The Peripatetic school1Robert W.SharplesTHE HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL AND OF ARISTOTLE’S WRITINGSThe history of Peripatetic philosophy after Aristotle falls into two phases,divided by the renewal of interest in the works we now possess after theirpublication by Andronicus in the first century BC.Initially, Aristotle’s own associates in the Lyceum and their successorscarried on the work of the school. When Aristotle left Athens for Euboeaat the news of the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, the headship ofthe school passed to Theophrastus of Eresus, who had collaborated withAristotle at least since the latter’s stay in Assos in Asia Minor in 347–345BC. When Theophrastus died in 288/7 or 287/6 BC, he was succeeded byStrato of Lampsacus, who remained head of the school until his own deatheighteen years later. The school was initially a centre of Macedonianinfluence in Athens, as it had been in Aristotle’s own lifetime; Demetrius ofPhalerum, a member of the school, was regent in Athens for Cassanderfrom 318 to 307, and it was probably he who gave Theophrastus, though aresident alien, the right of owning property. The philosophical schoolswere expelled from Athens for a year after Demetrius’ fall, and this maywell have been motivated by hostility to the Peripatetics in particular.The early activity of the school was characterised, as it had already beenin Aristotle’s lifetime, by the collection and interpretation of information inevery field, and by the raising and the attempted resolution of theoreticaldifficulties. Examples of two very different themes in the collection ofinformation are provided by the best known of the surviving works ofTheophrastus. TheCharactersis a series of sketches of more or lessimperfect personality types; it has been variously interpreted as material fora study of comedy, for the presentation of character in rhetoric, or for thestudy of character which the ancients called ‘ethics’ but we might ratherclassify as psychology.Theophrastus’ botanical writings, theResearches onPlants (Historia plantarum)andExplanations of Plants (De causisplantarum)are the earliest systematic botanical texts to survive. Thecontrast between theResearchesandExplanations,between the collectionof data and the more theoretical work, reflects Aristotle’s own practice in hiszoological writings; but we should beware of assuming that the collectionof material, and particularly its arrangement, is not already guided bytheoretical considerations. The botanical subject-matter indeed requiresconscious consideration, or tacit re-adjustment, of the Aristoteliantheoretical framework; what is unnatural may become natural with time(Explanations of Plants4.11.7), and the way in which art helps nature inthe cultivation of plants, both art and nature setting out to achieve what isbest, prompts consideration of whether the true end of a tree’s growth is toproduce fertile seed or edible fruit—edible by humans, that is (cf. especiallyExplanations of Plants1.16). Theophrastus is prepared, in discussing wildand cultivated species, to speak about natural kinds in a flexible way,describing reversion from cultivated to wild varieties as changes of kind(genos).<sup>2</sup> But—whatever view one takes of Aristotle’s own position on thefixedness of natural kinds in zoology3—Theophrastus does not explicitlypresent his approach to natural history as different from that of Aristotle.The Lyceum was also active in collecting the views of earlier scholars:Eudemus compiled a history of mathematics, Menon of medicine, andTheophrastus the opinions of earlier philosophers about the natural worldand about sense-perception. Among other historical activities were thework of Theophrastus’ contemporaries Aristoxenus (on music) andDicaearchus (on cultural history and biographies of philosophers andpoets). Theophrastus’ fellow-townsman Phainias wrote on botany(fragments 36–49 Wehrli) and on political history. Theophrastus’ concernwith earlier writers was not, however, purely historical; like Aristotlehimself, he discussed their views as a basis for establishing his own4—though he does seem to have gone into more detail than Aristotle, andsome interest in historical detail for its own sake cannot be excluded.There are similarities between the activity of the Lyceum in this periodand those of the scholars and scientists of Ptolemaic Alexandria. The twotraditions indeed overlapped; Hermippus, described as a ‘Peripatetic’biographer (of a somewhat sensationalist kind) was a follower of theAlexandrian scholar Callimachus, and other historians too are described asPeripatetics. The contributions of the two centres differed in different fields.In zoology the Peripatetics wrote as natural scientists, the Alexandrianscholars as literary scholars and encyclopaedists, at one remove from theirscientific subject-matter and concerned especially with the explaining ofclassical literary texts. In human anatomy and physiology, on the otherhand, the Alexandrians, aided by their practice of dissection, were in theforefront.<sup>5</sup>It has often been held that Theophrastus, and to an even greater extentStrato, changed the emphasis of Peripatetic philosophy, with a progressivemovement towards on empiricism and materialism. There issometruth inthis picture; the pseudo-AristotelianProblems,and other works wronglyattributed to Aristotle such as theMechanicsandOn Things Heard (Deaudibilibus)which show this tendency, derive from this period of the school,and a notable example of empirical observation is Strato’s proof thatfalling bodies accelerate, from the fact that water which falls as acontinuous stream breaks into separate droplets further down (fragment 73in [5.57]). But the contrast with Aristotle himself can be overstated. Forour knowledge of much of Theophrastus’ activity and all of Strato’s we aredependent on fragmentary reports by later writers. Writers like Plutarch, aPlatonist, and Cicero, emphasising the differences between philosophers ofthe same school in the interests of neo-Academic sceptical debate, may notbe the best guides to whether or not Strato is a good Aristotelian.<sup>6</sup> Plutarchindeed explicitly presents Strato as denying the involvement of purpose inthe natural world, but this may be tendentious; for Aristotle also, inPhysics2, nature is not aconsciousforce.To show that there is a basis insomepassages of Aristotle for a positionadopted by Theophrastus or Strato does not indeed establish that it is notin some sense un-Aristotelian; divergence can take the form of selectiveemphasis and omission as well as of straight contradiction. But suchdivergence may be unconscious and unintentional; and since selectiveemphasis of particular aspects of Aristotle’s thought is not confined toTheophrastus and Strato, or even to Plutarch and Cicero, but is foundamong modern interpreters as well, we need to be aware of the standpointfrom which a judgement of what is or is not Aristotelian is being made.Those who regard metaphysics as the central philosophical issue andtheology, in the sense of the study of incorporeal principles, as central tometaphysics may well regard not only Theophrastus and Strato but laterancient Peripatetics too as neglecting or rejecting whattheyregard asAristotle’s chief contributions. In a recent masterly short account ofAristotle, Jonathan Barnes devoted just two pages ([5.164] 63–5) out ofeighty-eight to Aristotle’s theology and the theory of the Unmoved Mover.This might have surprised St Thomas Aquinas and some other leadinginterpreters of Aristotle, ancient, medieval and modern; but Theophrastusand Strato might have found Barnes’ Aristotle more familiar thanAquinas’.One of the Theophrastean works to survive is his so-calledMetaphysics(the original title is unknown). This has often been described as ‘afragment’; it seems in fact to be complete, but it raises questions ratherthan answering them. In questioning two central Aristotelian doctrines, theexplanation of natural phenomena in terms of purpose and the theory ofthe Unmoved Mover, it can readily be seen as indicating Theophrastus’rejection of central Aristotelian doctrines—especially when Theophrastuscan be seen as paving the way for Strato. However, Most in [5.50] hasshown that some (but only some) of the examples of purpose in natureapparently rejected by Theophrastus are ones equally rejected by Aristotlehimself, and has suggested that Theophrastus’ discussion is aimed notagainst Aristotelian teleology but against a more thorough-going Platonistversion. And Theophrastus’ treatise does have a positive message, which isthat the universe is an organised system in which the same degree ofpurposefulness and goodness should not be expected at every level (2 6a2,5 8a3, 7 8a27; cf. Laks in [5.50] 237 ff.)—a theme we shall find recurringin later Peripatetics too. Theophrastus also emphasises the need for limitsto enquiry (Metaphysics8 9b21 and fragments 158–9 FHS and G).That Theophrastus did reject Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover seemsprobable enough; but Aristotle did not accept the theory of the UnmovedMover throughout his career, and in any case raising objections is athoroughly Aristotelian way of proceeding. Critics have been too ready toforget the problematic and exploratory nature of much of Aristotle’s ownsurviving works, and too ready to interpret his successors as abandoningwhat they themselves regard as crucial features of Aristotelianism ratherthan as continuing Aristotle’s enquiries (or sharing in them, for there is noreason to suppose that Theophrastus’Metaphysicswas not written inAristotle’s lifetime).<sup>7</sup>Even where Aristotle’s own position can be easily determined those ofhis successors are not always clear. Steinmetz in [5.41] claims, as will bediscussed in detail later, that Theophrastus modified the Aristotelian systemof four sublunary elements. Theophrastus certainly begins his survivingtreatiseOn Fireby raising general questions about the Aristotelian theory,but, characteristically, then turns aside from the general questions toinvestigate particular phenomena—concerning which some of his remarksdo seem to reveal un-Aristotelian assumptions. At this point we may, likeSteinmetz, suppose that Theophrastus did indeed develop a distinctivetheory of his own, and look for other reports of Theophrastus’ views thatseem to confirm this; or we may, with Gottschalk ([5.65] 80–1; [5.42] 2.4–6), suppose that Theophrastus couples a general adherence to anAristotelian framework with a flexibility and readiness to speculate inparticular details. Gottschalk stresses, indeed, that Theophrastus paved theway for Strato to adopt a more revolutionary approach to physics.After Strato the Lyceum rapidly fell into decline. Strato’s successor Lyco(head of the school for forty-four years from 270/69 or 269/8 BC) wasnotable for his oratory, social standing and love of luxury rather than forscience or philosophy; his successor Ariston of Ceos was noted chiefly forhis biographical studies. It is probably to Ariston that we owe thepreservation of the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and perhaps thelist of Aristotelian titles in Diogenes Laertius. In the second centuryCritolaus, who accompanied the Academic Carneades and the StoicDiogenes of Babylon in their visit to Rome in 155 BC, was philosophicallyactive, chiefly in defending Aristotelian positions (the eternity of the world,the fifth heavenly element, and the inclusion of bodily and external goodsas well as virtue as a constituent of happiness) against the Stoics; but heseems to have been the exception rather than the rule.Those for whom the most important aspects of Aristotelianism are thosewhich they see Aristotle’s immediate successors as questioning, rejecting orneglecting have tended to see the decline of the Peripatetic school as anatural consequence of the change of emphasis. Others, themselvesfavouring an empiricist approach to the natural world, have seenTheophrastus and Strato as advancing scientific enquiry where Aristotle’sattitudes hindered it;<sup>8</sup> this equally seems to overstate the contrast betweenAristotle and his successors.The real reasons for the decline of the Lyceum may be harder torecapture. Certainly the special sciences in the Hellenistic period developedan impetus of their own in institutions other than the Lyceum—notablymedicine in Ptolemaic Alexandria; but that does not explain why zoologyand botany, the sciences Aristotle and Theophrastus had made their own,declined in the Lyceum without developing elsewhere. Where philosophy ina narrower sense is concerned, the answer may be easier. Aristotle’s thoughtis guided by certain structures and assumptions, but within that frameworkit is characteristically questioning, open-ended and provisional. AndAristotle explicitly stressed, against Plato, the relative independence of thedifferent branches of philosophical enquiry. For those who were attractedby comprehensive and dogmatic philosophical systems the Lyceum hadnothing to offer that could compare with Epicureanism or the Stoa;<sup>9</sup> whilefor those who rejected dogmatism the Aristotelian approach must haveseemed a poor second-best to the aggressive scepticism introduced to theAcademy by Arcesilaus in the middle of the third century BC. Strato’ssuccessors emphasised those aspects of the school’s activity, present indeedfrom the outset, that related to the general literary and rhetorical culture ofthe period, and this too may have lessened the distinctive appeal of theschool. There is nothing un-Aristotelian in attention to the views andconcerns of people in general, as a glance at theNicomachean Ethicswillshow; but for Aristotle himself it was only the foundation on which hebuilt.To speak of how Aristotle’s ‘unpublished’ writings might have seemed toHellenistic readers assumes, indeed, that those who might have wanted toread them could have done so. The decline of the Lyceum is linked byStrabo and Plutarch with a story that Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ writings,left by Theophrastus not to Strato but to Neleus of Scepsis in the Troad,passed from Neleus to his descendants. They, having no interest inphilosophy, hid the books in a cellar to prevent their seizure by the kings ofPergamum, who wanted to create a library to rival the one in Alexandria.Thus, according to the story, the ‘unpublished’ works of Aristotle—thosewhich we now have, the originally ‘published’ works having been lost laterin antiquity—were inaccessible until rediscovered in the first century BC,and the Peripatetics were unable ‘to do philosophy in a systematic way’without them. The manuscripts were eventually recovered by thebibliophile Apellicon, who took them to Athens and published them, butinaccurately; they were then seized by the Roman general Sulla when hesacked the city in 86 BC, and taken to Rome, where they were copied bythe grammarian Tyrannio. From his copies a new collection, which is thebasis of the arrangement of Aristotle’s writings that exists today, wasproduced by Andronicus of Rhodes; this also included some works ofTheophrastus.<sup>10</sup>It is true, as we shall shortly see, that the revival of Aristotelianism datesfrom Andronicus, and that it is different in character from what hadpreceded it; where the earlier Peripatetics had sought to continueAristotle’s work, later writers are essentially looking back to it andcommenting upon it. It is significant that Strabo supposes that onecouldnot bea Peripatetic philosopher without access to texts of Aristotlehimself; concentration on the study of canonical texts was a generalcharacteristic of the period.<sup>11</sup>What is much less certain is that Aristotle’s works were indeedinaccessible in the intervening period. It is unlikely that even ‘unpublished’works existed in only one copy; we know that different, and differing,copies of Aristotle’sPhysicsexisted in the lifetime of Theophrastus, forEudemus (fragment 6 Wehrli) wrote to him about a variant reading, andStrato left to Lyco ‘all the books, apart from those I have written myself’(Diogenes Laertius 5.62).<sup>12</sup> The possibility remains that, if Aristotle’sworks were little read in the Hellenistic period, this was not because theywere unavailable but because—however strange this may seem to moderninterpreters for whom Aristotle is a central figure in the whole history ofphilosophy—they were not considered of great interest.Aristotelian doctrines were indeed still referred to; but characteristic ofthe Hellenistic period is, not the study of Aristotle’s own works, but thecompilation and use of summaries of the sort that underlie Cicero’sknowledge of Aristotle and the account in Areius Didymus (below).Examples of this type of writing include the ‘Aristotelian Divisions’preserved in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Plato and in a manuscript inVenice<sup>13</sup> and the source of the account of Aristotelian philosophy in book 5of Diogenes Laertius’Lives of the Philosophers.<sup>14</sup>The revival of Aristotelian studies which began with Andronicus’collection (on which see Gottschalk [5.77] 1089–97) was different in kindfrom what had gone before, for the status of Aristotle’s text had changed.Aristotle’s immediate successors had indeed taken his works as a startingpoint; Eudemus’Physicsessentially followed Aristotle’s while clarifyingcertain issues (Wehrli [5.57] vol.8:87), and Boethius presents Theophrastus(fragment 72A FHS and G) as filling in the points that Aristotle had notfully covered. But for the early Peripatetics it was a matter ofcontinuing Aristotle’s work, not of regarding him as the canonicalauthority to be interpreted.The writing of summaries of Aristotelian doctrines did not cease; but usewas now made—to differing extents—of the treatises edited byAndronicus.<sup>15</sup> Nicolaus of Damascus, a courtier of Herod the Great,compiled, in addition to historical and ethnographical writings, a summaryof Aristotle’s philosophy which collected together material on similartopics from different Aristotelian texts. This survives in a Syriac summaryand in other fragments. A treatise by Nicolaus on plants, possibly part ofthe compendium, was translated from Syriac into Arabic in the ninthcentury AD, thence into Latin in the second half of the twelfth century, andthence back into Greek. In the process it became mis-attributed to Aristotlehimself, and it is this re-translation that appears asOn Plantsin moderneditions of Aristotle, though the falsity of the attribution was alreadyrealised in the Renaissance.<sup>16</sup>Areius Didymus, a Stoic and ‘court-philosopher’ to the emperorAugustus, wrote summaries of the teachings of the various schools. Of histreatment of the Peripatetics we possess the section on ethics, quoted atlength by Stobaeus, and fragments of the section on physics; the doctrinesthey present are Aristotelian in content, and Areius sometimes used thetexts made available by Andronicus, but the terminology and emphasisreflect Hellenistic preoccupations and Areius’ concern to stress thesimilarities between Peripatetic and Stoic ethics.<sup>17</sup>Other scholars, however, concentrated on the writing of commentarieson the newly popular Aristotelian texts. The earliest of these are now lostexcept for scattered quotations, having been replaced by later, oftenNeoplatonic works. Andronicus and his pupil Boethus<sup>18</sup> commented on theCategoriesand on other works; so too did Alexander of Aegae, teacher ofthe emperor Nero. The earliest surviving complete commentary is that ofAspasius (first half of the second century AD) on theNicomachean Ethics;Adrastus of Aphrodisias’ explanations of the literary and historicalreferences in theEthicswere incorporated into the later anonymouscommentary on books 2–5.<sup>19</sup> But the earliest author from whom aconsiderable number of commentaries survives is Alexander of Aphrodisias,described as ‘thecommentator’ by his successors; though even of his worksonly a part survives. Interest in Aristotle’s ‘published’ works declined asthat in the ‘unpublished’ works in Andronicus’ collection developed; forCicero, who either did not know of or was not interested in the texts editedby Andronicus, Aristotle still meant the Aristotle of the ‘published’ works,but he is perhaps the last major writer for whom this is true.The Lyceum may have ceased to exist as an institution at the time ofSulla’s sack of Athens.<sup>20</sup> But Athens continued to be a centre forphilosophers of all schools. In AD 176 Marcus Aurelius established poststhere for teachers of the four principal philosophies (Platonic, Aristotelian,Stoic and Epicurean), and it may be to an appointment at Athens thatAlexander refers in the dedication of his treatiseOn Fate,written betweenAD 198 and 209. Alexander of Aphrodisias would not in any case havebeen the first holder of the Athenian post; that may have been his oldernamesake, Alexander of Damascus. The institution of the imperialappointments only confirmed a situation that already existed; philosophersof the different schools were teaching in Athens—and engaging in livelypolemic against each other—throughout the second century AD.Alexander’s commentaries do not yet show the adaptation to a context offormal teaching apparent in the later, Neoplatonic commentaries. They arediscursive and open-ended, presenting alternative interpretations withoutalways indicating a preference between them.<sup>21</sup> They seem to reflect theresults of teaching and discussion rather than an actual record of theprocess. We also possess some collections of short discussions attributed toAlexander; there were once more that are now lost. Some of these take theform of problems in Aristotelian doctrine, or in the interpretation ofparticular texts, followed by solutions; others are expositions of particularpassages, or summaries of texts or doctrines. Whether they are byAlexander himself has to be considered text by text. Since many of themare connected with themes dealt with in Alexander’s commentaries or inmonographs by him, it is natural to assume that they at least originate fromhis school. But it has recently been suggested that some of them may beconsiderably later in date, though still concerned essentially withAristotelian issues.<sup>22</sup> And this highlights a problem: that of the seconddisappearance of Aristotelianism, or rather its absorption intoNeoplatonism.We know the names of Alexander’s teachers, and can identify some oftheir doctrines and his reaction against them. But we do not know thenames of any of his pupils; and with one exception all ancientcommentators on Aristotle after Alexander whose writings are known tous are Neoplatonists. There had long been a tendency on the part ofPlatonists to incorporate Aristotelian ideas into their expositions of Plato;some, notably the second-century AD Platonist Atticus, rebelled againstthis, but they were in the minority. Plotinus himself had the works ofAristotle and the commentaries of Alexander, among others, read in hisschool (Porphyry,Life of Plotinus14). Subsequently, with theformalisation of the Neoplatonic philosophical curriculum, selected worksof Aristotle were studied as a preliminary to the reading of Plato. Theemphasis was on the logical and physical treatises and the workOn theSoul; that explains why Aspasius’ commentary on theEthicssurvived—there was no incentive to replace it—and why we have to wait until thetwelfth century AD for commentaries on theParva Naturalia,thezoological works, and theRhetoric.<sup>23</sup>The exception to the general dominance of Platonists after Alexander isThemistius, who in the fourth century AD combined epideictic rhetoricwith the production of explanatory paraphrases of Aristotle’s works.But Themistius’ Aristotelianism has no clear heritage; we cannot traceeither its immediate antecedents or his successors. There are occasionalreferences to other individuals as ‘Peripatetics’, such as the bishop Anatoliusof Alexandria in the third century AD; and as late as AD 500 Dorus fromArabia is described as having spent more of his life in the study of Aristotlethan he should have, before being introduced to the higher study of Platoby Isidorus.<sup>24</sup> But none of this amounts to the continued existence of adistinctive Aristotelian tradition.The second decline of Aristotelianism is a topic we will return to. First,however, it will be convenient to consider developments in each branch ofAristotelian philosophy in turn throughout the period of the five centuriesseparating Aristotle from Alexander.LOGICTheophrastus and Eudemus continued and developed the study of formallogic which Aristotle had instituted in thePrior Analytics.There are twoareas in which they made a particular contribution. The first is in modallogic, the logic of necessity and possibility. Aristotle had utilised a notionof possibility according to which ‘possible’ excludes not only what isimpossible but also what is necessary; while this is intuitive (it is not naturalto say ‘it ispossiblethat 2+2=4’, for example), it removes the expectedparallelism between statements of possibility and statements of fact. Forwith this type of possibility ‘it is possible that all B are A’ implies ‘it ispossible that no B are A’, and ‘it is possible that no B are A’ does not imply‘it is possible that no A are B’ (for it may be that all B have the possibility ofeither being A or not being A, but that there are some other A that cannotbe B at all). Second, while it may seem natural to suppose that a conclusioncannot be stronger than the weakest of the premisses from which it follows—the ‘weakest-link-in-the-chain’ principle, or, as medieval logicians put it,sequitur conclusio partem deteriorem,‘the conclusion follows the weakerpart’—Aristotle argued that it made a difference which premiss wasconcerned. For him ‘necessarily all B are A’ and ‘all C are B’ yield‘necessarily all C are A’, while ‘all B are A’ and ‘necessarily all C are B’yield only ‘all C are A’ and not ‘necessarily all C are A’.On both these issues Theophrastus and Eudemus, who are regularly citedtogether in our sources, adopted the opposite view; in both cases the effectis to make modal logic simpler and tidier. Statements of possibility nowbehave like statements of fact, and the modality of the conclusion in allsyllogisms is determined by a simple rule. If Aristotle was influenced intaking the view he did by extra-logical considerations (for example, thatbeing as a matter of fact a member of a group implies possessingnecessarily the properties that all members of the group possessnecessarily), the changes made by Theophrastus and Eudemus may indicatea move from logic conceived in terms of its applications in the real world tologic as a purely formal system. It is, however, one thing to assert this withhindsight, quite another to claim that Theophrastus and Eudemus wouldhave seen the change in these terms.Theophrastus also developed the study of argument forms mentioned byAristotle but not fully discussed by him. It seems highly probable that theseincluded the forms of argument with conditional, conjunctive anddisjunctive premisses which were to form the basis alike of Stoic logic andof modern propositional logic. But it also seems likely that Theophrastussaw these simply as one among several types of secondary argument form,the categorical syllogism remaining primary, and that he did not anticipateChrysippus’ development of propositional logic as a comprehensivesystem.<sup>25</sup>The eventual decline of the Stoic school, and the adoption of Aristoteliantexts into the Neoplatonic curriculum, ensured the victory of Peripateticlogic over Stoic logic as the subject of formal study. But the contribution ofAristotelian writers after Theophrastus and Eudemus to the developmentof logic was not great. The innovations came from writers outside theschool, such as Galen (even though it is not true, as once thought, thatGalen discovered the fourth figure of the ‘Aristotelian’ syllogism<sup>26</sup>.)Alexander wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works (onlythose onPrior Analytics1 and on theTopicsnow surviving) and a separatemonograph, now lost, onSyllogisms with Mixed Premisses(that is,premisses of differing modalities).PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS; FATE AND PROVIDENCEAristotle defined time as the numbered aspect of motion (Physics4.11219b5), indicated most clearly by the movement of the heavenly sphere,though not to be identified with this (Physics4.14 223b23). Theophrastusand Eudemus followed Aristotle’s view, but Strato rejected it on thegrounds that motion and time are continuous whereas number is discrete<sup>27</sup>and defined time as quantity or measure both in motion and in rest, thusgiving it an existence independently of motion (fragments 75–9 Wehrli). Hewas followed in this by Boethus.<sup>28</sup> Alexander explicitly rejected such atheory, and identified time as the number of the motion of the outermostheavenly sphere more definitely than Aristotle himself had done. WhereAristotle had suggested that there could be no time without soul, as withoutsoul there could be no numbering (Physics4.14 223a21 ff.), Alexanderargued that time is in its own nature a unity and is divided by the presentmoment only in our thought. This suggests that time itself can existwithout any actualnumbering;and Alexander appears to identify time inthis sense with the continuousnumerablemovement of the outermostheavenly sphere. Characteristically, Alexander’s approach combines a claimto be stating and defending the ‘Aristotelian’ position with a newdevelopment and emphasis of his own.<sup>29</sup>Theophrastus assembled a series of difficulties for Aristotle’s definitionof place as the innermost unmoved limit of what surrounds a thing(AristotlePhysics4.4 212a20; Theophrastus fragment 146 FHS and G.)We do not know whether these difficulties led Theophrastus actually toreject the Aristotelian conception of place. The Neoplatonist commentatorSimplicius, after outlining the view of place held by his predecessorDamascius, mentions in passing that Theophrastus seems to haveanticipated this, interpreting place as the proper position of a part in acomplex whole.<sup>30</sup> Strato (fragment 55 Wehrli, cf. fragments 59–60 Wehrli)certainly rejected Aristotle’s view of place, and defined it instead as theinterval or extension delimited by the outermost surface of what iscontained or the innermost surface of what contains it—which amounts tosaying that the place of a thing is, not as for Aristotle what contains it, butthe space that it occupies.<sup>31</sup>For Aristotle sublunary things are composed of the four elements, earth,air, fire and water (which can be and are transmuted into each other),while the heavenly spheres are composed of ether, the fifth element, whichhas the capacity for movement but for no other kind of change; fire and airnaturally move upwards, towards the heavens, and earth and waterdownwards. Steinmetz [5.41] argued that Theophrastus both rejected thefifth element and argued that fire requires a substrate in a way that theother elements do not. It is true that in the opening section ofOn FireTheophrastus draws attention to the fact that terrestrial fire needs aconstant supply of fuel, which might be thought to conflict with its status asa primary element; and he also speculates over whether the sun, if notactually fire, may not be at least hot.<sup>32</sup>Such thoughts might lead to a world-picture radically different fromAristotle’s—if indeed Aristotle’s own views were consistent throughout.<sup>33</sup>It is not, however, clear how far Theophrastus pursued the implications.For the introductory discussion ofOn Fireends inconclusively, andTheophrastus turns to more specific questions, not before pointing out thatthe need for replenishment applies not just to fire but to all the sublunaryelements (On Fire8). As for the fifth element, Philoponus suggests thatTheophrastus (fragment 161A FHS and G) retained it, and the evidence tothe contrary is at best dubious.<sup>34</sup> Strato (fragment 84 Wehrli) certainlyrejected the fifth element and held that the heavens are composed of fire. Healso held that all the elements naturally move to the centre of the universe(fragments 50–2 Wehrli).<sup>35</sup> The fifth element was later rejected also byXenarchus, a Peripatetic of the time of Augustus.<sup>36</sup>Steinmetz also suggested that Theophrastus emphasised the role of heat,especially that of the sun, in causing physical change, and that he modifiedthe Aristotelian explanation of meteorological phenomena by dry andmoist exhalations from the earth and the water on it, reducing the dry oneto mere reflection of the heat of the sun. But both Theophrastus’Meteorologyand his treatiseOn Firesuggest less divergence fromAristotle’s views than Steinmetz supposed.<sup>37</sup> And, once again, there is thequestion of Aristotle’s own consistency; for Longrigg ([5.67] 216–21), whoargues that Theophrastus treated fire as active and the other three elementsas passive, finds that both this and Theophrastus’ distinction between thegenerative heat of the sun and terrestrial fire develop themes already presentin Aristotle’s physiological and biological writings, as opposed to hisgeneral physical theory. The Stoics rejected a fifth element and gave amajor role to fire, and later, with Chrysippus,pneuma,as embodiments ofthe active principle in the universe; but the presence of similar tendencies inAristotle’s own successors does not mean that their enterprise of continuingand developing Aristotle’s thought should be seen only as a transitionpaving the way for Stoicism.Although Theophrastus denied the existence of the Unmoved Mover, hecontinued to hold, like Aristotle,<sup>38</sup> that the heavens are ensouled(fragments 159, 252 FHS and G). That the heavens are ensouled was laterthe belief of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and of his teacher Herminus(Simplicius,On the Heaven380.3 ff.).<sup>39</sup>Aristotle maintained the infinite divisibility of matter and the absence ofany void. Scholars have drawn particular attention to contexts whereTheophrastus, in the explanation of physical processes, makes use of thenotion of passages or pores (notablyOn Fire42). There is no inconsistencybetween this and Aristotelian physical theory, unless we are to supposethat the pores contain vacuum; they may well be thought of rather ascontaining matter more tenuous than what surrounds them. Strato wascertainly prepared to allow the existence of ‘microvoids’ within materialbodies (fragment 65a Wehrli).<sup>40</sup> Theophrastusdidit seems employ theprinciple of ‘nature abhorring a vacuum’ in the explanation of winds,<sup>41</sup> butthis and the idea of microvoids are not equivalent, as Furley [5.68] 156 ff.points out. Both ideas influenced the Alexandrian physician Erasistratus,who had been a fellow-pupil of Theophrastus with Strato, in hisexplanations of physiological processes; and the influence of Strato’s theoryhas also been seen in the technological writer Hero of Alexandria.<sup>42</sup> But allthis is still far removed from the Atomist conception of discrete particles ofmatter moving within an otherwise empty space. A tendency tomaterialistic explanations can be seen in Theophrastus’ introduction ofmaterial effluences into the explanation of odour, which Aristotle hadinterpreted rather as the propagation of a change in the interveningmedium. Even light was explained by some Peripatetics in material terms.<sup>43</sup>On issues of physical theory such as these the Peripatetics of the RomanEmpire, concerned as they were to explain the Aristotelian texts, returnedto more orthodox Aristotelian positions. (Alexander of Aphrodisias had aparticular interest in the theory of vision, inherited from his teacherSosigenes.) But on other aspects of the organisation of the natural worldlater Peripatetics found themselves constrained to develop ‘Aristotelian’positions on issues to which Aristotle himself had devoted little or no directattention. The Stoics, in particular, had made fate and divine providencecentral topics of philosophical debate. Aristotle himself had little to sayabout the former, and his account inMetaphysicsA of the UnmovedMover as engaged in self-contemplation, causing movement as an object ofdesire without itself being affected, seems to rule out divine providencealtogether.The nature of divine involvement with the universe forms the climax ofthe treatiseOn the World (De mundo),attributed to Aristotle (and socontained in our standard editions) but probably in fact a composition ofthe Roman period.<sup>44</sup> In this treatise God is likened to the Persian King,ruling by delegated authority; divine influence is present in the world, butGod himself is remote in a way that is appropriate to his dignity. Aristotlehimself inMetaphysics10, arguing that goodness is to be located both inthe Unmoved Mover and in the orderliness of the world dependent on it,but more in the former than in the latter, had employed the images of amilitary commander and the head of a household; these were to play animportant part in subsequent discussion, as we shall see. Otherinterpreters, however, took a harsher line, and the standard view attributedto Aristotle in both pagan and Christian sources—among them AreiusDidymus and Diogenes Laertius—is that the heavens are the objects ofdivine providence while the sublunary region is not. This view may deriveoriginally from Critolaus (fragment 15 Wehrli).<sup>45</sup> The Platonist Atticus(fragment 3 des Places) in the second century AD attacked Aristotlevehemently for holding such a view (and also for denying the immortalityof the soul, of which more later); Aristotle’s views, he argued, are really nodifferent from those of Epicurus, but at least Epicurus had the courage ofhis convictions and denied providence altogether, whereas Aristotle allowsits existence but only in a context where it cannot directly benefit us.It was apparently in reply to Atticus that Alexander of Aphrodisiasdeveloped an alternative ‘Aristotelian’ theory of providence, preservedpartly in his treatiseOn Providencewhich survives in two Arabic versions,and partly in various short texts attributed to him. Providence is located inthe heavens, he argues, in the sense that it is exercised from the heavensover the sublunary region, which, being subject to coming-to-be andpassing-away, is the only part of the universe that actually needsprovidential care. However, providence extends to the sublunary only inpreserving the eternity of natural kinds; there is no involvement ofprovidence in the lives of individuals. Alexander can thus account for theoccurrence of misfortunes in the lives of individuals, and also avoid aninvolvement of the divine in things that would be beneath its dignity—something for which he repeatedly criticises the Stoics.<sup>46</sup>Alexander’s theory of providence is a re-working of authenticallyAristotelian materials in a new guise. That the movements of the heavens,and especially the seasonal movements of the sun, preserve the continuity ofsublunary coming-to-be and hence of natural kinds is argued by Aristotlehimself in the penultimate chapter of hisOn Coming-to-be and Passing-away,and the eternity of natural kinds had been used as an argument forthat of the world by Critolaus (fragment 13 Wehrli).<sup>47</sup>Similarly where fate is concerned Alexander’s position is an adaptation ofAristotelian themes. For Aristotle what is natural applies for the most partbut not always; and Alexander, in his treatiseOn Fate,states that anindividual’s fate is their nature or, quoting Heraclitus, their character,which for the most part determines what happens to them, but not always.Alexander may not have been the first to put forward this view; certainlyone of the texts attributed to him endeavours to read such a notion of fateback into Aristotle’s own two uses of the adjective ‘fated’, intoTheophrastus and into an otherwise unknown Polyzelus.<sup>48</sup>What Alexander’s view of fate emphatically rules out is the Stoic conceptof fate as inexorably determining everything. The unity of the universe, heargues, is preserved not by the chain of causes and effects, but by theregular movement of the heavens; as in a household, so in the universeminor variations in matters of detail do not affect the orderliness of thewhole (Alexander,On Fatech. 25). The similarity to Alexander’s theory ofprovidence is apparent; so too is the place in Peripatetic thought of theconception of the universe as a hierarchy in which the same degree oforder, goodness and perfection is not to be expected at every level. It istempting to see the remoteness of God in theDe mundo,and Alexander’sattacks on the Stoics for involving God in every detail of the managementof the world, as reflecting the increased remoteness of earthly rulers whenthe Greek city state was replaced first by the Hellenistic monarchies andthen by the Roman Empire; but the fact that the hierarchical picture isalready implicit in AristotleMetaphysics10 itself may argue for cautionhere.Theophrastus and Strato devoted little attention to problems of generalmetaphysics such as the nature of universals; indeed, Strato’s materialism isreflected in his emphasising the effect of one element in overcominganother rather than the division into matter and form (Gottschalk [5.58]150, cf. Brink [5.1] 948). With the revival of Aristotelianism and theplacing of theCategoriesat the beginning of the whole sequence ofAristotle’s works the status of universals became a central issue. Onceagain, the thinker on whose views we are most fully informed isAlexander, though his views were anticipated by Boethus,<sup>49</sup> and some of theevidence comes from short texts which may not all be by Alexanderhimself. Definitions, it is argued, are of specific or generic forms; these donot include any of the peculiarities of individuals due to their matter, suchas Socrates’ snub nose, and yet are not in themselvesuniversal;the natureof human being would be the same even if only one human being existed.Socrates exists because ‘human being’ exists, and not the other way round;yet ‘human being’ would not exist if no individual human being at allexisted. The implication seems to be that each human being has the samenature or form, the form of the species human being, but that my form andyours are the same only in kind (or ‘form’; the Greek is the same), notnumerically; or, putting it another way, to speak of ‘the same form’ doesnot mean that there is a single numerically individual form that you and Ishare.<sup>50</sup>Alexander’s position has been criticised both in ancient and in moderntimes for being nominalist and hence un-Aristotelian. Some of thosecriticisms are, however, from a Platonist standpoint.<sup>51</sup> For Aristotle as wellas for Alexander universals have their existence aspost remmentalconstructs;<sup>52</sup> but it is important that those mental constructs are notarbitrary but reflect the fundamental reality of the specific forms. Thelatter are the product of the abstracting power of intellect (Alexander,OnSoul90.2–11), but that does not mean that it is up to us which features weabstract. On the contrary, the important thing about every human being isthat he or she is ahuman being,the various accidents due to matter beingsecondary to this. This explains why texts attributed to Alexander can saythat the universal is prior to anyparticularindividual;<sup>53</sup> and, while it maybe questionable whether we should use ideas from one area of Alexander’sphilosophising to settle an issue in another, the emphasis in his theory ofprovidence on the preservation of the species agrees with an emphasis onthe reality of specific form. Lennox [5.175] indeed sees eternity in speciesthrough reproduction as the context for understanding what is meant by‘being one in form’.Alexander has also been regarded as un-Aristotelian in diminishing therole of form in comparison with that of matter. But this is chiefly in thecontext of his doctrine of soul, to which we should now turn.SOULAristotle defined the soul as the form of the living creature. It is thusneither a separable immaterial entity (as Plato had supposed), nor a distinctmaterial ingredient in the whole creature (as Epicurus for example was toargue). But neither is it, for Aristotle, simply a product of the arrangementof the bodily parts, reducible to the latter; body is to be explained in termsof soul, and in general compounds of matter and form are to be explainedin terms of the latter. A human body has a certain structure in order toenable the human being to function in the way that human beings do.However, that body is to be explained in terms of soul and not vice versaneed not mean that a certain arrangement of bodily parts is not a necessarycondition for the existence of a certain type of soul. In the case ofperceptive soul the bodily organ that relates to a particular soul-faculty isevident; the eye in the case of sight, the ear in that of hearing. It is lessobvious how we are to relate the soul to the body in general—both interms of how soul and body interact, and in terms of whether some part ofthe body plays a particularly vital role. Aristotle had seen ‘connate spirit’(pneuma)as the physical means by which soul operated, and the heart asthe particularly vital organ, the first to develop in the embryo. He had alsoasserted that intellect, alone of the soul-faculties, was not correlated withany particular organ, and had spoken, in the notorious chapter 3.5 ofOnSoul,of a distinction in intellect between ‘that which makes everything’ and‘that which becomes everything’, apparently presenting the former, activeintellect as imperishable in a way in which the latter, passive intellect wasnot. The history of subsequent Peripatetic psychology is largely that ofattempts to clarify these issues, attempts that were affected to varyingextents by contemporary attitudes and the positions of other philosophicalschools. It will be convenient first to discuss the nature of the soul as awhole and its relation to the body, and then to consider the question ofintellect separately.Among Aristotle’s immediate pupils, Dicaearchus is said (fragments 11–12 Wehrli) to have regarded the soul as a ‘harmony’ or mixture of the fourelements in the body, a view which some reports present as equivalent todenying the existence of the soul at all (fragments 7–8 Wehrli). Annas [5.160] 31 sees Dicaearchus’ theory of the soul as eliminativist, with thecaveatthat our sources may be tendentious). Aristoxenus, too, is said(fragments 119–20 Wehrli) to have regarded the soul as a harmony orattunement of the body, simply. It is possible that both writers wereprompted by Plato’s attack on the Pythagorean theory of soul as aharmony in thePhaedo(86ad, 92a–94e) and that their interest was chieflyin attacking Plato’s position. We do not know whether they actuallypresented their interpretations as ‘Aristotelian’. Strato certainly broughtsome highly pertinent criticisms (fragments 122–7 Wehrli, cf. Gottschalk[5.58] 164 ff.) against Plato’s arguments for immortality in thePhaedo,and was followed in this by Boethus.<sup>55</sup> Even less interest in Aristotle’stheory is shown by Heraclides of Pontus (a pupil both of Aristotle and ofPlato’s successor Speusippus; he is a follower of the Academy rather than aPeripatetic, though sometimes treated as such), and by Clearchus, anotherwriter on the fringes of the Peripatetic school; both were interested in ‘outof-the-body’ experiences.<sup>56</sup>Strato emphasised the role ofpneuma,‘breath’ or ‘spirit’, in thefunctioning of the soul. Aristotle and Theophrastus had usedpneumatoexplain bodily processes,<sup>57</sup> and for Strato (fragments 119–20 Wehrli) soulactivitieswere explained bypneumaextending throughout the body fromthe ‘ruling part’, which he located not in the chest (as both Epicurus andthe Stoics did) but in the head, or more precisely in the space between theeyebrows. The term for ‘ruling part’ in our sources(hêgemonikon)is Stoic,but even if Strato did not use this actual word the idea is implied.Tertullian illustrates Strato’s theory with the analogy of air in the variouspassages of a musical pipe (Strato, fragment 108 Wehrli); the Stoics were touse that of the tentacles of an octopus (SVF2.836). Strato was influencedhere by developments in contemporary medicine and anatomy; Erasistratusinvestigated the function of the nerves by dissection and argued that theycontained ‘psychic’pneumaextending from the brain. All sensation, Stratoheld, was felt in the ruling part of the soul, rather than in the bodilyextremities (fragments 110–11 Wehrli); all sensation involved thought(fragment 112 Wehrli), and there is no thought not derived from sensation(fragment 74 Wehrli). Some have drawn a contrast between Strato’s viewson thought itself and those of Aristotle, emphasising Strato’s empiricism;but the contrast sometimes depends on attributing to Aristotle himself abelief in intuition as a mode of cognition distinct from the senses, and thisis at least questionable.<sup>58</sup>Lyco’s successor Ariston of Ceos may have stressed the distinctionbetween rational and irrational soul, against the Stoics,<sup>59</sup> but perhaps in anethical rather than a psychological context. Critolaus described the soul asmade of ether, the fifth element (fragments 17–18 Wehrli; Annas [5.160]33). It has been suggested that soul itself and ether were more closelylinked in Aristotle’s ‘published’ works than in those that survive; but this isquestionable.<sup>60</sup> Cicero says that Aristotle identified the soul with ether, butthis may reflect a misunderstanding, aided by the familiarity ofmaterialistic theories of soul in other schools, of a reference in Aristotle’searlyEudemusto soul as a fifthincorporealnature besides the fourmaterial elements recognised at that stage.<sup>61</sup>Andronicus defined the soul as the power arising from the mixture of thebodily elements,<sup>62</sup> and was followed in this by Alexander (On Soul24.21–3). Alexander has been criticised for interpreting Aristotle in a materialistway, treating soul as form, indeed, but making form secondary to matter.<sup>63</sup>His treatment of soul as the culmination of an analysis which starts fromthe simple physical elements and builds up through successively morecomplex structures does suggest that he sees form in general and soul inparticular as the product of material arrangement. However, it is not un-Aristotelian to say that a certain bodily arrangement is anecessaryconditionfor the existence of soul.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, Alexander may have intendedto defend an authentically Aristotelian position against more materialistinterpretations. His view does indeed exclude any personal immortality;but so does Aristotle’s own, with thepossibleexception of his crypticremarks about the Active Intellect (see p. 165).Andronicus probably, and Alexander certainly (On Soul22.7 ff.),compared soul as a principle of movement with the nature of the simplebodies, for example the weight of earth. It was by appeal to this conceptionof nature (itself Aristotelian enough; Aristotle,Physics2.1 192b21) thatAlexander explained the application to the simple bodies of Aristotle’sclaim that everything that moves is moved by something (Aristotle,Physics8.4 254b24), defending it in a treatise surviving only in Arabic.<sup>65</sup>INTELLECTDiscussion of Aristotle’s theory of intellect begins already withTheophrastus, who suggests that the reason that we are not alwaysthinking is because of the mixture of the active intellect with potentialintellect and body (Theophrastus fragments 320–1 FHS and G). A furtherproblem was how intellect, which can have no nature of its own if it is tobe able to receive all intelligible forms, can ever begin to perform the task ofabstraction by which it separates forms from their matter (cf. Theophrastusfragments 307, 309, 316–17 FHS and G). AlexanderOn Soul84.24–7later expresses the point by saying that our intellect, at birth, is not somuch like a blank wax tablet as like the blankness of the wax tablet; andXenarchus suggested, whether seriously or as areductio ad absurdum,thatpotential intellect was to be identified with prime matter. It was natural tosee Aristotle’s remarks inOn Soul3.5 about an active intellect which‘makes all things’, contrasted with the passive intellect ‘which becomes allthings’, as indicating some solution to this problem.In the treatiseOn the Generation of Animals,moreover, Aristotle refers,in passing and with no very clear explanation, to intellect, alone of oursoul-faculties, as entering into the father’s seed, ‘from outside’ (AristotleGeneration of Animals2.3 736b27) At some point this was linked with theActive Intellect ofOn Soul. One of the minor works attributed toAlexander,On Intellect,records—only to criticise in its turn—an answer tothe objection that such an intellect could not ‘come from outside’ since,being immaterial, it could not change place at all. The objection and replyfollow on a previous section introduced as ‘from Aristoteles’; this is probablyto be taken as a reference to its content being an interpretation ofAristotle’s own doctrines, and in any case the identity of the person whoseviews are reported in this section, and of the originator of the followingreply to the objection concerning change of place, are uncertain—the textmay be disjointed.<sup>66</sup>The section introduced as ‘from Aristoteles’ explains the role of theActive Intellect. It is not an element in the soul of each individualseparately; rather, it is identified with the supreme intelligible, theUnmoved Mover, and acts upon our intellects to develop their potentialitythrough our thinking of it. The objection concerning movement is thenanswered by the argument that the Active Intellect is present everywherethroughout the world, but can only produce intelligence in those parts ofmatter that are suitable—i.e. human beings (and any superior intelligencesthere may be). To this the author ofOn Intellecthimself replies withobjections similar to those which Alexander elsewhere brings against Stoicpantheism, complaining that involvement of the divine in the sublunaryworld is inconsistent with the divine dignity. Gottschalk [5.77] 1160–2stresses, however, that the rejected account differs from Stoicism in notregarding its omnipresent intellect asmaterial.The author ofOn Intellectshares the view that the Active Intellect actsupon our intellects; it does so by our becoming aware of it so that itbecomes, as it were, a paradigm of the intelligible for us. The difficultywith this view is that it suggests that God is the first thing we think of,whereas it would be more plausible for awareness of him to be theculmination of our understanding. And in Alexander’s own, certainlyauthenticOn Soulwe find two other explanations of the role of the ActiveIntellect; being the supreme intelligible itself, it must be the cause of otherthings being intelligible, and it is also the cause of things being intelligiblebecause, as Unmoved Mover, it is the cause of their having being in thefirst place (Alexander,On Soul88.24–89.8 and 89.9–19 respectively).<sup>67</sup>Neither explanation, however, indicateshowthe Active Intellect causes usto have intelligence; they simply provide ingenious grounds for assertingthatit does so. Such concentration on solving the immediate problem istypical of Alexander. An explanation would indeed be available if we wereto suppose that the divine intellect already contained within itself thethoughts that we can come to apprehend; but that is essentially the positionof Plotinus, and while he may be indebted in various respects toAlexander’s account of intellect, there is no indication that Alexanderhimself took this particular step.It has been debated whether Alexander’sOn Soulis an attempt toimprove onOn Intellect,or the reverse. Both accounts alike, by identifyingthe Active Intellect with God rather than with a part of the individual’s soul,deny personal immortality. Since thought, for Alexander as for Aristotle, isidentical in form with its objects, and the Unmoved Mover is pure formwithout matter, our minds in a sense become the Unmoved Mover whilethey think of it, and can thus achieve a sort of temporary immortality; butthat is all (On Soul90.11–91.6).<sup>68</sup> Whether this claim is to be seen inmystical terms, or whether it is simply the by-product of Alexander’sundoubted ingenuity in attempting to clarify Aristotelian doctrine, isdebatable. It is also questionable as exegesis of Aristotle; Aquinas was laterto argue, against Alexander and Averroes, that Aristotlehadintended theActive Intellect to be a personal element in each individual’s soul and hadthus intended a personal immortality.ETHICS, POLITICS, RHETORICThroughout our period Peripatetic ethics are characterised by a contrastwith the paradoxical extremes of Stoicism. Cicero repeatedlyportrays Theophrastus as weakening virtue by recognising external goods,subject to fortune, as necessary for happiness (Theophrastus fragments 493,497–9 FHS and G; so too Ariston of Ceos, cf. Wehrli [5.60] 580).Theophrastus’ position is not that far removed from some aspects ofAristotle’s; the latter had after all said that to call someone being torturedhappy is absurd (Nicomachean Ethics7.13 1153b19; cf. CiceroTusculanDisputations5.24, and Fortenbaugh [5.30] 218–23). Lyco is attacked byCicero (Tusculan Disputations3.77= Lyco fragment 19 Wehrli; cf. 3.76)for seeking to reduce distress by arguing that it is caused by disadvantagesof fortune and of the body, not by evil in the soul.The claim that happiness involves all three classes of goods, of the soul,of the body, and external, is attributed to Critolaus (fragments 19–20Wehrli), though he also argued that if those of the soul were placed on oneside of a balance and bodily and external goods on the other, the formerwould far outweigh the latter (fragments 21–2 Wehrli). Areius Didymus(cited by StobaeusEcl.2.7.3b p. 46.10–17 Wachsmuth), however, seekingto reconcile Peripatetic and Stoic ethics, explicitly rejects Critolaus’ view,which he interprets as making all three types of goodspartsof humanexcellence; this is also the view attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius(5.30; Moraux [5.87] 276). For Areius bodily and external goods areratherused byvirtuous activity; a similar view is later held by Aspasius(On the Nicomachean Ethics24.3 ff.<sup>69</sup> Areius holds that there is nohappiness without external goods as well as virtue; however, while lack ofexternal goods does not necessarily lead to actual unhappiness, lack ofvirtue always does.<sup>70</sup>Opposition to extreme Stoic ethical views played a part in the renewedinterest in Aristotelianism on a popular level in the Imperial period. It isparticularly notable in the treatment ofpathosor ‘emotion’, whichAristotle had regarded as fundamental to ethics. The Stoics confined theterm to emotional reactions that went beyond right reason, and thereforeregardedpathêas such as uniformly bad (though also recognising a class of‘good feelings’,eupatheiai,such as ‘watchfulness’ by contrast with fear;Critolaus rejected this distinction, fragment 24 Wehrli, cf. Wehrli [5.57]vol. 10 p. 69 and [5.60] 588). The Peripatetics characteristicallyrecommended not the absence of passions,apatheia,butmetriopatheia,moderation in the passions; as Aristotle himself had taught, failure to showanger when anger is due is a shortcoming (Nicomachean Ethics2.71108a8; cf. Diogenes Laertius 5.31; Philodemus,On AngerXXXI.31–9Wilke; Cicero,Tusculan Disputations4.43–4; AspasiusOn theNicomachean Ethics44.12–19; Moraux [5.75] 282 n. 197, [5.87] 278).According to Areius Didymus (StobaeusEcl.2.7.1, 38.18–24Wachsmuth), Aristotle regardedpathosnot as an excessive movement ofthe soul but as an irrational movementliableto excess. Andronicus andBoethus too defined it as a movement of an irrational part of the soul(Aspasius,On the Nicomachean Ethics44.20 ff.); but Andronicus sharedwith the Stoics the view that allpathosinvolves a supposition thatsomething is good or bad, and Boethus held that it was a movementpossessing a certain magnitude. Aspasius rejected both these points,distancing the Peripatetic position further from the Stoic one (Aspasius,Onthe Nicomachean Ethics42.13 ff.).Aspasius’ role in the development of Aristotelian ethics as a subject ofstudy has been a topic of recent debate. His commentary on theNicomachean Ethicsincludes the ‘common books’ which are transmittedboth as part of theNicomachean Ethicsand of theEudemian(Nicomachean Ethics5–7=Eudemian4−6). It is from the time of Aspasiusthat theNicomachean Ethicsrather than theEudemianis the workregularly studied and cited (as in theEthical Problemsattributed toAlexander, for example). Perhaps it was Aspasius who was responsible forthe placing of the ‘common books’ in their Nicomachean context, but thisseems more questionable.<sup>71</sup>The Stoics based their ethics on the ‘appropriation’(oikeiôsis)orrecognition by living creatures of their own selves. The most fundamentalimpulse was that to self-preservation, which developed in two ways inhuman beings as they grew older, firstly by the person coming to recognisevirtue and reason as true self-interest, and secondly by the recognition ofother people as akin to oneself. Attempts have been made to trace theorigin of this Stoic doctrine to the post-Aristotelian Peripatos.<sup>72</sup> It wasindeed attributed to Aristotle by Areius Didymus (ap. Stobaeus,Ecl.2.17.3,116.21– 128.9 Wachsmuth),<sup>73</sup> Boethus and Xenarchus (Alexander ofAphrodisias,Supplement to the book On the Soul (De anima librimantissa)151.3–13), but this may simply reflect Stoic influence and, in thecase of Areius at least, a desire to assimilate Stoic and Aristotelian thoughtto one another.<sup>74</sup> Theophrastus spoke of ‘affinity’(oikeiotês)between allhuman beings and animals (fragment 531 FHS and G; cf. fragment 584AFHS and G), but this is hardly the same as the process of ‘appropriation’described by the Stoics. Some have argued that the account of moraldevelopment in terms of ‘appropriation’ at Cicero,On Ends5.24–70derives from Theophrastus, even though the book as a whole represents theviews of the syncretising Antiochus of Ascalon,<sup>75</sup> but this is at best open todebate.Dicaearchus in hisTripoliticus(fragments 70–1 Wehrli) set out thedoctrine of the mixed constitution, a combination of monarchy, aristocracyand democracy superior to each of these. The concept was already present,applied to Sparta, in Plato (Laws4.712d) and Aristotle (Politics2.61265b33);<sup>76</sup> it was later to be applied to Rome by Polybius (6.11.11) andCicero (Republic1.69–70, 2.65) and appears in Areius Didymus (ap.StobaeusEcl.2.7.26, p. 151.1 Wachsmuth). Cicero presents Dicaearchusand Theophrastus as advocates of the active and contemplative livesrespectively, continuing a debate already present in AristotleNicomacheanEthics10.7–8 (Dicaearchus fragment 25 Wehrli, Theophrastus fragment481 FHS and G).Theophrastus developed Aristotle’s study of rhetoric, elaborating fromAristotelian materials a doctrine of the four virtues of style(correctness, clarity, appropriateness, and ornament) which becamestandard for later writers, and dealing with rhetorical delivery, a subjectAristotle had neglected. Theophrastus’Charactersmay well relate to therhetorical portrayal of character as much as to comic drama or the study ofethics; these purposes are not indeed mutually exclusive. Subsequently,however, the study of rhetoric became a subject in its own right and grewapart from Peripatetic philosophy.<sup>77</sup>CONCLUSIONThe history of Aristotelianism as a separate tradition in the ancient worldcomes to an end with Alexander and Themistius. Part of the reason forAlexander’s having no distinguished followers in his own school isundoubtedly the decline in interest in formal higher education in the thirdcentury by contrast with the second. But that does not on its own explainwhy Aristotelianism declined where Platonism did not. Once again, as inthe third century BC, the lack of a distinctive doctrinal appeal may haveplayed a part; where Platonism had a radical and distinctive message,Aristotelianism appealed to scholars and, on a different level, to commonsense. The difference was that, where Aristotelianism in the Hellenisticperiod lacked a distinctive identity except in so far as the pursuit of enquiryitself provided one, the revived Aristotelianism of the Empire was limited inits scope by being too closely tied to the exposition of the Aristoteliantexts. More might indeed have been made of those texts and theirimplications; but if Alexander had developed his ideas concerning intellectfurther, he would, as already indicated, have been adopting a position notunlike that of the Neoplatonists themselves.Merlan ([5.2] 122–3 n.4) and Movia ([5.128] 63–81) both assessAlexander in terms of a tension between naturalism and mysticism. Merlangoes further, suggesting that the whole history of the Peripatetic traditionin antiquity can be seen in terms of an uneasy oscillation between amaterialism insufficiently distinct from Stoicism, on the one hand, and abelief in immaterial principles insufficiently distinct from Platonism, on theother; the school declined because it lacked a distinctive enough position ofits own (Merlan [5.2] 122. Merlan’s perspective is indeed explicitlyPlatonist; but it was after all Platonism that eventually prevailed).In another sense, however, the decline of Aristotelianism was onlyapparent. The continued study of Aristotle’s writings was a fundamentalpart of the Neoplatonist curriculum, and Greek philosophy passed to theIslamic world in a form which combined Platonic and Aristotelianelements. It was the latter which, in a new guise indeed, became central tothe philosophies of Avicenna, Averroes, Aquinas and many others. But totell that story now would take more space than we have already used.NOTES1 It will be immediately apparent how much the following account owes to thewritings of others, and in particular to those of Paul Moraux and of HansGottschalk. Important too is the survey of Peripatetic writers fromTheophrastus to Nicolaus of Damascus in Wehrli [5.60]. I am particularlygrateful to Fred Schroeder for his permission to refer to work in progress atthe time of writing. Numbered references in [brackets] are to thebibliography; for fragments of Peripatetic writers, Wehrli=[5.60] and FHSand G=[5.25].2 Theophrastus,Explanations of Plants1.9.1, 1.16.12, 1.18.2. Cf. Einarsonand Link [5.6] vol. 1, xvii–xviii. I am grateful to Geoffrey Lloyd foremphasising the importance of this to me.3 Cf. Pellegrin [5.184]; Lennox [5.176].4 See Steinmetz [5.41] 334–51; Gottschalk [5.42] 20; Mansfeld [5.153], [5.179] and [5.180] especially 67–70.5 See Annas [5.160] 26–8.6 Plutarch,Against Colotes14 1114F=Strato fragment 35 Wehrli; Cicero,Onthe Nature of the Gods1.35=Strato fragment 33 Wehrli; cf.AcademicaPosteriora1.121=Strato fragment 32 Wehrli. Repici [5.62] 117–56; on theother side, van Raalte [5.51] 203.7 Cf. Devereux [5.49], especially at 182. Balme [5.53] similarly argues thatTheophrastus’ views on spontaneous animal generation antedate Aristotle’sown latest views.8 So, recently, Isnardi-Parente [5.173] 125–8 and Marenghi [5.69] 9–11, 33–6.9 This is not to deny that both these schools showed philosophical acumen andsubtlety; the loss of interest in Aristotle was not a loss of interest inphilosophical argument as such.10 Strabo 13.1.54; cf. PlutarchLife of Sulla26.1–3 and, for Andronicus, alsoPorphyry,Life of Plotinus24. I use ‘published’ and ‘unpublished’ asequivalents for the traditional ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ respectively; the latter,in particular, could have misleading connotations. That Andronicus produceda definitiveeditionin the sense of a standard text, as opposed to a standardarrangement of works, has been called into question by Barnes in [5.79] andin his contribution to [5.98]. Against Düring’s claim that Andronicusproduced his collection in Rome cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1093.11 Gottschalk [5.77] 1088, 1098 11.96, and 1173. Cf., for the second centuryAD in particular, Ebbesen [5.165] vol. 1, 54–6.12 Moraux [5.87] 248–9. Cf. also Athenaeus 1.4 3ab with Gottschalk [5.77]1084–6, who suggests that the books inherited by Neleus may never have leftAthens and (speculatively) that Apellicon may have stolen the books andmade up the whole story to conceal the fact.13 Ed. H.Mutschmann, Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. Translation and commentary inRossitto [5.90].14 On which see Moraux [5.87], emphasising Diogenes’ use of a Hellenisticsource which, he suggests, impressed him because of its antiquity.15 Cf. also Gottschalk [5.77] 1129–31, on the classifications in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatiseOn Virtues and Vicesand the adaptation of this,combined with Stoic material, in the workOn Passionsfalsely attributed toAndronicus himself.16 On Nicolaus see Moraux [5.74] 445–514; Gottschalk [5.77] 1122–5. On thetreatiseOn Plantsin particular Moraux [5.74] 487–9, with bibliography, andDrossaart-Lulofs and Poortman [5.86]. For the reception of the work in theRenaissance, cf. Schmitt [5.185] 299–300, 307–8.17 On Areius see Moraux [5.74] 259–444; Fortenbaugh [5.82]; Gottschalk [5.77] 1125–9; Hahm [5.83]. For the historical evidence for his personalrelationship with Augustus see Hahm [5.83] 3035–8. The identity of theauthor of our texts with the friend of Augustus has recently been called intoquestion by Göransson [5.167].18 On Boethus see Moraux [5.74] 143–79.19 In [5.94]; cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1155, against Kenny [5.95] 37 11.3, whoattributed thewholecommentary to Adrastus. On Adrastus generally cf.Moraux [5.75] 294–322.20 So Lynch [5.3] 161–2, 200–7. Gottschalk [5.77] 1093–4, however, arguesthat the school continued to exist in some sense at least for the rest of thefirst century BC, and that Andronicus was its head.21 Gottschalk [5.77] 1159–60 notes the same tendency in Alexander’s teacherSosigenes, and suggests it may have been a didactic technique. Cf. Moraux [5.137] 169 n. 1; Sharples [5.131] 97.22 Schroeder [5.117]. Cf. also, onQuaestio1.11, Sharples [5.119] 50 n. 126.23 There is a convenient list of the published commentaries in Sorabji [5.78] 27–30.24 Damascius ap. Suda s.v. Doros (no. 1476, vol. 2 p. 137.3–15 Adler). Dorus isalso mentioned in Damascius’Life of Isidorus,131. Cf. Brink [5.1] 947.25 So Barnes [5.40]; cf. Ebert [5.166] 15–19, arguing against Barnes that there isno evidence for Theophrastus using variables to represent propositions ratherthan terms, as the Stoics did. On Theophrastus’ logic in general cf. Knealeand Kneale [5.174] 100–12.26 Cf. Kneale and Kneale [5.174] 183–4; Gottschalk [5.77] 1171.27 SimpliciusOn the Physics788.34 ff.=Theophrastus fragment 151B FHS andG =Eudemus fragment 91 Wehrli=Strato fragment 75 Wehrli.28 SimpliciusOn the Categories434.2 ff., cf. Gottschalk [5.77] 1108.29 Cf. Sharples [5.139] and Gottschalk [5.77] 1168.30 Theophrastus fragment 149 FHS and G. Cf. Sorabji [5.44] and [5.186] 158,202–15; Algra [5.45]; [5.25] commentary volume 3.1, 54–60.31 Cf. Gottschalk [5.58] 169; Sorabji [5.186] 158.32 Cf. on this [5.25] commentary volume 3.1, 89–90, 115–16; Battegazzore [5.43].33 Cf., on the question of the fifth element, Furley [5.68] 193–5.34 On Theophrastus fragment 232 FHS and G—a report of Xenophanes’ views,not of Theophrastus’ own as Steinmetz and others have supposed—see mostrecently Runia [5.47].35 Furley [5.68] 159. Theophrastus atOn Winds22 already seems to imply thatairnaturally moves downwards, Longrigg [5.67] 221.36 Gottschalk [5.77] 1119. On Xenarchus see Moraux [5.74] 197–214.37 As Gottschalk ([5.42] 24) has pointed out.38 Cf. Guthrie [5.170] xxix–xxxvi.39 Zeller regarded this as un-Aristotelian in Herminus and Alexander,and Gottschalk ([5.77] 1159) describes it as startling; but if it is so it is as areturn to Aristotelian orthodoxy.40 Gatzemeier [5.66] 94–7 argued that no more than a theory of potential voidwas to be attributed to Strato; but cf. Furley [5.68] 151–3, Algra [5.159] 58–69, and, against Gottschalk’s attribution of a belief in actual void toTheophrastus, Furley [5.68] 141–3.41 Steinmetz [5.41] 30; and see now Daiber [5.14] 279, 283 and Kidd [5.46]303, against Gottschalk [5.42] 24 and [5.58] 159 ff., who regarded therelevant section of Theophrastus’Meteorology(13.13–17 and 13.50, pp. 28–9 in Daiber [5.14]) as contaminated by Strato’s views.42 Cf. Furley [5.68] loc. cit., and references there.43 Cf. Gottschalk [5.58] 155, [5.65] 76.44 Cf. Moraux [5.75] 1–82, Gottschalk [5.77] 1132–9. Reale [5.89] claimed thattheDe mundois a genuine early work of Aristotle himself, but this has notfound general acceptance.45 Cf. Moraux [5.87] 282 and Gottschalk [5.77] 1126 and n. 237; Mueller [5.182] 155 n. 42 is, however, more doubtful.46 See further Sharples [5.127] 1216–18, and references there.47 Moraux [5.141] 199–202, before the Arabic text ofOn Providencewasknown, criticised Alexander’s theory of providence for being ‘mechanistic’; infact the Arabic text makes it clear that Alexander does want to assert that thedivine is aware of its beneficial effects on the sublunary, though how hereconciled this withMetaphysicsA we do not know.48 Cf. Donini [5.129] 159–61 and [5.151] 182; Sharples [5.127] 1218–19 andreferences there.49 Cf. Lloyd [5.144] 52, Gottschalk [5.77] 1109.50 The first way of putting it suggests a doctrine of individual forms (not, ofcourse, in the sense that each person’s form will include individualpeculiarities); the second, that a form is the sort of thing to which questionsof numerical identity or difference do not apply. Cf. Lloyd [5.144] 49 ff.,especially 54, and Lennox [5.175] 77–8. (But Lennox goes further, arguingthat we should not speak of ‘the sameform’, or of your form and mine beingthe same inform,at all; it iscompoundsof form and matter that are or arenot the same as each other. Ibid. 88–9.) The question whether or notAristotlebelieved in ‘individual forms’, and if so in what sense, has been amajor topic of contemporary debate; cf., recently, Halper [5.171] 227–55.51 Simplicius,On the Categories82.22; Dexippus,On the Categories45.12. Cf.Sharples [5.127] 1199, and references there.52 Lloyd [5.144] 2 ff., 49 ff., though noting expressions in Alexander which couldencourage what he calls ‘back door Platonism’.53 Cf. Sharples [5.127] 1201 against Lloyd [5.144] 51, but also [5.122] 50 11.126.54 So Annas [5.160] 30–1. See also Gottschalk [5.168].55 Gottschalk [5.77] 1117–19.56 Cf. Annas [5.160] 30–2. The testimonia to both writers are included inWehrli [5.57]. Cf. also Gottschalk [5.61] 98–108.57 Cf. Solmsen [5.70] 560–3, 567–8, arguing that in Aristotle the theory is inthe early stages of its development and that there is no indication of channelsthrough whichpneumapasses in the body; with a rather differentemphasis, linkingpneumawith the blood in the blood-vessels, Peck [5.183]593. Cf. also Verbeke [5.188] 198, Annas [5.160] 18–19, and Longrigg [5.178] 173–4. There is, however, no hint in either Aristotle or Theophrastus ofthe distinctive position of Praxagoras and Erasistratus (below) that thearteries normally containonlyair, the veins blood.58 Cf. Barnes [5.163] 256–7. On Strato’s psychology cf. further Gottschalk [5.58] 164 and Annas [5.160] 28–9. At 33 Annas describes him as the onlymember of the Hellenistic Lyceum with interesting views on the soul.59 This depends on whether a report at Porphyry ap. StobaeusEcl.1.49.24 p.347.21 Wachsmuth is to be assigned to him, as it is by Movia [5.181] 150–5,Ioppolo [5.182] 272–8 and Annas [5.160] 33, but not by Wehrli [5.57] vol. 6,or to the Stoic Ariston of Chios (=SVF1.377).60 Cf. Gottschalk [5.61] 106–7.61 So Easterling [5.64]; see also Moraux [5.63] 1206, 1229–30, andTheophrastus fragment 269 FHS and G.62 Galen,Quod animi mores44.18 Müller. Cf. Moraux [5.74] 132–4,Gottschalk [5.77] 1113. Galen himself argues for it being the mixture, simply.63 Moraux [5.141] 29–62, comparing Alexander here with Strato; Robinson [5.145], especially 214–18. See Sharples [5.127] 1203 and references there; alsomy reply to Robinson atClassical Review43 (1993) 87–8.64 Gottschalk [5.77] 1114, while stressing the similarity of Alexander’s positionto that of Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, notes the affinity of Dicaearchus’view with Aristotle’sownposition—though his source for this is the PlatonistAtticus, whose intentions are hostile.65 See Pines [5.136], and for a full translation of the text Rescher and Marmura[5.138]. Alexander’s view is seen by Pines as an ancestor of the impetustheory used by Philoponus to explain the forced motion of projectiles andpassed on to medieval science; where projectiles are concerned Alexanderhimself holds the orthodox Aristotelian view that their movement is causedby the transmission of movement through the air behind them.66 Moraux [5.99] interpreted the remark as a reference to Alexander’s teacherAristoteles of Mytilene, arguing that the doctrines inOn Intellectarenotinfact contained in the works of Aristotle (the Stagirite). That does not meanthat the ingenious might not have found them there; that the reference is afterall to the Stagirite has been re-asserted against Moraux by Thillet [5.123] xv–xix and Schroeder and Todd [5.116] 22–31. Accattino and Donini in [5.115]xxvii n. 77 side with Moraux. I am grateful in particular to Jan Opsomer forilluminating discussion of this passage, to be developed more fully elsewhere.The identification of the person referred to does not affect the fact that anidentification of the Active Intellect and the ‘intellect from outside’ wasasserted by someone early enough to be criticised, and defended, before theworkOn Intellectattributed to Alexander criticised the defence in its turn.However, Schroeder [5.117] has raised doubts not only about the attributionofOn Intellectto Alexander (which has long been debated; cf. Sharples [5.127] 1211–14) but also about its date (see above, n. 22).67 On the first argument cf. Lloyd [5.177] 150, defending it against Moraux [5.141] 90–2 who criticises it as based on Platonist rather than Aristoteliansuppositions. The second argument will apply more easily to things subject tocoming-to-be and passing-away than to those that are eternal. Cf. Sharples [5.127] 1206–8 and nn.68 In the sixteenth century Nicoletto Vernia argued that Alexander did believein personal immortality, but this is a misinterpretation; cf. Mahoney [5.142].69 Cf. Moraux [5.87] 276; Gottschalk [5.77] 1127; Hahm [5.83] 2981, 3010.70 For an assessment of Areius’ position as an interpretation of Aristotle, and afavourable comparison in this regard with Antiochus of Ascalon, see Annas[5.161] 415–25.71 Cf. Kenny [5.95] and Gottschalk [5.77] 1101, 1158.72 Cf. Brink [5.55], Gottschalk [5.77] 1117, 1127–8, and the references theyprovide.73 Cf. Görgemanns in [5.82] and Hahm [5.83] 2991, 2998–3000.74 Cf. Hahm [5.83] 3001–11, and, for a comparison between Areius’ account ofoikeiôsisand Aristotle’s theory of friendship, Annas [5.161] 279–87.75 Cf. Gigon [5.56]; Magnaldi [5.84].76 Also of Athens under Solon, Aristotle,Politics2.12 1273b38.77 This process is traced in Fortenbaugh and Mirhady [5.71].BIBLIOGRAPHYThis bibliography combines (i) an attempt to survey the most importantliterature in the field and (ii) references to all works that there has beenoccasion to cite in the course of the discussion.GENERAL SURVEYS5.1 [] C.O.Brink, ‘Peripatos’, in Pauly-Wissowa,Realencyclopädie derAltertumswissenchaft,suppl. 7 (1940) 899–949.5.2 [] P.Merlan, ‘The Peripatos’, in A.H.Armstrong, ed.,The Cambridge Historyof Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1967, 107–23.5.3 [] J.P.Lynch,Aristotle’s School,Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972.THEOPHRASTUS: TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS; SURVIVING WORKSResearches on Plants (Historia plantarum)5.4 [] A.Hort,Theophrastus: Enquiry into Plants,London Cambridge, Mass.,Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1916–26.Greek text, annotated English translation. Also includesOn Odoursand thespuriousOn Weather-Signs.5.5 [] S.Amigues,Théophraste: Recherches sur les plantes,Paris, Budé, 4volumes, 1988–, in progress). (Greek text, French translation, commentary.)Explanations of Plants (De causis plantarum)5.6 [] B.Einarson and G.K.K.Link,Theophrastus: De causis plantarum,Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 11976, vols. 2 and 3 1990. (Greek text, annotated English translation.)On the Senses5.7 [] in H.Diels,Doxographi Graeci,Berlin, Reimer, 1879, 497–527. (Greektext.)5.8 [] G.M.Stratton,Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychologybefore Aristotle,London/New York, Allen and Unwin/Macmillan, 1917.(Greek text, English translation, commentary.)On Stones5.9 [] E.R.Caley and J.C.Richards,Theophrastus On Stones,Columbus, OhioUniversity, 1956. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.)5.10 [] D.E.Eichholz,Theophrastus: De lapidibus,Oxford, Clarendon Press,1965. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.)On Fire5.11 [] V.Coutant,Theophrastus: De Igne,Assen, Vangorcum, 1971. (Greek text,translation, commentary.)On OdoursSee [5.4] above; also5.12 [] U.Eigler and G.Wöhrle, eds,Theophrastus: De odoribus,Leipzig andStuttgart, Teubner, 1993. (Greek text, German translation, commentary.)On Winds5.13 [] V.Coutant and V.Eichenlaub,Theophrastus: De ventis,Notre Dame,University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. (Greek text, English translation,commentary.)Meteorology (preserved only in Syriac and Arabic)5.14 [] H.Daiber, ‘TheMeteorologyof Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabictranslation’, in [5.37] 166–293. (Arabic and Syriac texts, English translation,commentary.)Metaphysics5.15 [] W.D.Ross and F.H.Fobes,Theophrastus: Metaphysics,Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press, 1929. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.)5.16 [] M.van Raalte,Theophrastus: Metaphysics,Leiden, Brill, 1993. (Greektext, English translation, commentary.)5.17 [] A.Laks and G.Most. Paris, Budé, 1993. (Greek text, annotated Frenchtranslation.)On Fish5.18 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘Theophrastus:On Fish’, in [5.37] 347–85. (Greek text,English translation, commentary.)Characters5.19 [] R.G.Ussher,The Characters of Theophrastus,London, Macmillan, 1960.(Greek text, commentary.)5.20 [] P.Steinmetz,Theophrast: Charaktere,Munich, Max Hueber, 1960–2.(Greek text, commentary.)5.21 [] J.Rusten,Theophrastus, Characters,Cambridge, Mass., HarvardUniversity Press (Loeb Classical Library; with Herodas and Cercidas), 1992.(Greek text, English translation.)Minor worksFor other surviving minor works(On Sweats, On Giddiness, On (Typesof) Fatigue)5.22 [] a new edition to be published by Brill is in preparation by W.W.Fortenbaugh, R.W.Sharples and M.Sollenberger, but meanwhile referencemust still be made to5.23 [] F.Wimmer,Theophrasti Eresii opera,vol. 3, Leipzig, Teubner, 1854–62, orto5.24 []——Theophrasti Eresii opera,Paris, Didot, 1866, reprinted 1964.THEOPHRASTUS: COLLECTIONS OF FRAGMENTS AND TESTIMONIAIn general5.25 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh, P.M.Huby, R.W.Sharples (Greek and Latin) and D.Gutas (Arabic), eds,Theophrastus of Eresus,Leiden, Brill, 1992. (Greek/Latin/Arabic text and English translation; commentary vol. 3.1, R.W.Sharples,Sources on Physics,with contributions on the Arabicmaterial by Dimitri Gutas, 1998; vol.5, R.W.Sharples,Sources on Biology,1995; others forthcoming.)Fragments on particular topicsLogic5.26 [] A.Graeser,Die logischen Fragmente des Theophrast,Berlin, De Gruyter,1973. (Greek text, commentary.)5.27 [] L.Repici,La logica di Teofrasto,Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977. (Greek text,Italian translation, commentary.)Physical doxography5.28 [] Diels ([5.7]) 473–95. (Greek texts.)Intellect5.29 [] E.Barbotin,La Théorie aristotélicienne de l’intellect d’après Théophraste,Louvain, Publications Universitaires, 1954. (Greek text, French translation,commentary.)Ethics5.30 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh,Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts,Amsterdam, Grüner,1984. (Greek text, commentary.)Piety5.31 [] W.Pötscher,TheophrastosPeri Eusebeias, Leiden, Brill, 1964. (Greek text,German translation, commentary.)Laws5.32 [] A.Szegedy-Maszak,TheNomoiof Theophrastus,New York, Arno, 1981.(Greek text, commentary.)THEOPHRASTUS: STUDIESGeneralFundamental are:5.33 [] O.Regenbogen, ‘Theophrastos’, in Pauly-Wissowa,Realencyclopädie derAltertumswissenchaft,suppl. 7 (1940) 1354–562.5.34 [] F.Wehrli in [5.187] 474–522.Numerous papers on various aspects of Theophrastus’ work in:5.35 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh, P.M.Huby and A.A.Long, eds,Theophrastus of Eresus:On his Life and Work(Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities,2), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1985.5.36 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh and R.W.Sharples, eds,Theophrastean Studies(RutgersUniversity Studies in Classical Humanities, 3), New Brunswick, Transaction,1988.5.37 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh and D.Gutas, eds,Theophrastus: His Physical,Doxographical, and Scientific Writings(Rutgers University Studies inClassical Humanities, 5), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1992.5.38 [] Jan van Ophuisjen and Marlein van Raalte, eds,Theophrastus:Reappraising the Sources(Rutgers University Studies in ClassicalHumanities, 8), New Brunswick, Transaction, 1998.Logic5.39 [] I-M.Bochénski,La Logique de Théophraste,Fribourg en Suisse, Librairie del’Université, 1947.5.40 [] J.Barnes, ‘Theophrastus and hypothetical syllogistic’, in [5.189] 557–76,and in [5.35] 125–41.Physics5.41 [] P.Steinmetz,Die Physik des Theophrast(Palingenesia, 1), Bad Homburg,Max Gehlen, 1964.5.42 [] H.B.Gottschalk, Review of [5.41], inGnomon39 (1967) 17–26.5.43 [] A.M.Battegazzore, ‘Spigolature filologiche e note esegetiche alDe igneTeofrasteo’,Sandalion10–11 (1987–8) 49–66.5.44 [] R.Sorabji, ‘Theophrastus on Place’, in [5.36] 139–66.5.45 [] K.Algra, ‘Place in Context’, in [5.37] 141–65.5.46 [] I.G.Kidd, ‘Theophrastus’Meteorology,Aristotle and Posidonius’, in [5.37]294–306.5.47 [] D.T.Runia, ‘Xenophanes or Theophrastus’, in [5.37] 112–40.Doxography5.48 [] J.B.McDiarmid, ‘Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes’,Harvard Studiesin Classical Philology61 (1953) 85–156.5.49 [] D.T.Devereux, ‘The relation between Theophrastus’MetaphysicsandAristotle’sMetaphysics Lambda’, in [5.36] 167–88.5.50 [] A.Laks, G.W.Most and E.Rudolph, ‘Four notes on Theophrastus’Metaphysics’, in [5.36] 224–56.5.51 [] M.van Raalte, ‘The idea of the cosmos as an organic whole in Theophrastus’Metaphysics’, in [5.36] 189–215.Biology5.52 [] G.Senn,Die Pflanzenkunde des Theophrast von Eresos,ed. O.Gigon,Basel, Universität, 1956.5.53 [] D.M.Balme, ‘Development of biology in Aristotle and Theophrastus:theory of spontaneous generation’,Phronesis7 (1962) 91–104.5.54 [] G.Wöhrle,Theophrasts Methode in seinen botanischen Schriften,Amsterdam, Grüner, 1985.Ethics5.55 [] C.O.Brink,‘OikeiôsisandOikeiotês;Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature inmoral theory’,Phronesis1 (1956) 123–45.5.56 [] O.Gigon, ‘The Peripatos in Cicero’sDe finibus’, in [5.36] 259–71.OTHER PERIPATETICS OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIODTexts5.57 [] Wehrli, F.,Die Schule des Aristoteles,Basel, Schwabe, 2nd edn, 1967–78.(Greek texts, German commentary.)supplemented, for Strato, by5.58 [] H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Strato of Lampsacus: some texts’,Proceedings of theLeeds Philosophical and Literary Society, Literary and Historical Section,11.6 (1965) 95–182.5.59 [] A series of texts, English translations and discussions will appear inRutgers Studies in Classical Humanities;the first on Dicaearchus andDemetrius of Phalerum (Rutgers Studies9 and 10, ed. W.W.Fortenbaughetal.), the next on Eudemus.Studies: generalA survey of the whole period in5.60 [] F.Wehrli, ‘Der Peripatos bis zum Beginn der römischen Kaiserzeit’, in [5.187] 459–599.On specific writers:5.61 [] H.B.Gottschalk,Heraclides of Pontus,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.5.62 [] L.Repici,La natura, e l’anima,: saggi su Stratone di Lampsaco,Torino,Tirrenia, 1988.MetaphysicsStudies: particular topicsPhysics5.63 [] P.Moraux, ‘Quinta essentia’, in Pauly-Wissowa,Realencyclopädie derAltertumswissenchaft,24.1 (1963) 1171–263.5.64 [] H.J.Easterling, ‘Quinta natura’,Museum Helveticum21 (1964) 73–85.5.65 [] H.B.Gottschalk, ‘TheDe coloribusand its author’,Hermes92 (1964) 59–85.5.66 [] M.Gatzemeier,Die Naturphilosophie des Straton von Lampsakos,Meisenheim am Glan, Anton Hain, 1970.5.67 [] J.Longrigg, ‘Elementary physics in the Lyceum and Stoa’,Isis66 (1975)211–29.5.68 [] D.J.Furley,Cosmic Problems,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1989.5.69 [] G.Marenghi,[Aristotele]: Profumi e miasmi,Naples, Arte Tipografica,1991.Biology5.70 [] F.Solmsen, ‘Greek philosophy and the discovery of the nerves’,MuseumHelveticum18 (1961) 169–97, reprinted in id.,Kleine Schriftenvol. 1,Hildesheim, Olms, 1968, 536–82.Rhetoric5.71 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh and D.C.Mirhady, eds,Peripatetic Rhetoric afterAristotle(Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 6), NewBrunswick, Transaction, 1994.Aristotelian bibliography and the transmission and editing of his works5.72 [] P.Moraux,Les Listes anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote,Louvain, Éditionsuniversitaires, 1951.5.73 [] I.Düring,Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition,Göteborg/Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1957.PERIPATETICS OF THE ROMAN PERIODGeneralThere is a very full survey in5.74 [] P.MorauxDer Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,vol. 1, Berlin, De Gruyter,1973.5.75 []——vol. 2, 1984.5.76 []——vol. 3, ed. J.Wiesner, forthcoming.A shorter survey in5.77 [] H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman world’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase, eds,Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,vol. II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1079–174.See also5.78 [] R.Sorabji, ed.,Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators andtheir Influence,London, Duckworth, 1990.Andronicus5.79 [] J.Barnes, ‘Roman Aristotle’, in J.Barnes and M.Griffin, eds,PhilosophiaTogata II,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, 1–69.Arius Didymus5.80 [] Fragments of the physical epitome in [5.7] 447–72.5.81 [] Text of the ethical epitome in Stobaeus,Ecl.2.7 (vol. 2 pp. 37–152 in C.Wachsmuth, ed.,Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii duo libri priores,Berlin,Weidemann, 1884).Studies5.82 [] W.W.Fortenbaugh, ed.,On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of AriusDidymus(Rutgers Studies in Classical Humanities, 1), New Brunswick,Transaction, 1983.5.83 [] D.E.Hahm, ‘The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus’, in H.Temporiniand W.Haase, eds,Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,vol. II.36.4,Berlin, De Gruyter, 1990, 2935–3055.5.84 [] G.Magnaldi,L’oikeiôsis peripatetica in Ario Didimo e nel ‘De finibus’ diCicerone,Florence, Le Lettere, 1991.Nicolaus of DamascusTexts in5.85 [] H.J.Drossaart Lulofs,Nicolaus of Damascus on the Philosophy ofAristotle,Leiden, Brill, 1965. (Syriac text, English translation andcommentary of fragments of books 1–5 of Nicolaus’ compendium.)5.86 [] H.J.Drossaart Lulofs and E.J.Poortman,Nicolaus of Damascus ‘Deplantis’; Five translations,Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing, 1989(Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie vanWetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 139).Other eclectic writingsFor Diogenes Laertius’ account of Aristotle’s views see5.87 [] P.Moraux, ‘Diogène Laërce et lePeripatos’,Elenchos7 (1986) 247–94.5.88 [] [Aristotle]De mundoappears in editions of the collected works ofAristotle; cf. especially E.S.Forster and D.J.Furley,Aristotle: On SophisticalRefutations,etc., London/Cambridge, Mass., Heinemann/ HarvardUniversity Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1955, and bibliography there.Reale’s view that the work is a genuine early one of Aristotle is argued in5.89 [] G.Reale (1974)Aristotele: Trattato sul cosmo,Naples, Loffredo, 1974;revised edn, Giovanni Reale and Abraham P.Bos, eds,Il trattatoSul cosmoper Alessandroattributo a Aristotele,Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1995.On the ‘Aristotelian’Divisionssee5.90 [] C.Rossitto, ed.,Aristotele ed altri: Divisioni,Padua, Antenore, 1984.5.91 [] [Andronicus]On the Passionsis edited by A.Glibert-Thirry,Pseudo-Andronicus de Rhodes, Peri pathôn,Leiden, Brill, 1977 (Corpus LatinumCommentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum, suppl. 2).Adrastus and Aspasius5.92 [] Aspasius’ commentary on theNicomachean Ethicsis edited by G.HeylbutinCommentaria in Aristotelem Graecavol. 19.1, Berlin, Reimer, 1889.5.93 [] Annotated English translation of Aspasius by H.P.Mercken, forthcoming:London, Duckworth.5.94 [] The anonymous scholia onNicomachean Ethics2–5 incorporating materialfrom Adrastus are edited by G.Heylbut inCommentaria in AristotelemGraecavol. 20, Berlin, Reimer, 1892.See also5.95 [] A.Kenny,The Aristotelian Ethics,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978.5.96 [] F.Becchi, ‘Aspasio e i peripatetici posteriori: la formula definitoria dellapassione’,Prometheus9 (1983) 83–104.5.97 []——‘Aspasio, commentatore di Aristotele’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase(eds),Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Weltvol. II.36.7, Berlin, DeGruyter, 1994, 5365–96.5.98 [] A.Alberti and R.W.Sharples, eds,Aspasius: The Earliest ExtantCommentary on Aristotle’s Ethics,Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999.On Aristoteles, argued by Moraux to be the teacher of Alexander ofAphrodisias, see5.99 [] P.Moraux, ‘Aristoteles, der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias’,Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie49 (1967) 169–82.ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIASTexts and translations5.100 [] Greek texts inCommentaria in Aristotelem Graecavols 1–3, Berlin,Reimer, 1883–1901 (commentaries; various editors) and in5.101 [] I.Bruns, ed.,Supplementum Aristotelicum2.1–2, Berlin, Reimer, 1887–1892 (other works). For spurious works see the bibliography in [5.127].Editions of texts surviving in Arabic, many with translations, are listed in[5.127] and in5.102 [] R.Goulet and M.Aouad, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise’, in R.Goulet, ed.,Dictionnaire des philosophes antiquesvol. 1, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1989,125–39,to be modified in the light of5.103 [] A.Hasnawi, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise vs Jean Philopon: notes sur quelquestraités d’Alexandre ‘perdus’ en grec, conserves en arabe’,Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy4 (1994) 53–109.5.104 [] F.W.Zimmermann, ‘Proclus Arabus rides again’,Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy4 (1994) 9–51.Editions, translations and commentaries of particularworksCommentaries on Aristotle5.105 [] J.Barnes, S.Bobzien, K.Flannery and K.Ierodiakonou,Alexander ofAphrodisias On Aristotle Prior Analytics 1.1–7,London, Duckworth, 1991.(Annotated English translation.)5.106 [] W.E.Dooley,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Metaphysics 1,London, Duckworth, 1989. (Annotated English translation.)5.107 [] W.E.Dooley and A.Madigan,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On AristotleMetaphysics 2 and 3,London, Duckworth, 1992. (Annotated Englishtranslation.)5.108 [] A.Madigan,Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Metaphysics 4,London: Duckworth, 1993. (Annotated English translation.)5.109 [] W.Dooley,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Metaphysics 5, London,Duckworth, 1993. (Annotated English translation.)5.110 [] G.Fine,On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993. (Discusses material from Alexander’scommentary on Aristotle,MetaphysicsA.)5.111 [] E.Lewis,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Meteorology 4,London:Duckworth, 1996. (Annotated English translation).5.112 [] M.Rashed, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise et la ‘Magna Quaestio’: Rôle etindépendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotélicien’,Les Études Classiques63 (1995) 295–351. (On fragments of Alexander’sPhysicscommentary.)5.113 [] M.Rashed, ‘A “new” text of Alexander on the soul’s motion’, in R.Sorabji,ed.,Aristotle and After,University of London, School of Advanced Studies,1997 (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies,suppl. vol. 68), 181–95.On the Soul5.114 [] A.P.Fotinis,The ‘De Anima’ of Alexander of Aphrodisias,Washington,University Press of America, 1979. (English translation and commentary; alsoincludesOn Intellect.)5.115 [] P.Accattino and P.L.Donini,Alessandro di Afrodisia: L’anima,Rome andBari, Laterza, 1996. (Italian translation and commentary.)On Intellect5.116 [] F.M.Schroeder and R.B.Todd,Two Aristotelian Greek Commentators onthe Intellect: The De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias andThemistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle De Anima 3.4–8,Toronto, PontificalInstitute of Medieval Studies, 1990. (Medieval Sources in Translation, 33.)5.117 [] Frederic M.Schroeder, ‘The Provenance of theDe Intellectuattributed toAlexander of Aphrodisias’,Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosoficamedievale6.1 (1995).On Providence5.118 [] S.Fazzo and M.Zonta,Alessandro d’Afrodisia,Sulla Provvidenza, Milan,Rizzoli, 1998.QuaestionesandEthical Problems5.119 [] R.W.Sharples,Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1–2.15,London,Duckworth, 1992. (Annotated English translation.)5.120[]——Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 2.16–3.15,London,Duckworth, 1994. (Annotated English translation.)5.121[]——Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems,London, Duckworth,1990. (Annotated English translation.)On Fate5.122 [] R.W.Sharples,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Fate,London, Duckworth,1983. (Greek text, English translation, commentary.)5.123 [] P.Thillet,Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Traité du, Destin,Paris, Budé, 1984.(Greek text, annotated French translation.)5.124 [] A.Magris,Alessandro di Afrodisia, Sul Destino(collana ‘I rari’), Firenze,Ponte alle Grazie S.p.A., 1996. (Italian translation, commentary.)5.125 [] C.Natali,Alessandro di Afrodisia: Il Destino,Milan, Rusconi, 1996.(Italian translation, commentary.)On Mixture5.126 [] R.B.Todd,Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics,Leiden, Brill, 1976.(Greek text, English translation, commentary.)Studies: generalA general survey, with full bibliography, in5.127 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’,in H.Temporini and W.Haase, eds,Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischenWelt,vol. II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1176–243.A much fuller survey in [5.76].5.128 [] G.Movia,Alessandro di Afrodisia tra naturalismo e misticismo,Padua,Antenore, 1970.5.129 [] P.L.Donini,Tre studi sull’ aristotelismo nel II secolo d.C.,Turin, Paravia,1974.5.130[]——Le scuole, l’anima, l’impero,Turin, Rosenberg and Sellier, 1982.5.131 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘The School of Alexander’, in [5.78] 83–111.5.132 [] G.Abbamonte, ‘Metodi Esegetici nel commentoin Aristotelis TopicadiAlessandro di Afrodisia’,Seconda Miscellanea Filologica, Università degliStudi di Salerno, Quaderni del dipartimento di scienze dell’antichità 17,Naples, Arte Tipografica, 1995, 249–66.5.133 [] P.L.Donini, ‘Alessandro di Afrodisia e i metodi dell’ esegesi filosofica’, inEsegesi, parafrasi e compilazione in età tardoantica: Atti del Terzo Congressodell’ Associazione di studi tardoantichi,a cura di C.Moreschini, Naples,1995, 107–29.5.134 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders of Aphrodisias,scriptaminima. Questionsandproblems, makeweightsand prospects’, in W.Kullmann, J.Althoff and M.Asper, eds.,Gattungen wissenschaftlicherLiteratur in der Antike(ScriptOralia Bd. 95=Altertumswissenschaftliche ReiheBd. 22), Tübingen: Günter Narr Verlag, 1998, 383–403.Studies on particular topicsLogic5.135 [] K.L.Flannery, SJ.,Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias(Philosophia Antiqua, 62), Leiden, Brill, 1995.Physics5.136 [] S.Pines, ‘Omne quod movetur necesse est ab aliquo moveri: a refutation ofGalen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the theory of motion’,Isis52 (1961)21–54. Reprinted in id.,Studies in Arabic Versions of Greek Texts and inMedieval Science,Jerusalem and Leiden, Magnes Press/Brill, 1986, 218–51.5.137 [] P.Moraux, ‘Alexander von AphrodisiasQuaest.2.3’,Hermes95 (1967)159–69.5.138 [] N.Rescher and M.Marmura,Alexander of Aphrodisias: The Refutation ofGalen’s Treatise on the Theory of Motion,Islamabad, Islamic ResearchInstitute, 1969.5.139 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias,On Time,’Phronesis27 (1982)58–81.5.140 [] S.Fazzo and H.Wiesner, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Kindî-circle andin al-Kindî’s cosmology’,Arabic Sciences and Philosophy3 (1993) 119–53.Psychology and metaphysics5.141 [] P.Moraux,Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d’Aristote,Liège/Paris, Faculté des Lettres/E.Droz, 1942.5.142 [] E.P.Mahoney, ‘Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander ofAphrodisias: an unnoticed dispute’,Rivista critica di storia della filosofia23(1968) 268–96.5.143 [] P.L.Donini, ‘L’anima e gli elementi nelDe Animadi Alessandro diAfrodisia’,Atti dell’ Accademia delle Scienze di Torino,classe di scienzemorali, storiche e filologiche, 105 (1971) 61–107.5.144 [] A.C.Lloyd,Form and Universal in Aristotle (ARCA, Classical and MedievalTexts, Papers and Monographs,4), Liverpool, Francis Cairns, 1981.5.145 [] H.Robinson, ‘Form and the immateriality of the intellect from Aristotle toAquinas’, in H.Blumenthal and H.Robinson, eds.,Aristotle and the LaterTradition(Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,supplementary volume),Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, 207–26.5.146 [] D.K.W.Modrak, ‘Alexander onphantasia:a hopeless muddle or a betteraccount?’,Southern Journal of Philosophy31 (1993), supplement, 173–97.5.147 [] J.Ellis, ‘Alexander’s Defense of Aristotle’s Categories’,Phronesis39 (1994)69–89.5.148 [] A.Madigan, ‘Alexander on Species and Genera’, in Lawrence P.Schrenk, ed.,Aristotle in Late Antiquity,Washington, DC, The Catholic University ofAmerica Press, 1994, 74–91.5.149 [] R.W.Sharples, ‘On Body, Soul and Generation in Alexander ofAphrodisias’,Apeiron27 (1994) 163–70.5.150 [] P.Accattino, ‘Generazione dell’anima in Alessandro di Afrodisia, De anima2.10–11.13’,Phronesis40 (1995) 182–201.Fate5.151 [] P.L.Donini, ‘Stoici e megarici nel de fato di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, inG.Giannantoni, ed.,Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica,Bologna,Il Mulino, 1977, 174–94.5.152 [] D.Frede, ‘The dramatisation of determinism: Alexander of Aphrodisias’Defato’, Phronesis27 (1982) 276–98.5.153 [] J.Mansfeld, ‘Diaphonia in the argument of Alexander De fato chs 1–2’,Phronesis33 (1988) 181–207.5.154 [] P.L.Donini, ‘IlDe fatodi Alessandro: questioni di coerenza’, in H.Temporini and W.Haase, eds,Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,vol.II.36.2, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1987, 1244–59.5.155 [] R.Gaskin, ‘Alexander’s sea battle: a discussion of Alexander of AphrodisiasDe fato10’,Phronesis38 (1993) 75–94.5.156[]——The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and DiodorusCronus on the Metaphysics of the Future,Berlin, De Gruyter, 1995.5.157 [] P.L.Donini, ‘Doti naturali, abitudini e carattere nelDe fatodi Alessandro’,in K.A.Algra, P.W.van der Horst, D.T.Runia, eds,Polyhistor: Studies in theHistory and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to JaapMansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday,Leiden, Brill, 1996, 284–99.5.158 [] S.Bobzien, ‘The inadvertent conception and late birth of the free-willproblem’,Phronesis43 (1998) 133–75.OTHER WORKS CITED (MISCELLANEOUS)5.159 [] K.Algra,Concepts of Space in Greek Thought,Leiden, Brill, 1995.(Philosophia Antiqua, 65.)5.160 [] J.E.Annas,Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind,Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1992.5.161[]——The Morality of Happiness,New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.5.162 [] H.von Arnim,Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta,Leipzig, Teubner, 1903–24(=SVF).5.163 [] J.Barnes,Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975.5.164[]——Aristotle,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.5.165 [] S.Ebbesen,Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s ‘SophisticiElenchi’(Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum , 7),Leiden, Brill, 1981.5.166 [] T.Ebert,Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus,Göttingen,Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1991.5.167 [] T.Göransson,Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus(Studia Graeca et LatinaGothoburgensia, 61), Göteborg, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995.5.168 [] H.B.Gottschalk, ‘Soul as harmonia’,Phronesis16 (1971) 179–98.5.169 [] A.Gotthelf, ed.,Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical andHistorical Studies Presented to David M.Balme,Pittsburgh, Mathesis, 1985.5.170 [] W.K.C.Guthrie,Aristotle: On the Heavens,London/Cambridge, Mass.,Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1939.5.171 [] E.C.Halper,One and Many in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’: The CentralBooks,Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1989.5.172 [] A.M.Ioppolo,Aristone di Chio,Naples, Bibliopolis, 1980.5.173 [] M.Isnardi Parente,Filosofia e scienza nel pensiero ellenistico,Naples,Morano, 1991.5.174 [] W.Neale and M.Kneale,The Development of Logic,Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1963.5.175 [] J.G.Lennox, ‘Are Aristotelian species eternal’, in [5.169] 67–94.5.176 []——‘Kinds, forms of kinds, and the more and less in Aristotle’s biology’, inA.Gotthelf and J.G.Lennox, eds.,Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, 339–59.5.177 [] A.C.Lloyd, ‘The principle that the cause is greater than its effect’,Phronesis21 (1976) 146–56.5.178 [] J.Longrigg,Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and Medicine fromAlcmaeon to the Alexandrians,London, Routledge, 1993.5.179 [] J.Mansfeld, ‘Aristotle, Plato, and the Preplatonic doxography andchronography’, in G.Cambiano, ed.,Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofiaantica,Turin, Tirrenia, 1986, 1–59.5.180 [] J.Mansfeld, ‘Physikai doxaiandProblemata physikafrom Aristotle toAëtius (and beyond)’, in [5.37] 63–111.5.181 [] G.Movia,Anima e intelletto,Padua, Antenore, 1968.5.182 [] I.Mueller, ‘Hippolytus, Aristotle, Basilides’, in Lawrence P.Schrenk, ed.,Aristotle in Late Antiquity,Washington, DC, The Catholic University ofAmerica Press, 1994, 143–57.5.183 [] A.Peck,Aristotle: Generation of Animals,London/Cambridge, Mass.,Heinemann/Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library), 1942.5.184 [] P.Pellegrin, ‘Aristotle: a zoology without species’, in [5.169] 95–115.5.185 [] C.B.Schmitt, ‘Aristotelian textual studies at Padua: the case of FrancescoCavalli’, in A.Poppi, ed.,Scienza e filosofia all’ università di Padova nelquattrocento,Padua, Edizioni LINT, 1983, 287–314.5.186 [] R.Sorabji,Matter, Space and Motion,London, Duckworth, 1988.5.187 [] F.Ueberweg, ed. H.Flashar,Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, DiePhilosophie der Antike,3, Basel, Schwabe, 1983.5.188 [] G.Verbeke, ‘Doctrine du pneuma et entéléchisme chez Aristote’, in G.E.R.Lloyd and G.E.L.Owen, eds,Aristotle on Mind and the Senses,Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1978, 191–214.5.189 [] J.Wiesner, ed.,Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung: Paul Moraux gewidmet,vol.1, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1985.5.190 []——vol. 2, 1987.5.191 [] E.Zeller,Die Philosophie der Griechen3.24, Leipzig, Reisland, 1903.