ refers in thiscontext to the type of intentional act, e.g., question, wish, statement, etc. ([1.35], 578–80,589, 657; [1.54], 26–36). These distinctions are consistent with Husserl’s claim, in thefirst investigation, that propositions are related to the acts in which they are expressed ina manner comparable to the way in which species are related to their instances.Considered as an intentional essence, the intentional content (matter and quality) is anideal proposition that is independent of particular intentional acts. Taken as instantiated,the matter and quality are non-independent ‘moments’ of a particular act ([1.35], 330).Many commentators have rejected this thesis on the grounds that it seems to commitHusserl to the questionable view that ideal propositions may somehow be particularizedas moments of individualintentional acts. John Drummond has called attention to twopassages that suggest that Husserl eventually modified his position. A note in the secondedition (1913) strongly implies that the intentional content should not be regarded as aparticularized feature of the intentional act ([1.35], 576; [1.54], 26–36, 39–42). Moreover,inIdeas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy(1913), Husserl adds that what he had formerly taken to be a property of acts was really aproperty of the ‘meant as such’ ([1.41], 308; [1.54], 41). In other words, Husserl finallyidentifies intentional matter and intentional object (in the sense of the ‘object consideredas it is intended’). This is an important statement, for it effectively eliminates any residueof the medieval notion that we must postulate some son of intermediary content inbetween intentional acts and their objects.Husserl agrees with Brentano that we must distinguish between predication andjudgmental assent. However, he disagrees with Brentano’s view that judgment is theacceptance or rejection of a neutralized presentation. According to Husserl, judgment isan assertive attitude which pervades the achievement of predication. This attitude isdetermined by anticipated or concomitantly experienced intuitions of things and theirfeatures, rather than by some sort of appraisal of the sense of the sentence. Husserl alsoagrees with Frege, as opposed to Brentano, that judgment is always a positive attitude,even when the content to which it assents includes a negation. In the context of discourse,assertoric statements make truth claims by reason of their form, not by reason of theirpredicative content as such, nor by reason of some tacit prefixed existential proposition([1.35], 612–16). He thus firmly rejects the modern view that judgments are appraisals ofnominalized propositional contents. In our straightforward dealings with the world, weare ordinarily preoccupied with things and their properties, rather than with what we aresaying. Our speech is guided not by a scan of meanings but rather by anticipated orachieved intuitions of the essential structures of things. It follows that we need notpostulate mediating structures (ideas or concepts) between words and things, nor do weneed to speculate about a ‘place’ in which they dwell. To know something is simply topossess its form, to intuit it through its essence, i.e., its intelligible structure. Speech actsexpress meanings as ideal objects, but meanings are not grasped as such in the instance ofarticulation.Husserl also develops more in detail the guiding metaphor of his account ofintentionality. He contrasts the ‘emptiness’ of symbolic intentions with the ‘fullness’ ofintuitive presentations. An empty act is directed toward an object in its absence. Afulfilling act registers its presence. Symbolic intentions may be either nominal (simple) orpropositional (complex). A nominal act is single-rayed and directed towards a whole. Apropositional act is multi-rayed, since it articulates discrete parts within a complex object.Intuitive presentations may be either perceptual or categorial.These distinctions prepare the way for a discussion of truth in the sixth investigation.According to Husserl, the experience of truth occurs when we recognize the identity of anobject in the transition from empty intention to fulfilling intuition ([1.35], 621–4, 765–70). This description displaces the problem of truth from its traditional locus in thejudgment, since the identity-synthesis may occur both in nominal and propositionalcontexts. Truth is achieved on the pre-predicative level in the identity-synthesis of anempty nominal intention and its correlative perceptual intuition. If judgments achievetruth in a comparable sense, it is not by reason of their propositional structure but byreason of a parallel intuitive fulfillment of their emptily intended objects ([1.76], 68).The sixth investigation also offers a more extensive critique of the restrictive accountof intuition proposed by British empiricism. Husserl approaches this issue indirectly byfirst criticizing the interpretation that the empiricist tradition had given to the role ofthose components of a proposition that belong to its categorial form, e.g., prepositions,conjunctions, cases and the copula. According to Locke and Hume, these syntacticaloperators refer to intra-mental processes rather than to aspects of the world. Husserldismisses this thesis on the grounds that, when we use such expressions, we are directedtowards things rather than towards inner processes. For example, if we say ‘This paper iswhite’, it is because we find that the property ‘white’ belongs to the paper. Hence wesurely use the term ‘is’ in such a sentence to refer to the objective situation rather than tosome inner psychological happening. Besides syntactical terms, he adds, there are otherformal components of propositions that cannot find their fulfillment in ordinary simpleintuitions. Nouns, verbs and even adjectival expressions introduce senses which cannotbe fulfilled by simple intuitions: ‘The intention of the word “white” only partiallycoincides with the colour-aspect of the appearing object; a surplus of meaning remainsover, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it’ ([1.35], 775).Husserl concludes that we must acknowledge the role of nonsensuous or ‘categorial’intuitions which function in conjunction with simple perceptions and which bring theformal components of predication to intuitive fulfillment. The fulfilling intuition of anyexpression describing a particular thus involves the intuition of formal senses that exceedwhat is intuited in the simple perception of the particular. These expressions refer toparticular things by way of accidental or essential descriptive features whose surplussenses function as conditions for the manifestation of the particulars as such ([1.114], 70–1). Categorial intuition is therefore the first step in the process of discernment ofessences, for to grasp the essence of some thing or situation is first of all to grasp itssortal property, i.e., its specific form. Translated into Aristotelian terms, intuition of thelooks of things (secondary substances) is the condition for the presentation of particulars(primary substances).THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURNDuring the period from 1900 to 1913, Husserl developed more fully his criticism of themodern account of cognition. He spelled out his new position in a series of five lectureswhich introduce the theme of transcendental phenomenology for the first time. Given inGöttingen in 1907 and later published asThe Idea of Phenomenology,these lectures aredevoted to a clarification of the notions of immanence and transcendence. According toHusserl, modern descriptions of the relationship between immanence and transcendencetend to invoke two complementary themes: inside versus outside and accessibility versusinaccessibility. When immanence is described as an enclosure containing mentalprocesses and impressions, transcendence is correspondingly defined as whateverremains outside of that enclosure. When immanence is described as a region ofindubitable givenness, transcendence is defined as a region populated by unknowablethings-in-themselves. Most epistemologies combine these two senses of the relationshipbetween immanence and transcendence. They first conflate mental acts and their contentsby describing both as ‘contained’ within the mind’s psychic processes. They thenconstrue the enigma of cognition as a problem of how to establish a connection betweenintra-mental representations and extra-mental things. The ‘unspoken assumption’ of thesetheories is that our cognitive processes are devoid of intentional import. This, accordingto Husserl, is the ‘fatal mistake’ of modern philosophy. Husserl praises Hume foracknowledging that this way of formulating the problem would in the end lead only toscepticism, but he adds that Hume’s scepticism is itself riddled with contradictions. Onthe one hand, Hume degrades to the status of fictions everything that transcendsimpressions and ideas. On the other hand, he ascribes to the processes of mind the samesort of reality as the transcendent things that we would reach if we could somehow breakout of the circle of immanence. Husserl concludes that whenever philosophers ask aboutthe possibility of cognition in a way that implies that ‘cognition is a thing apart from itsobject’, or that ‘cognition is given but the object of cognition is not given’, they introducean inappropriate notion of transcendence, which in turn entails an inappropriateinterpretation of immanence ([1.34], 27–30).According to Husserl, philosophy needs to adopt a new way of thinking and a newcritique of reason: ‘philosophy lies in a wholly new dimension. It needs an entirely newpoint of departure and an entirely new method distinguishing it in principle from any“natural” science’ ([1.34], 19). He therefore proposes a new and radical method whichrequires the bracketing(epoche)or suspension of natural convictions: ‘At the outset ofthe critique of cognition the entire world of nature, physical and psychological, as well asone’s own human self together with all the sciences which have to do with theseobjective matters,are put into question’([1.34], 22). Husserl immediately distinguisheshis new method from Descartes’ doubt. Descartes’ goal was to establish certitude aboutthe existence of the thinking self and transcendent things. Husserl has no interest in sucha project. His goal is simply to uncover the essence of cognition. He points out thatDescartes failed to grasp the essence of cognition because he defined himself,qua,inquirer, as a ‘thinking thing’ having the same status as the transcendentthingswhoseexistence he had called into doubt ([1.34], 5–7). The purpose of the new method is to freeus from this incoherent interpretation of transcendence, and consequently to enable us toredefine both transcendence and immanence. When we bracket everything within therealm of transcendence (as it is understood by Descartes and Hume), we in fact excludenothing more than the incoherent interpretation of transcendent being as a region situatedbeyond the range of our knowledge. In so far as the mind’s ‘inside’ is interpreted ashaving the same sort of ontological status, it too must be bracketed. This approachpermits us to redefine immanence, in a broader sense, as the zone of all manifestation,wherein both immanent objects (considered now, in a narrower sense, as reflectivelyintuited experiences) and their intentional correlates (transcendent things) appear to us.Immanent and transcendent objects are now distinguished in terms of their differentstyles of appearing, rather than by appeal to the difference between intra-mentalappearance and extra-mental being.In the first volume ofIdeas,Husserl describes this broader field of immanence as arealm of transcendental consciousness. He distinguishes in this work between the ‘naturalattitude’, in which we are preoccupied by things in the world, and the ‘phenomenologicalattitude’, in which we reflect on the intentions at work in the natural attitude and on theobjective correlates of those intentions. We achieve the latter transcendental point ofview by suspending our natural attitude of belief in the reality of things and the world.Husserl emphasizes once again that the purpose of this procedure is not to call naturalconvictions into doubt but rather to achieve a distance that will enable us to reflect uponthem. He adds that the method may also be called ‘reduction’, for it ‘leads back’ fromlived acts and attitudes to reflective consideration of those acts and attitudes. After thereduction, we no longer live in our intentions. We step back from them in order to reflecton them in their full concreteness. For example, we step back from our participation inthe positing of things as real, but continue to maintain that positing as something uponwhich we reflect. We also maintain our contact with things. The same things in the worldare still there for our consideration, but the change in focus initiated by the reduction nowpermits us to appreciate them preciselyasintended objects. We now notice them asperceived, as judged, as posited, as doubted, as imagined. Husserl calls any object soconsidered anoema,and he calls the correlative intention anoesis([1.41], 214; [1.54],46–56, 256–7).Many commentators equate the phenomenological reduction with the reflective turn ofconsciousness away from things and facts towards concepts and propositions. Theycontend that the purpose of the reduction is to orient philosophical analysis towardssemantic issues. Proponents of this view find striking similarities between Husserl’sconcept of thenoemaand Frege’s concept of ‘sense’(Sinn). They hold that both Fregeansenses and Husserlian noemata ordinarily serve as intermediaries between our linguisticexpressions and their referents ([1.61], 680–7). Frege claimed that the sense conveyed byan expression shapes or determines its reference. Certain passages fromIdeasseem toassign an analogous role to the noema. For example, in one passage Husserl speaksenigmatically of a ‘determinable X’ that functions as a centre for the noematic contentswhich present an object in diverse ways ([1.41], 313–14, 320–2). Proponents of theFregean interpretation of the noema suggest that Husserl meant to say that the noematic‘X’ functions like the sense conveyed by a demonstrative pronoun. It identifies the objectof reference not through its properties but as the bearer of properties ([1.95], 195–219).On this interpretation, the role of the phenomenological reduction is to disclose thesemantic entities through which intentional direction to objects is achieved.Robert Sokolowski points out that this interpretation fails to take into account the laterHusserl’s remarks, inFormal and Transcendental Logic(1929), on the differencebetween the kind of reflection that yields access to propositions and the properlyphilosophical reflection made possible by the reduction ([1.31, 110–27; [1.100], 45–7).Husserl makes it clear in this work that there is nothing specifically philosophical aboutpropositional reflection, i.e., the reflective turn away from the ‘ontological’ realms ofthings and facts towards the ‘apophantic’ realm of concepts and propositions. This shiftin focus occurs quite naturally whenever we reflect on what we ourselves or others havesaid, in such a way as to take what has been said as a mere supposition or proposal, i.e.,as a proposition. It also occurs regularly in the context of scientific inquiry. Scientificverification requires a constant oscillation between investigation of facts and reflectionon propositions. Both ordinary and scientific forms of prepositional reflection take placewithin the natural attitude, and therefore do not require the phenomenological reductionas their condition.What then is the difference between prepositional reflection and philosophicalreflection? Prepositional reflection turns our attention from things and facts to conceptsand propositions. Philosophical reflection focuses on the correlation between intentionalacts and attitudes(noeses)and the ways in which things are presented(noemata). Itconsiders things and facts as the correlates of the attitude of straightforward involvementin the world, and it considers propositions as the correlates of the intentional attitude ofprepositional reflection. We may therefore conclude that, for Husserl, the noema issimply the object itself, considered under the reductionaspresented. It follows that the‘determinable X’ is not a semantic entity that functions as a medium of reference. It is theintentional object itself considered as an identity genuinely given in each of itspresentations ([1.54], 181–91).Husserl’s description of the relationship between the ontological and apophanticdomains reinforces his thesis that concepts and propositions do not function as mentalintermediaries. Concepts and propositions emerge only when we shift from anontological to an apophantic focus. Hence, they do not serve as mediating entities thatsomehow link speech acts to their intentional referents. As we have seen, Husserlexplicitly rejected Locke’s view that concepts are mental representations, and implicitlyrejected the medieval view that concepts are transparent media of reference. Moreover,he never claimed, as does Frege, that concepts and propositions belong to a ‘thirdrealm’ (the first realm is the outer world of physical things; the second realm is the innerworld of psychic processes) that functions as a non-subjective medium of reference.Robert Sokolowski suggests that the tendency to regard concepts and propositions asreified intermediaries is probably due to a confusion between object-oriented andreflective stances of consciousness. We enjoy a marginal awareness of what we aresaying in the process of saying it. However, we do not at that moment objectify what weare saying as a proposition, for our consciousness remains directed towards the world.We can, none the less, easily shift back and forth between ontological and prepositionalattitudes. The very mobility of our consciousness inculcates a forgetfulness of the changein attitude requisite for the manifestation of concepts and propositions. Concepts andpropositions then easily come to be thought of as having a status analogous to things andfacts. We thus come to think of them as separate entities situated in some psychic orsemantic realm. For those who are looking for a solution to the modern epistemologicalproblem of establishing a link between our speech acts and their targets, it is thenperfectly natural to assign this mediating role to concepts and propositions. According toHusserl, however, there is no such need for mediation. Our consciousness is intentionalby its very nature ([1.101],110–11; [1.106], 451–63).This does not mean, of course, that there is no mediating role for language. Husserldraws a distinction between genuinely thoughtful speech and routine linguisticperformances. He observes that when we speak, we ordinarily focus upon what we see, oranticipate seeing, and only marginally upon what we are saying. Though marginal, ourconsciousness of the meanings of linguistic expressions testifies to a familiarity with avast network of culturally established distinctions and nuances whose ultimatejustification lies in the intuitive disclosure of the looks of things. Once in command of thestandardized senses of words, we need no longer focus on those senses. When we speakabout things, we let ourselves be guided only by our categorial intuitions. Our choice ofwords is governed directly by the looks of the things we struggle to describe. Sometimeswe simply repeat standard formulae. We then fail to exercise the potential for clarity ordistinctness provided by the linguistic code. Sometimes we are more conscious of makinglinguistic choices. At such moments, we shift our focus away from things towards thesenses of words ([1.31], 56–60). Husserl thus suggests that our ability to shift back andforth easily between these orientations accounts for the interdependence of intuitive andlinguistic discriminations. Finding the appropriate word, therefore, is not just a matter offamiliarity with the rules of a language-game. An exclusively pragmatic account oflinguistic use amounts to a nominalism that rejects any link between predicates and theintuited forms of things. Thoughtful speech is the product of an artful integration ofseeing and saying. Mastery of an extensive linguistic repertoire makes for more nuancedperceptions, which in turn call for more nuanced linguistic options.In the first volume ofIdeas,Husserl takes up again the effort to redefine the notions ofimmanence and transcendence. He attempts to bring the reader gradually to therealization that the new dimension revealed by the reduction is not a region comparableto other regions of being. He first defines a region of being as a specific domain ofobjects (e.g., the regions ‘material thing’ and ‘culture’) whose unity is determined bysome maximally broad genus. He notes that empirical sciences which deal with a givenregion of being ought to be grounded in a corresponding science of essences which hecalls a ‘regional ontology’. The task of a regional ontology is to specify the essences thatstructure all objects in its domain, and to spell out the hierarchically ordered relationshipsbetween them. In addition to the various regional ontologies, Husserl proposes that thereshould be a new science, called ‘formal ontology’, devoted to the study of thefundamental categories that govern the relations and arrangements between objects in anyregion whatsoever. He then criticizes the thesis, common to most epistemologicalaccounts, that consciousness is confined within a psychic region, opposed to the region ofthings. Whenever consciousness is described in this manner, there is a tendency, heargues, to reduce intentionality to representation within the enclosure of the mind.Repeating the themes developed earlier inThe Idea of Phenomenology,he then describesthe transcendence of things as a mode of givenness within immanence, now more broadlyunderstood as the range of intentionality’s transcending power. He again stresses that thereduction does not exclude anything that is genuinely given. Finally, he points out thatthis new dimension of immanence cannot coherently be understood as situated within theco-ordinates of a pre-given world. Even the horizon of the world is given as such withinthe sphere of immanence. Unlike all other regions, therefore, the transcendental domainis absolute and all-inclusive. It has no perimeters, no outside. Husserl thus takes themetaphor of ‘region’ to its limits, in order to demonstrate that it is, in fact, incoherent tothink of immanence as a sector within a broader whole. Any attempt to conceive of adimension of being beyond the zone of possible consciousness is nonsensical.Consciousness and being belong together. Their ranges are co-extensive. There can be nooutside for a being whose mode of being is to be open to all things.EGO AND WORLDOne of the most controversial theses of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is hisclaim that both ego and world may be considered as noemata by the transcendentalinquirer. He frequently distinguishes between the ego considered as part of the world andthe transcendental ego for whom the world itself is anoema. He contends that ourcapacity to function as transcendental subjects permits us to achieve a reflective distancefrom our own natural way of being in the world, and therefore to understand that way ofbeing more fully. Husserl develops these themes inIdeas II, Cartesian Meditations,andin a manuscript published posthumously under the titleThe Crisis of European Sciencesand Transcendental Phenomenology.Ideas IIintroduces the theme of the human ego in an oblique fashion by firstdescribing the role of corporeal orientation and intellectual perspective in the presentationof things. Things appear to us in quite different ways, depending on the condition of oursense organs, on variations in our kinesthetic orientation, and especially on whether wetake a pragmatic or theoretical attitude towards them. Husserl situates his analysis withinthe context of an understanding of nature that has been substantially affected by modernscience. The contemporary sense of nature, he contends, is the intentional correlate of anattitude which he describes as both ‘doxic’ and ‘theoretical’. It is doxic because it ispermeated by an unthematic belief in the existence of its objects; it is theoretical becauseit prescinds from the practical, aesthetic and ethical features of its objects. While ordinaryexperience does not constantly maintain an exclusively theoretical stance, none the lessthe influence of science has generated the everyday conviction that the true sense of thething is what remains when we bracket the useful, the beautiful and the good ([1.5], 1–11;[1.89], 39–40). Further analysis of the presentation of things reveals that the full sense oftheir objectivity is dependent upon a recognition of intersubjectivity. For example, asense of relatively fixed spatial positions is essential to our sense of objectivity. It wouldsurely be difficult to develop this notion from an exclusively private perspective. Wemanage eventually to locate ourselves within a public system of co-ordinates by firstrecognizing that one individual’s ‘here’ may be another’s ‘there’, and then agreeing uponsome convention for relating all positions to a stable network of places. This is a typicalexample of phenomenological analysis. Husserl’s goal is always to unpack the layers ofmeaning sedimented in the senses of various types of objects, and thus to reveal theintentional acts and attitudes tacitly at work in the presentation of these objects.InCartesian Meditations(1931), Husserl continues his analysis of intersubjectivity byintroducing a modification of the bracketing technique that he calls ‘reduction to thesphere of ownness’. He proposes to abstract from everything in our experience thattestifies to the presence of others. The purpose of this strategy is not to describe theproduction of meaning by a subjectivity actually cut off from others and the world, or toassure us that we are really in contact with other people. Despite its title,CartesianMeditationsis not motivated by any such epistemological concern. On the contrary,Husserl’s purpose is simply to uncover the contribution of the sense that there are otherselves to the individual’s sense of self and of world. Phenomenological analysis is areconstruction, not a creation of meaning.In hisLectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness(1928), Husserlclaims that a second-order reflection reveals a level of time-consciousness that accountsfor the identity of the transcendental ego. He first distinguishes between transcendenttemporal objects, such as musical performances or public lectures, and immanenttemporal objects, such as our perceptions of these events. He then points out that theperception of a temporal object may itself be taken as temporal object. Whenever weperceive the elapsing of a speaker’s words into the past, we also experience the fading ofour perceptions of those words into the past. We thus learn to situate transcendenthappenings within the context of objective time, and also to locate our perceptions ofthose events within the horizon of immanent time. Finally, he claims that reflection onthe correlation between the flux of immanent temporal objects and our experience of thatflux reveals that we are conscious of a deeper level of time which accounts for our senseof the temporal flow of our intentional acts. We experience this primal flux as the basicform within which all experience occurs. This form is composed not of the basictemporal phases (past, present and future), but of the conditions for their possibility, i.e.,a primal impression, ‘retention’ of the just-past, and ‘protention’ of the just-about-to-be.Awareness of the concatenation of these components makes it possible for us toexperience our own intentional life as temporal, and to grasp intentional objects as thesame again throughout their successive presentations ([1.14], 378–82; [1.46], 298–326;[1.100], 138–68).ESSENCESHusserl claims that we are sometimes able to discern the essential structures of things. InExperience and Judgment,he distinguishes between the grasp of empirical universals andthe fully-fledged intuition of essences. A preliminary awareness of empirical universalsoccurs when we make the transition from merely associative judgments, which expressperceived likenesses among things, to those judgments which explicitly identifyparticulars as instances of some category. Once we have discerned what is the sameamong many individuals, we may then thematize the universal itself and begin to makescientific judgments about it. The goal of science is to specify ever more completely thecharacteristics of such empirical universals. According to Husserl, however, sciencenever fully realizes this ideal, for it is impossible to achieve a truly exhaustive anddefinitive determination of all of the features of any empirical universal. Thedetermination of every empirical concept is ‘always in progress, always being furtherfashioned, and also refashioned’ ([1.35], 116; [1.36], nos 80–98; [1.100], 58–62).We make the transition from the grasp of an empirical universal to the intuition of anessence when we move from the perceptual to the imaginary mode of consciousness bysubmitting the universal to a process of ‘free variation’ designed to reveal an invariantstructure. Husserl describes this technique as follows. We attempt to imaginesuccessively the subtraction of one after another of the various features of the objectunder consideration. In this way we eventually isolate those invariant features withoutwhich the object in question wouldcease to be what it is. We need not consider everyconceivable variation. Indeed, in most cases it would be impossible to carry out anexhaustive survey of every possibility. What matters is that the manner of variationshould be such that not only do we have the sense that the process could go onindefinitely, but also that it would in fact be fruitless to continue. As Husserl puts it, theprocess of variation should have a character of ‘exemplary arbitrariness’ ([1.36], no.87b). Eidetic intuition is therefore a product of method. As Husserl puts it: ‘The inwardevidence on which all knowledge ultimately reposes is no gift of nature, appearingtogether with the idea of states of affairs without any methodically artful set-up’ ([1.35],63; [1.110].Husserl does not, like some contemporary philosophers, extend the method of freevariation to the consideration of improbable scenarios imagined as taking place withinpossible worlds. His imaginative variations, like Aristotle’s, are generally guided andlimited by our ordinary intuitions of things in this world. Moreover, he never attempts toprovide anything like a clear-cut rule for deciding when the process of ‘free variation’ought to come to an end. He tells us only that there comes a point in any enquiry when itis reasonable to conclude that there are no further pertinent questions to be asked. It isthen imprudent or even pathological to consider additional alternative possibilities. Inshort, discernment of essences requires both method and judgment. A sense of the meanbetween extremes is as necessary in intellectual enquiry as it is in practical affairs.Husserl claims, moreover, that the kind of certainty that we should assign to the resultsof this procedure varies in proportion to the type of access that we have to the objectsunder investigation. Our apperceptive access to the basic structures of consciousnessyields a different son of evidence than is available in our perceptions of things in theworld. Ordinary perceptions are perspectival and therefore necessarily incomplete.However, the philosophic recognition that all such perceptions are perspectival is notitself perspectival or incomplete in the same fashion. Ordinary perceptions areperspectives in the sense that they present only one side of their objects at a time.Philosophic descriptions of the structure of perception are ‘perspectives’ in the sense thatthey are influenced by historically conditioned questions and methods. Husserl suggeststhat it is just as inappropriate to blur these differences by asserting that all forms ofcognition are similarly perspectival, as it is to look for mathematical certitudes in theethical and political domains.Husserl at first held that the relative immediacy of access to the structures of cognitionprovided by our tacit awareness of intentional performances makes for apodicticcertainty. He eventually acknowledged, however, that even the privileged access ofconsciousness to its own structures does not guarantee the perfect accuracy of reflectivedescriptions of those structures. Given the oblique and unthematic character of our tacitawareness of intentional acts and attitudes, and given the distorting influence of prevalentphilosophic categories, our reflective descriptions are often vague and confused. Indeed,the history of philosophy testifies convincingly to the fact that no philosophic reflectioncan dissipate all vagueness. In any case, Husserl adds, philosophic differences are neversettled by sweeping refutations, but rather by the elaboration of strategic distinctions thatreveal the partial, vague or confused character of opposing positions. This is whyphilosophy must be a co-operative effort of a community of investigators.LIFE-WORLD AND HISTORYHusserl’s later works are largely devoted to the themes of life-world and history. Hehoped that his phenomenological analyses of these topics would serve as correctives tothe naturalism and historicism which he recognized as two of the most powerful themesof modernity. Naturalism is a philosophic position consequent upon the mathematizationof nature achieved by the new scientific method at the beginning of the modern era. Itsthesis is that the entire realm of nature, including human nature, is comprised only ofentities and processes susceptible of such quantitative analysis. Historicism may bedefined as the tendency to regard the conceptual systems of both the natural and thehuman sciences as world views whose presuppositions are determined by contingenthistorical transformations.Husserl traces the drift of modern science towards reductionism to Galileo’s failure torelate scientific truths adequately to their sources in the life-world, the pre-scientificworld in which we live. He calls attention, in particular, to the ambiguous implications ofGalileo’s bold decision to overcome the obstacle which perceived qualities presented tocalculative rationality by treating them as subjective indices of objective quantities. Thisdecision had the effect of concealing the priority of perceived over mathematical objects.Husserl contends that two factors contributed to this concealment ([1.33], 21–60; [1.89],162–7).In the first place, he observes, we must not forget that Galileo was heir to a relativelyadvanced tradition of ‘pure geometry’, which by reason of its very advances had alreadylost contact with the fundamental insights on which it was first constructed. Geometrymost likely had its origins in the invention of practical techniques of surveying andmeasuring. Its ideal figures were thus first derived by abstraction and progressiveidealization from the perceived forms of things. Once having acquired the notion of afield of pure ‘limit-shapes’, mathematical praxis was able to achieve an exactness and afreedom that is denied to us in empirical praxis. This ideal geometry was subsequentlytranslated into applied geometry in the field of astronomy, where it became possible tocalculate ‘with compelling necessity’ the relative positions and even the existence ofevents that were never accessible to direct empirical measurement. This achievementconstituted a partial fulfillment of the dream of the ancient Pythagoreans who hadobserved the functional dependency of the pitch of a tone on the length of a vibratingstring which produced it, and had therefore evoked the possibility of a generalized theoryof correlations between perceived properties and measurable changes in geometricalproperties. All of this, Husserl speculates, inclined Galileo to bracket the problem of theoriginal derivation of geometry from the perceived qualities of things, and to interpretsuch qualities as merely subjective indicators of the true quantitative being of the world([1.33], 29).In the second place, Husserl continues, we must take into account the ‘portentous’influence on Galileo’s thinking of the new algebraic formalization of geometry. Thedevelopment of algebra in effect liberated geometry from all intuited actuality and evenfrom the concept of number. Although it was only with Descartes’ invention of analyticgeometry that the full implications of this move would be realized, Galileo had alreadyclearly understood that Euclid’s geometry could now be interpreted as a general logic ofdiscovery rather than as a theory limited to the realm of pure shapes ([1.33], 44–6).Husserl’s argument may be confirmed by considering the role of Galileo’s diagrams forhis theorems about uniformly accelerated bodies. It is clear that the lines and angles ofthese diagrams no longer refer literally to spatial shapes created by geometric relationsbetween linear magnitudes but rather to a sequence of ratios between time and velocity.Galileo therefore implicitly considered such ‘geometric’ diagrams as expressive ofrelationships among any magnitudes whatever. Although this realization contributedsignificantly to the advance of modern physics, it also initiated a process of furtheralienation of scientific method from its roots in the perceived world. Unlike traditionalgeometry, which requires insight into the reasons for every step in its demonstrations,algebra lends itself to the development of techniques of calculation which no longerdemand such comprehension but require instead only the blind implementation ofprocedural rules.Galileo himself continued to employ the more traditional geometrical style ofdemonstration, and hence demanded of his readers conscious insight into the point ofeach transition. Nevertheless, his method took modernity further along the road towardsthe reductionist interpretation of reason as an adaptive power whose operations aremechanistic processes devoid of intuitive insight. Husserl cites as an example of thisaccount of reason the tendency of some twentieth-century logicians to conflatecomputing procedures with authentic deductions, and even to interpret the rulesgoverning such procedures as a genuine logic ([1.37], 117). He concludes that the greatdiscovery of modernity, i.e., the emancipation of mathematics from the constraintsimposed by the intuition of Euclidean shapes, was both an advance and a setback. On theone hand, freedom from servitude to intuited forms would give to the geometer a greaterpotential for mastery over nature. On the other hand, it also further promoted the modernforgetfulness of the priority of insight into perceived structures over technical virtuosity.This forgetfulness would eventually lead to a bracketing of those acts and attitudes of thehuman spirit that render scientific and other modes of cognition possible. Naturalismforgets the role of the inquiring subject whose intentional acts remain inaccessible toempirical observation.Husserl calls attention to the irony implicit in this history of modernity. He observesthat it is unlikely that Galileo was ever aware of the hidden ‘motivation’ of his project.The seeds of reductionism and even of scepticism were, of course, already present inHobbes’s rationalistic exaltation of the power of reckoning. Hobbes had dismissed thewhole sphere of pre-scientific experience and discourse. Whatever cannot be quantifiedhe assigned to the realm of illusion. Moreover, Hobbes clearly regarded reason’s calculusas an outgrowth of our biological drives and needs. For a long time, however, the successof the new sciences obscured the implications of this naturalism. Hobbes thought thatcalculative procedures could succeed where the ancient and medieval quest for essenceshad failed. Reckoning would reveal the hidden structures of reality. It required a geniussuch as Hume, says Husserl, to take the naturalism initiated by Hobbes to its logicalconclusions. Hume realized that if cognitive intuition cannot break out of the circle ofimpressions and ideas, there is no justification for supposing that reckoning can yield anyless fanciful results. The fundamental categories requisite for a mathematicized version ofnature must somehow be derivable from information provided by the manifold ofimpressions. According to Hobbes, however, sensory impressions yield only illusions. Itfollows that scientific theories too are productions of fancy. This realization is the key toHume’s scepticism: ‘Hume goes on to the end. All categories of objectivity—thescientific ones through which an objective extra-psychic world is thought in scientificlife, and the pre-scientific ones through which it is thought in everyday life—arefictions’ ([1.33], no. 23). Scientific descriptions are useful fictions, but they neverthelessremain fictions. The high hopes of modernity thus culminated finally in a thoroughgoingpragmatism. It seems clear in retrospect that the hidden intent of Galileo’sfatefuldecision, and indeed of the entire project of modernity, was to give up on truth andsettle for power.Husserl therefore thought that the most urgent task of philosophy was to restoreconfidence in the rationality of our ordinary intuitions about the life-world. We mustdemonstrate how scientific accounts of nature are always dependent upon the evidencesof ordinary experience, and show how the success of Galileo’s method in some areasdoes not justify an unlimited application in all fields of enquiry. Phenomenologicalanalysis reveals, for example, that human acts have a conscious dimension that cannot bereduced to quantifiable processes, or explained as a product of causal sequences. This isespecially true of the procedures of scientific discovery which require a disciplineddetachment from biological needs and environmental stimuli. In short, the actsprerequisite for the emergence of things as empirical objects cannot coherently be takenas exclusively empirical processes.Husserl also makes some interesting remarks on the implications of his own method ofhistorical interpretation, as exemplified in the above analysis of the unintended projectconcealed by Galileo’s manifest intentions and accomplishments. He observes thatwhenever we engage in an historical analysis of this type we always find ourselves in asort of circle. We can only understand the past in the light of the present, and yet thepresent has meaning only in the light of the past. ‘Relative clarification’ in one directionbrings about ‘some elucidation’ in the other, and vice versa. There is no tone ofpessimism in Husserl’s description of this methodological predicament ([1.33], 58). Hesuggests that his ‘zigzag’ method of historical interpretation makes it possible to achieveever more comprehensive historical understanding, but he never claims that it will yielddefinitive truths. He does not lament this situation. He simply calls attention to the kindof truth that is available to historical interpretation.These remarks suggest that, in his later works at least, Husserl was sensitive to thehermeneutic circle implicit in all human enquiry. His comments on the historicity of thelife-world confirm this impression. Although he sometimes describes the life-world as ahorizon of experience common to human beings in every historical epoch, at other timeshe speaks of multiple life-worlds and hints that every life-world is conditioned by layeredsedimentations of meaning produced by forgotten cultural achievements. He even goes sofar as to say that we must look for truth ‘not as falsely absolutized, but rather, in eachcase, as within its horizons’ ([1.20], 279). This passage suggests that all evidence issubject to correction by further evidence. Husserl adds, moreover, that it is in accordancewith the nature of a horizon that ‘it leaves open the possibility that conflictingexperiences may supervene and lead to corrections in the form of a determining asotherwise or else in the form of a complete striking out (as illusion)’ ([1.20], 281;[1.110], 50).Husserl’s reflections on these issues did not cause him to repudiate the original projectof phenomenology. Indeed, in the same passages which call attention to the role ofintentional horizons he constantly reaffirms the phenomenological goal of uncoveringand ‘explicating’ the sedimented senses of these horizons. Husserl therefore apparentlysaw no conflict between this goal and his properly hermeneutic discovery that all inquirytakes place within an historical context. Jacques Derrida contends that this attitudeindicates that the entire enterprise of phenomenology was founded on an uncontrolledpresupposition. Husserl tacitly took for granted the trans-historical validity of the ideal ofuniversal truth, even though his own historical interpretation established that commitmentto this ideal is an historically conditioned attitude. His description of this ideal as aregulative idea effectively exempted him from the task of justifying it ([1.51], 154). Itseems more likely, however, that Husserl always understood that the ideal of universaltruth functions more as a moral imperative than as a demonstrable or self-evidentprinciple. He was convinced that our experience of the world yields enough intelligibilityand direction to encourage the expectation that further investigation will yield furtherprogress in truth. However, his choice of the Kantian notion of a regulative idea todescribe the telos of philosophy suggests that he regarded the expectation of progress intruth as a postulate of rationality rather than as a metaphysical principle.SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary textsWhere pertinent, references are to the more recent critical editions (the ‘Husserliana’series published by the Husserl Archives at Louvain) rather than to the original Germaneditions.1.1 ‘Besprechung: E.Schröder,Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, I’,Göttingischegelehrte Anzeigen(1891):243–78.1.2 ‘Die Folgerungskalkül und die Inhaltslogik’,Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftlichePhilosophie,15 (1891):168–89, 351–6.1.3 ‘Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik’,Philosophische Monatshefte,30(1894):159–91.1.4Die Idee der Phänomenologie,ed. W.Biemel (Husserliana II), The Hague: Nijhoff,1950.1.5Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,BuchII, ed. M.Biemel (Husserliana IV), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952.1.6Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,BuchIII, ed. M.Biemel (Husserliana V), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952.1.7Erfahrung und Urteil,ed. L.Landgrebe, Hamburg: Claassen, 1954.1.8Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentalePhänomenologie,ed. W.Biemel (Husserliana VI), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954.1.9Erste Philosophie, Band I, Kritische Ideengeschichte,ed. R.Boehm (Husserliana VII),The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956.1.10Cartesianische Meditationen,ed. S.Strasser (Husserliana I), The Hague: Nijhoff,1959.1.11Erste Philosophie,Band II, ed. R.Boehm (Husserliana VIII), The Hague: Nijhoff,1959.1.12Phänomenologische Psychologie,ed. W.Biemel (Husserliana IX), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1962.1.13Cartesianische Meditationen,2nd edn. S.Strasser (Husserliana I), The Hague,Nijhoff, 1963.1.14Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs und Forschungsmanuskripten(1918–1926),ed. M.Fleischer (Husserliana XI), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966.1.15Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925,ed. W.Biemel (Husserliana IX), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968.1.16Philosophie der Arithmetik,2nd edn, ed. L.Eley (Husserliana XII), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1970.1.17Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik,ed. L. Landgrebe,Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1972.1.18Die Idee der Phänomenologie: Fünf Vorlesungen,ed. U.Melle (Husserliana II), TheHague: Nijhoff, 1973.1.19Ding und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907,ed. U.Claesges (Husserliana XVI), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1973.1.20Formale und transzendentale Logik,ed. P.Janssen (Husserliana XVII), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1974.1.21Logische Untersuchungen,Band I, ed. E.Hollenstein (Husserliana XVIII), TheHague: Nijhoff, 1975.1.22Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,BuchI, ed. K.Schumann (Husserliana III/1 and III/2), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976.1.23Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910),ed. B.Rang (Husserliana XXII), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1979.1.24Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie: Texte aus dem Nachlass(1886–1901), ed.I.Strohmeyer (Husserliana XXI), The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.1.25Einleitung in der Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906–7,ed. U. Melle(Husserliana XIV), Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1984.1.26Logische Untersuchungen,Band II, ed. U.Panzer (Husserliana XIX/1), The Hague :Nijhoff, 1984.1.27Logische Untersuchungen,Band III, ed. U.Panzer (Husserliana XIX/2), The Hague:Nijhoff, 1984.1.28 ‘Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, inAufsätze und Vorträge (1911–21)’, ed.T.Nenon and H.R.Sepp (Husserliana XXV), Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987.Translations1.29On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time(1893–1917), trans.J.B.Brough, Holland: Dordrecht Kluwer, 1990.1.30 ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’, trans. Q.Lauer, inPhenomenology and theCrisis of Philosophy,New York: Harper & Row, 1965, pp. 71–147.1.31Formal and Transcendental Logic,trans. D.Cairns, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969.1.32Cartesian Meditations,trans. D.Cairns, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970.1.33The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,trans. D.Carr,Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.1.34The Idea of Phenomenology,trans. W.Alston and G.Nakhnikian, The Hague:Nijhoff, 1970.1.35Logical Investigations,2 volumes, rev. edn, trans. J.N.Findlay, London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1970.1.36Experience and Judgment,trans. J.Churchill and K.Americks, Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1970.1.37 ‘A Review of Volume I of Ernst Schröder’sVorlesungen über die Algebra derLogik’, trans. D.Willard,The Personalist,59 (1978):115–43.1.38 ‘The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents’, trans. D.Willard,ThePersonalist,60 (1979):7–25.1.39Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,Book III, trans. T.Klein and W.Pohl, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980.1.40 ‘Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic’, in P.McCormick and F.Elliston (eds),Husserl: Shorter Works,South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1981, pp. 126–42.1.41Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,Book I, trans. F.Kersten, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.Other works and criticism1.42 Aristotle,Aristotelis Opera,ed. I.Bekker, Berlin: Reimer, 1860–70.1.43 Bell, D.Husserl,London and New York: Routledge, 1990.1.44 Boehm, R. ‘Immanenz und Transzendenz’, inVom Gesichtspunkt derPhänomenologie: Husserl-Studien,The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968.1.45 Brentano, F.Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,trans. A.C.Rancurello,D.B.Terrell and L.L.McAlister, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.1.46 Brough, J. ‘The Emergence of an Absolute Consciousness in Husserl’s EarlyWritings on Time-Consciousness’,Man and World,5 (1972):298–326.1.47 Carr, D.Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies,The Hague:Nijhoff, 1987.1.48 Cobb-Stevens, R. ‘Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition’,Etudesphénoménologiques,7 (1988):3–32.1.49 Cobb-Stevens, R.Husserl and Analytic Philosophy,Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.1.50 de Boer, T.The Development of Husserl’s Thought,trans. T.Plantinga, The Hague:Nijhoff, 1978.1.51 Derrida, J.Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs,trans. D.Allison, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.1.52 Derrida, J.Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction,trans. J.Leavey,Stony Brook: Nicholas Hays, 1978.1.53 Dreyfus, H. ‘Husserl’s Perceptual Noema’, in H.Dreyfus and H.Hall (eds),Husserl:Intentionality and Cognitive Science,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.1.54 Drummond, J.Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noemaand Object,Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990.1.55 Dummett, M.A.E.Frege: Philosophy of Language,London: Duckworth, 1973.1.56 Dummett, M.A.E.The Interpretation ofFrege’s Philosophy,London: Duckworth,1981.1.57 Elliston, F., and McCormick, P. (eds)Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,SouthBend: Notre Dame University Press, 1977.1.58 Fink, E. ‘Operative Begriffe in Husserl’s Phänomenologie’,Zeitschrift fürphilosophische Forschung,2 (1957):321–37.1.59 Fink, E. ‘The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and ContemporaryCriticism’, in R.O.Elverton (ed.)The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: SelectedCritical Readings,Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, pp. 73–147.1.60 Føllesdal, D.Husserl and Frege,Oslo: Aschehoug Press, 1958.1.61 Føllesdal, D. ‘Husserl’s Notion of the Noema’,The journal of Philosophy,66(1969):680–7.1.62 Føllesdal, D. ‘Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects of Perception’,GrazerPhilosophische Studien,5 (1978):83–94.1.63 Frege, G. ‘Rezension von E.Husserl,Philosophie der Arithmetik’,Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie und philosophische Kritik,103 (1894):313–32.1.64 Frege, G.The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into theConcept of Number,trans. J.L.Austin, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959.1.65 Frege, G. ‘Review of Dr. E.Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic’, trans. E.W.Kluge,in J.N.Mohanty (ed.)Readings on Husserl’s Logical Investigations,The Hague:Nijhoff, 1977.1.66 Frege, G.Posthumous Writings,trans. P.Lang and R.White, Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1979.1.67 Frege, G.Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy,ed. B.McGuinness, trans. M.Blacket al.,Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.1.68 Gadamer, H.G. ‘The Science of the Life-World’, inPhilosophical Hermeneutics,trans. D.Linge, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.1.69 Hall, H. ‘Was Husserl a Realist or an Idealist?’, in H.L.Dreyfus (ed.)Husserl,Intentionality and Cognitive Science,Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.1.70 Heelan, P. ‘Natural Science and Being-in-the-World’,Man and World,16(1983):207–19.1.71 Heelan, P.Space-Perception and the Philosophy of Science,Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1983.1.72 Herbart, J.F.Sammtliche Werke,Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1850.1.73 Hintikka, J.The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities,Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975.1.74 Holmes, R. ‘An Explication of Husserl’s Theory of the Noema’,Research inPhenomenology,5 (1975):143–53.1.75 Langsdorf, L. ‘The Noema as Intentional Entity: A Critique of Føllesdal’,Review ofMetaphysics,37 (1984):757–84.1.76 Levinas, E.The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology,trans. A. Orianne,Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.1.77 Lotze, H.Logic,trans. B.Bosanquet, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.1.78 Lotze, H.Metaphysik,Leipzig: Hirzel, 1897.1.79 McKenna, W. ‘The “Inadequacy” of Perceptual Experience’,Journal of the BritishSociety for Phenomenology,12 (1981):125–39.1.80 Mill, J.S.A System of Logic,London: Longmans, Green, 1843.1.81 Miller, J.P.Numbers in Presence and Absence: A Study of Husserl’s Philosophy ofMathematics,The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982.1.82 Mohanty, J.N. ‘On Husserl’s Theory of Meaning’,The Southwestern Journal ofPhilosophy,5 (1974):240.1.83 Mohanty, J.N. ‘Husserl’s Theory of Meaning’, in F.Elliston and P.McCormick (eds)Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals,South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1977,pp. 18–37.1.84 Mohanty, J.N.Readings on E.Husserl’s Logical Investigations,The Hague: Nijhoff,1977.1.85 Mohanty, J.N. ‘Intentionality and the Noema’,The Journal of Philosophy,78(1981):706–17.1.86 Mohanty, J.N.Frege and Husserl,Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.1.87 Mohanty, J.N.Transcendental Phenomenology,Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.1.88 Natanson, M.Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks,Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1966.1.89 Ricoeur, P.Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology,trans. G.Ballard andL.Embree: Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967.1.90 Rosen, S. ‘Thought and Touch: A Note on Aristotle’sDe Anima’,Phronesis,6(1961):127–37.1.91 Rosen, S.The Limits of Analysis,New York: Basic Books, 1984.1.92 Schröder, E.Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik,Leipzig: Teubner, 1890.1.93 Schutz, A. ‘Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy’,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research,20 (1959):154.1.94 Smith, D.W. and McIntyre, R. ‘Intentionality via Intensions’,Journal of Philosophy,68 (1971):541–61.1.95 Smith, D.W. and McIntyre, R.Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaningand Language,The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.1.96 Smith, Q. ‘On Husserl’s Theory of Consciousness in the Fifth LogicalInvestigation’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,37 (1977):356–67.1.97 Sokolowski, R. ‘The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl’sInvestigations’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,38 (1968):537–53.1.98 Sokolowski, R.The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution,The Hague:Nijhoff, 1970.1.99 Sokolowski, R. ‘The Structure and Content of Husserl’sLogical Investigations’,Inquiry,14 (1971):318–47.1.100 Sokolowski, R.Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things,Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1974.1.101 Sokolowski, R.Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Languageand Being,Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.1.102 Sokolowski, R. ‘Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition’,Phenomenology andthe Human Sciences(formerlyPhilosophical Topics), 12 (1981): 127–41.1.103 Sokolowski, R. ‘Intentional Analysis and the Noema’,Dialectica,38 (1984): 113–29.1.104 Sokolowski, R. ‘Quotation’,Review of Metaphysics,37 (1984):699–723.1.105 Sokolowski, R. ‘Exorcising Concepts’,Review of Metaphysics,60 (1987): 451–63.1.106 Sokolowski, R. ‘Husserl and Frege’,The Journal of Philosophy,84 (1987): 521–8.1.107 Sokolowski, R. ‘Natural and Artificial Intelligence’,Daedalus,142 (1988): 45–64.1.108 Sokolowski, R. ‘Referring’,Review of Metaphysics,42 (1988):27–49.1.109 Spiegelberg, H.The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction,2vols, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971.1.110 Ströker, E. ‘Husserl’s Principle of Evidence’, inThe Husserlian Foundations ofScience,Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1987.1.111 Ströker, E.Husserls transzendentale Phänomenologie,Frankfurt am Main: VittorioKlostermann, 1987.1.112 Stumpf, K.Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung,Leipzig:Hirzel, 1873.1.113 Taminiaux, J.Le Regard et l’excédent,The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977.1.114 Taminiaux, J. ‘Heidegger and Husserl’sLogical Investigations:In Remembranceof Heidegger’s Last Seminar (Zähringen, 1973)’, inDialectic and Difference: Finitudein Modern Thought,trans. 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Decker, Atlantic Highlands: HumanitiesPress, 1985, pp. 91–114.1.115 Taminiaux, J. ‘Immanence, Transcendence, and Being in Husserl’sIdea ofPhenomenology,in J.Sallis, G.Moneta and J.Taminiaux (eds),The CollegiumPhaenomenologicum: the First Ten Years,Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 47–75.1.116 Taminiaux, J.Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology,trans M.Gendre, Albany: SUNY Press, 1991.1.117 Tragesser, R.Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984.1.118 Welton, D.The Origins of Meaning: A Criticial Study of the Thresholds ofHusserlian Phenomenology,The Hague: Nijhoff, 1983.1.119 Willard, D. ‘The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl’s Way Out’,AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly,(1972):94–100.1.120 Willard, D. ‘Concerning Husserl’s View of Number’,The Southwestern Journal ofPhilosophy,5 (1974):97–109.1.121 Willard, D. ‘Husserl’s Critique of Extensionalist Logic: A Logic that Does notUnderstand Itself,Idealistic Studies,9 (1979):143–64.1.122 Willard, D.Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge,Athens: Ohio UniversityPress, 1984.