Kant’s moral and political philosophyDon BeckerPractical philosophy, for Kant, is concerned with how one ought to act.His first important work in practical philosophy, Foundations of theMetaphysics of Morals, provides Kant’s argument for the fundamentalprinciple of how one ought to act, called the “categorical imperative,”which basically requires one to act only according to principles that arethemselves fit to be universal law. In Part I of this chapter we will focus onKant’s argument for the categorical imperative, and see how it functions asthe fundamental principle of his moral philosophy. In Part II we will lookat Kant’s political philosophy, seeing both that it is grounded in thisfundamental principle of how one ought to act, and that it gains supportfrom other aspects of Kant’s philosophical thinking.PART I: KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHYInasmuch as Kant thinks that the fundamental principle of how one ought toact must be capable of grounding a definitive answer in all circumstances, herecognizes that no empirical study, which is dependent on the contingentnature of the world as we experience it, can provide the sort of principle thathe seeks. Instead, Kant will proceed with an a priori study of how one oughtto act, which, insofar as it is independent of the contingent nature of theworld as we experience it, can provide a definitive principle. Two forms of apriori study that Kant employs are the analysis of concepts andtranscendental arguments. According to the former, insofar as some conceptapplies, whatever is entailed in that concept is true. According to the latter,insofar as some concept applies, whatever is a necessary condition of itsapplication is true. Thus, Kant begins with the two concepts that arefundamental to his intended study, “morality” and “rational being,” anddetermines that they reveal the truth of the categorical imperative.(Although the concept “rational being” is really the fundamental conceptemployed by Kant, the concept “morality,” which he could have derivedfrom the concept “rational being,” plays a central role in his presentation.)Kant’s presentation includes two basic steps.First, he asks what is meant bythe concept “morality,” and argues that it entails rational beings acting inaccord with the categorical imperative. This, however, only answers thequestion of what morality is on the assumption that morality exists. Kantthen considers the concept “rational being,” and argues that a necessarycondition of a being thinking that this concept applies to itself is that it thinkof itself as free. Furthermore, since Kant equates freedom in this sense (i.e.“positive freedom”) with what he calls autonomy, and autonomy withsubjection to the categorical imperative, it follows that beings who think ofthemselves as rational must consider themselves to be subject to thecategorical imperative that he has described.1“Morality” and “rational beings”Kant engages in the a priori study of ethics, or metaphysics of morals,because this is the only way to gain definitive knowledge of how oneought to act. He proceeds by first considering what is meant by“morality,” and determining that it means neither more nor less thanacting according to the categorical imperative (FMM, 58).2 Although moremust be said before it is possible to explain the categorical imperativefully, and the exact nature of the moral principle that it designates,nevertheless, if one merely considers the two words that make up the term,an important aspect of its nature is revealed. “Categorical” meansabsolute, without qualification or exception, and “imperative” refers to atype of command. Thus, a categorical imperative is an absolute command.According to Kant, “Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally(i.e. as a ground of obligation), must imply absolute necessity” (FMM, 5).Thus, Kant treats it as obvious to everyone that morality ultimately entails anabsolute command or categorical imperative. Furthermore, since nothingabsolute can be derived from something contingent, he argues that the onlyway to determine the exact nature of this absolute command is to engage in thea priori study of practical reason (i.e. reason related to acting):unless we wish to deny all truth to the concept of morality andrenounce its application to any possible object, we cannot refuse toadmit that the law is of such broad significance that it holds notmerely for men but for all rational beings as such; we must grantthat it must be valid with absolute necessity and not merely undercontingent conditions and with exceptions. For with what rightcould we bring into unlimited respect something that might be validonly under contingent human conditions? And how could laws of thedetermination of our will be held to be laws of the determination ofthe will of any rational being whatever and of ourselves in so far aswe are rational beings, if they were merely empirical and did nothave their origin completely a priori in pure, but practical reason?(FMM, 24)Kant holds that morality entails absolute laws; that, insofar as they areabsolute, these laws must hold not only for human beings but for allsimilar, i.e. rational, beings; and that to have such general applicabilitythese laws cannot be learned through experience or any empirical study,but must be derived through a purely a priori study.Kant thinks that people, insofar as they are rational, are subject to anabsolute moral law. Kant thinks that the fact that rational beings aresubject to an absolute moral law is what fundamentally distinguishes themfrom all of the other material things in the world, which he recognizes tobe subject to the laws of nature. Thus, Kant distinguishes physics, which isconcerned with those objects that are subject to the “laws of nature,”from ethics, which is concerned with those objects that are subject to the“laws of freedom” (FMM, 3). As will become clear, these laws of freedomconstitute the absolute moral law.This distinction between physics and ethics can be somewhat confusing;after all, isn’t everything subject to the laws of nature? Maybe not. Thinkfor a moment of a world in which everything were subject to the laws ofnature. This would be a world of strict causal determinism; everythingthat happened would have followed inexorably from what preceded it.Among other things, all human behavior would be completely determinedby these laws. But if all human behavior is causally determined accordingto laws of nature, then in what sense could people be considered morallyresponsible for their acts? Thus, if the concept “morality” is to makesense, then it must be possible to think of people not only as commonphysical entities subject to the laws of nature, but also, in another sense, asrational beings, subject to the laws of freedom (see FMM, 68–73).Kant thinks of people in just this dual way, as sensible or physical beings,causally determined according to the laws of nature, and as intelligible orpurely rational beings, independent of causal determinism and capable ofacting in accord with the laws of freedom. Accordingly, Kant suggests that thehuman will is subjected to two influences (see e.g. FMM, 16, 42). As sensibleor physical beings, human beings have desires that arise from their physicalnature and corresponding physical needs, which Kant broadly characterizesas the desire to be happy. This universal desire, as well as otherindiosyncratic particular desires, is the source of inclinations, which exert apotentially controlling influence on the will. However, insofar as humanbeings are intelligible or purely rational beings, they recognize the laws offreedom, resist the force of inclination, and determine their will forthemselves, independently of external influences and inclinations.Furthermore, and recognition of this is crucial for a correct understanding ofKant’s moral philosophy, Kant thinks that all rational beings, insofar as theydetermine their will for themselves independently of their inclinations, willrecognize the very same principle, the categorical imperative, as expressingthe law of freedom in accord with which they ought to act (FMM, 71).Thus far we have seen that the concept of “morality” entails the notionof an absolute law or “categorical imperative,” and that it can only applyto (rational) beings who can resist their inclinations and choose to followsuch a law of freedom. Let us now look more closely at exactly what Kantmeans by a “categorical imperative.”Kant’s concept of a categorical imperativeImagine that the human will were influenced only by pure reason.Whatever pure reason recognized as right would necessarily be willed, andwhoever was possessed of pure reason would never do wrong. But Kanthas said that the human will is influenced by both reason and inclination.Therefore, human beings don’t necessarily will (and consequently act) aspure reason reveals is right, because they can be led astray by theirinclinations. Thus, if a human will is to be determined in accordance withthe objective moral law, it must be constrained. Kant calls the formulathat expresses the command that constrains this will an imperative. Kantholds that there are two types of imperatives:All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Theformer present the practical necessity of a possible action as a meansto achieving something else which one desires (or which one maypossibly desire). The categorical imperative would be one whichpresented an action as of itself objectively necessarily, without regardto any other end.(FMM, 30)Two points that are rather important to Kant are expressed in thispassage.First, Kant reveals the basic difference between hypothetical andcategorical imperatives. All imperatives determine the will to some good,but hypothetical imperatives say only that some action is good given thatone has a particular purpose. Hypothetical imperatives reveal the meansto given ends. Since these ends are contingent, however, as are all theends that one commonly imagines (including the desire for happiness)inasmuch as there is no necessity for human beings to be so constitutedthat they have any of the particular desires that they experience, theseends cannot give rise to a categorical imperative. A categoricalimperative, as Kant says, cannot depend on any contingent end, but“would be one which presented an action as of itself objectivelynecessary.”Second, by saying of a categorical imperative that it “would be one…,’Kant is making it clear that there may be no categorical imperative. Kantis only talking about what a categorical imperative would be like if oneexisted. This is very important, and is consistent with a point made earlier.Human beings can only be subject to a moral law if they are capable ofresisting the influences of their inclinations, and determining their willsthrough reason in accord with a principle or law that is known a priori.There can be no moral responsibility for beings whose actions are allcausally determined. Thus, before Kant can actually assert that there is acategorical imperative, he must first show that human beings have reasonto believe themselves capable of determining their wills through reason.Nevertheless, Kant’s argumentative strategy is to hold off on the questionof whether human beings are actually subject to the categoricalimperative, and to first pursue the question of what a categoricalimperative would be, assuming that one exists.The first formulation of the categorical imperativeKant argues that there can be only one categorical imperative, and that,from the very idea of a categorical imperative, one can deduce a formulaof the categorical imperative. Kant’s argument can be expressed as follows(see FMM, 37–8). A categorical imperative is an absolute law. Although itis obvious that a categorical imperative entails an absolute law, it is not atall clear what this law will command. Imagine any possible content of thislaw, say, to maximize human happiness. Insofar as what constituteshuman happiness is contingent (human beings could be constituteddifferently), all that one can construct is a hypothetical imperative directedto a particular contingent end. Thus, a categorical imperative cannot bedirected to any particular contingent end.But if the imperative cannot be directed toward any particularcontingent ends, then what is left? Although later a formulation of thecategorical imperative that is based on an end that is not contingent willbe considered, for now it seems that the imperative can require nothingmore than conformity to absolute law. But since there is nothing inparticular to which this absolute law can be directed, it can command onlythat one act in a way that is at least consistent with the possibility ofabsolute law. Kant expresses this categorical imperative as follows: “Actonly according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will thatit should become a universal law” (FMM, 38). This imperative does notrely on any specific content, but states the formal requirement that onealways act in a way that one could will to be required to act by anabsolute law.The application of the categorical imperative and the distinctionbetween perfect and imperfect dutiesWhat does it mean to act only according to that maxim by which youcan at the same time will that it should become a universal law? First,what is a maxim? A maxim is a general principle according to which anindividual acts. Thus, one might hold the maxim “I will watch televisionwhen bored,” or “I will steal things when I desire more goods.” Kantis saying that it is morally permissible to act according to one’s maximonly if it is possible at the same time to will that it should become auniversal law.One of the most famous examples that Kant uses to help make his pointclear is that of the maxim to make a false promise to honor one’s debtwhen seeking a loan that one does not intend to pay back (see e.g. FMM,18–19, 39). Can one hold this maxim and, at the same time, will that itshould be a universal law? Well, imagine that there were a universal law tomake false promises. In such circumstances, inasmuch as no one could betrusted, the institution of promising itself could not exist. Now, since it islogically impossible for one at the same time to will both to make a falsepromise and that the institution of promising not exist, it is immoral to acton the maxim to make a false promise when desirous of another’s money.Thus, the categorical imperative, as well as stating a restriction onpermissible behavior, also provides a test of whether the restrictionapplies. If one cannot conceive of acting on the maxim while, at the sametime, the maxim holds as a universal law, as is the case in the exampleof the false promise, then the maxim fails the test and may not beacted upon.Immediately after introducing the categorical imperative, Kant providesfour examples of its application, which are designed to represent acommon division of duties into four basic categories. Kant providesexamples of perfect duties and imperfect duties both to oneself and toothers, which can be classified as shown below.Duty to oneself Duty to othersPerfect duty Do not commit suicide Do not falsely promiseImperfect duty Develop talents Be beneficentWhile the distinction between duties to oneself and duties to othersrequires no explanation, this is not the case with the distinction betweenperfect and imperfect duties. Kant was not the first to distinguish betweenperfect and imperfect duties, but his distinction does not correspondexactly with that of his predecessors (FMM, 38 n.). As Kant employs theconcepts, perfect duties are those with which one’s every action mustconform. Thus, in all but one special case (i.e. the duty to join the state),perfect duties actually entail prohibitions against actions that should neverbe performed under any circumstances, e.g. stealing and murder. Imperfectduties, for Kant, entail principles that one must adopt, but that one neednot (and, in fact, cannot) act upon in every instance. One would not thinkof another as moral who did not hold, and in some appropriatecircumstances act upon, the principle “Be beneficent.” However, it is alsoclear that it is not possible for one’s every act to be the fulfillment of animperfect duty. For one thing, one’s every act cannot be, say, beneficent,since one also must tend to one’s own physical needs. Even moreobviously, one’s every act cannot be one of beneficence, and also one ofdeveloping talents, and also one that furthers every other imperfect duty.Thus, Kant distinguishes between those duties with which one’s every actmust accord, and those duties that require one to adopt a principle, butleave one leeway in deciding when to act upon it.With this distinction between perfect and imperfect duties in mind, it isimportant to look back to the categorical imperative, and to the test of thepermissibility of actions. There are two ways that a maxim can fail the testof the categorical imperative. There are maxims for which it is logicallyimpossible, and thus inconceivable, for one to will the maxim and itsuniversalization at the same time, as in the false promise examplediscussed above, and there are maxims for which there is merely acontradiction in the will of an individual who wills both the maxim and itsuniversalization at the same time, as in the example discussed below. Kantrecognizes that there is an exact correspondence both between the dutiesgenerated by maxims failing the test of the categorical imperative in theformer manner and perfect duties, and between the duties generated bymaxims failing the test of the categorical imperative in the latter mannerand imperfect duties (FMM, 40–1).3 Both Kant’s test of duties entailed inthe categorical imperative and his reformulation of the distinction betweenperfect and imperfect duties gain support from this correspondence.Having already seen in the example of a false promise how perfect dutiesare related to maxims for which it is inconceivable to will both the maximand its universalization at the same time, let us turn to an example of animperfect duty. Consider the maxim “I will not develop my talents when Iseem to be doing fine without bothering.” There is no logical contradictionthat results from holding this maxim and, at the same time, willing that itshould become a universal law. After all, one can very well imagine a rathereasy life on a tropical island where one need do nothing more than pick fruitwhen hungry. Thus, adopting this maxim does not violate a perfect duty.Remember, however, that the categorical imperative says to “act onlyaccording to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that itshould become a universal law.” While the test of perfect duties focuses onwhether one can will that the maxim should become a universal law,thereby focusing on the logical possibility of holding the maxim and itsuniversalization at the same time, the test of imperfect duties focuses on thequestion of whether one can will that the maxim should become a universallaw. It may be logically possible to live a human life without developingone’s talents, and yet it may be impossible, without contradiction, to will tolive such a life. Although Kant’s treatment of the examples of imperfectduties is very unclear, I think that one can make the best sense of hisdiscussion if one reads him as saying that the human will is essentiallyunlimited in that it can hold anything imaginable as its object, and that acontradiction therefore results if one wills to place a limitation on one’s ownwill. Thus, it is not logically impossible for people to will not to developtheir talents (it doesn’t violate a perfect duty) but it entails a contradiction intheir will, since, on the one hand, their wills are essentially unlimited, but,on the other hand, willing the nondevelopment of one’s talents yields alimitation on what one can effectively will. According to this analysis, itfollows that there is an imperfect duty to develop one’s talents.The second formulation of the categorical imperativeAlthough Kant thinks that there is only one categorical imperative, hethinks that it can be formulated in more than one way. Of course, anyother formulation of the categorical imperative, if it is to be a formulationof the same imperative, must require and prohibit exactly the same actionsas the first formulation. Although Kant maintains that the firstformulation discussed above is the most fundamental and precise, hedevelops alternative formulations of the categorical imperative becausethey make the demands of morality more intuitively plausible (FMM, 53).The derivation of the first formulation of the categorical imperative canbe thought of as based on a consideration of the necessary form of acategorical imperative. The idea is that the imperative must express anabsolute law, but, since the law cannot command any contingent particularand still be absolute, all that can be commanded is that any particularmaxim to be acted upon must be of such a form that it could be universallaw. The second formulation of the categorical imperative, in contrast,focuses on the proper content of one’s maxims (FMM, 48, 53). Kant basesthe second formulation of the categorical imperative on his view thatrational beings have absolute value as ends in themselves (FMM, 45–6).Although Kant’s argument in support of this view of rational beings isnot very clear, it appears to rely on two fundamental claims. Kant haselsewhere said that the only thing that is good without qualification is agood will (since anything else can be put to a bad end, but not goodwilling itself) (FMM, 9–10), and seems to allude to this position during theargument. He also begins the discussion of which this argument is a partby reminding his readers that only rational beings have a will (FMM, 44).From these two claims it is reasonable to conclude that rational beings areof absolute value because they are the only possible source of that which isgood without qualification. An imperative with content can therefore be acategorical imperative, provided that the end of that imperative is forrational beings to be treated as ends. Thus, the second formulation of thecategorical imperative is: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in yourown person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a meansonly”4 (FMM, 46). This imperative includes an absolute prohibitionagainst treating others as means only, and to do so would violate a perfectduty. It also requires one actively to treat others as ends, and thisrequirement is an imperfect duty. A reconsideration of the examplesintroduced earlier will help make this clear.Consider what happens when Mary makes a false promise to John, sayto pay back a loan when, in fact, she intends to flee to Brazil. Mary hasused John as a means for gaining the money she needs to go to Brazil. It istrue that virtually any time two people make an agreement they aretreating one another as means, but the important thing is that when theagreement is honest they are not treating one another as a means only.When making an honest agreement, people know more or less how theyare furthering the interests of another, and this furthering of the other’sinterests is an explicit part of their own act. Thus, in honest agreementspeople treat one another as means, but they also respect one another asends, insofar as the other has been able to make a free and informeddecision as to whether to participate in the agreement. However, whenMary exploited John’s trust by making a false promise, she treated him asa means only, in that he was not given the relevant information withwhich to decide whether he wanted to provide the benefit to Mary thatshe actually received. He was not treated as an end at all, in that he wasnot provided the opportunity to embrace the results of their interaction asan end of his own. Thus, Mary violated a perfect duty by treating anotherrational being, not as an end, but as a means only.Now imagine that Mary is a botanist fascinated by, and extremelytalented at, studying tropical deforestation, and she asks John, who won$50 million in the lottery, to help fund a research trip to Brazil. Here thereis no question of perfect duties. Neither Mary’s request for support, norJohn’s either providing it or refusing to do so, entails treating a rationalbeing as a means only. But should John provide the support? Were John toprovide the funding, he would be treating Mary as an end, insofar as hewould be acting to facilitate her realization of her own ends. Of course, aswas pointed out in the previous discussion of imperfect duties, it is nothumanly possible for one’s every action to be one of actively treating (inthe sense of furthering) others as ends. Nevertheless, there is an imperfectduty to hold the principle of actively treating or furthering others as ends,and to act on this principle in appropriate circumstances. John may not bespecifically required to provide funding for Mary, but he does have animperfect duty, in a range of circumstances that seem appropriate to him,to use his personal resources to actively treat or further other rationalbeings as ends. Thus, it is a perfect duty never to treat oneself or anotherrational being as a means only, and an imperfect duty to actively treat orfurther all rational beings as ends in themselves.The third formulation of the categorical imperative, theprinciple of autonomy, and dutyAlthough Kant expresses his third formulation of the categoricalimperative in a number of ways, its clearest statement may be in the“principle of autonomy.” According to this principle one is only subject tothe moral law that one has legislated for oneself: “Never choose except insuch a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended as universallaw in the same volition” (FMM, 57). Although this principle seems quitesimilar to the first formulation of the categorical imperative, the importantdifference is that this principle requires one to think of the universal lawsas issuing from one’s own volitions, and thus that the constraints to whichone is subject come from one’s own will. Kant’s point is that rational beingsare not merely subject to the moral law, but subject to the law because theycreated it themselves, i.e. because the law comes from their own will.To understand the importance of autonomy for morality one mustconsider Kant’s views on “good will” and “duty.” While other things mightbe good toward one end or another, or when employed in one way oranother, Kant says that the only thing that is good without qualification isthe good will (see FMM, 9–10). Kant then reveals the nature of the goodwill in a discussion of duty (see FMM, 12–15). Kant argues that acts do nothave moral worth merely because they accord with duty, but only if they aredone from (the motive of) duty. For example, if a shopkeeper gives a youngchild the correct change because they know that it is good for business, oreven if someone helps another in need because they like to be helpful,although the acts accord with duty, they have no true moral worth. Kant isnot saying that it is bad for people to behave in these ways, but only thatthey do not warrant moral esteem. In all the cases in which people behave inaccord with duty, but for reasons other than just the requirements of duty,the person is moved by some particular interest, even if it is only the goodfeeling that they get inside. In all of these cases the person is acting out ofsome particular interest, and not merely manifesting a good will. The goodwill is only manifest when one does one’s duty, not from any particularinterest, but precisely because it is one’s duty.Now the importance of the principle of autonomy can be clear. Imaginethat rational beings were subject to a moral law that they had not createdfor themselves. If the moral law did not come from the rational being’sown will, then there would have to be some influence external to thisbeing that moved it to act in conformity to the law. Obedience to themoral law would then be conditional on rational beings responding in acertain way to this external influence. For Kant, however, this would beantithetical to morality. Obedience might accord with duty, but it wouldnot be from duty, it would not manifest a good will, and it would have notrue moral worth.Kant concludes that the principle of autonomy expresses thefundamental claim of his moral theory:That the principle of autonomy, which is now in question, is the soleprinciple of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis ofconcepts of morality; for by this analysis we find that its principlemust be a categorical imperative and that the imperative commandsneither more nor less than this very autonomy.(FMM, 58)The concept of morality entails the idea of an absolute law, and, therefore,the fundamental moral principle must be a categorical imperative. Butwhen one thinks about this imperative one recognizes that, since theimperative must be absolute, it cannot be based on anything ofcontingent interest. This requirement eliminates all principles that havetheir source outside of the individual, and leaves only the principle ofautonomy.Why people are subject to the categorical imperativeSo far it has been shown that if there is such a thing as morality, then itsrule is expressed by the categorical imperative (in all of its alternativeformulations) that Kant has provided. What has not been shown is thatbeings like ourselves are subject to this morality. Kant has shown that it isessential to the concept of the categorical imperative, through the principleof autonomy to which it leads, that, if there is to truly be a categoricalimperative, then it must be adopted by rational beings for themselves. Butwhy would rational beings adopt the categorical imperative? Kant’sanswer is that, insofar as rational beings take themselves to be rational,they necessarily recognize the categorical imperative as a constraint uponthemselves. Kant is saying that a necessary component of the self-image ofrational beings is their recognition of the fact that they must constrainthemselves in accord with the categorical imperative. Here again one cansee that Kant is using an a priori argument based on the concept “rationalbeing” to support his moral theory.Kant’s transcendental argument for his moral theory takes thefollowing form. First he argues that there is a relationship betweenfreedom and autonomy such that all beings who consider themselves freemust accept the principle of autonomy, which, as was previouslydiscussed, entails the categorical imperative (FMM, 64). Then he showsthat rational beings, because of how they experience the world, and,specifically, their own activity in the world, must consider themselves free(FMM, 65). Thus, it follows that rational beings must think of themselvesas constrained by the categorical imperative. An explanation of thistranscendental argument for the categorical imperative best begins with anaccount of his view of freedom.Rational beings have wills, and they cause things to happen inthe world through their wills. Kant says of the will of rationalbeings thatfreedom would be that property of this causality by which it can beeffective independently of foreign causes determining it, just asnatural necessity is the property of the causality of all irrationalbeings by which they are determined to activity by the influence offoreign causes.(FMM, 63)This is Kant’s view of negative freedom, i.e. freedom from determinationby something external to the will. The idea is that if one’s will is free inthis negative sense, then, as opposed to existing merely as a sensible orphysical being, subject to strict causal determinism, one must also exist asan intelligible or purely rational being that can have effects on the worldindependently of any foreign influences one experiences.Kant claims that this negative conception of freedom opens the door toa positive one. Kant has said that the will is a kind of causality that, free inthe negative sense, is not determined by foreign influences. One mustrecognize, however, that “the concept of a causality entails that of lawsaccording to which something (i.e. the effect) must be established throughsomething else which we call cause” (FMM, 63).So how is a will that is free in the negative sense determined? It is clearfrom the concept of “causality” that a free will must be determined inaccord with some law. This is also confirmed by common sense. Toimagine a will that is not determined in accord with some law, is toimagine a will that is random. But a being whose will appears to berandom is not thought of as free, but is ushered away by people in whitecoats. Such a will does not accord with the concept of “freedom.”To be free, therefore, a will must be determined in accord with somelaw. It cannot be determined by the laws of nature, for determination bythe laws of nature is exactly what accounts for the lack of negativefreedom in sensible or physical beings. Thus, a will that is free in thepositive sense must determine itself, it must act in accord with a law that itadopts for itself, a law of freedom. This, however, is exactly what it is tobe autonomous, and therefore to recognize oneself as subject to thecategorical imperative. After all, the categorical imperative is the onlyprinciple of the will that beings can adopt for themselves, since all otherimperatives are based on ends that are of contingent value, and, thus,entail rational beings’ determination by things external to themselves.Kant concludes this discussion by stating that “a free will and a will undermoral laws are identical” (FMM, 64).Kant still hasn’t shown either that rational beings have free wills, orthat there are any beings in the world that are subject to the morality thathe has described. What has been shown is that only free beings can besubject to morality, and, more importantly, that all beings that think ofthemselves as free must think of themselves as subject to morality. Thus, ifKant demonstrates that rational beings necessarily think of themselves asfree, then he will have shown that rational beings must think of themselvesas subject to the categorical imperative. And if this demonstration is basedon the way that rational beings necessarily experience themselves in theworld, then Kant will have provided a transcendental argument thatrational beings are subject to the categorical imperative. So the question is:Do rational beings experience themselves in the world in a way thatrequires them to think of themselves as having a free will?5What is it to think of oneself as a rational being? To think of oneselfas rational is to think that one applies reason (competently) whenmaking judgments. The following is an example of applying reason whenmaking a judgment: If a rational being knows that if statement P is truethen statement Q is true, and also knows that P is, in fact, true, then, ifit actually manifests its rationality, it will conclude that Q is true,through the application of a certain, in this case obvious, principle oflogic. A being that came to hold that Q is true without having appliedthe principle of logic, say because Q just popped into its mind, wouldnot be thought of as having made a rational judgment (regardless of thetruth of its belief). Furthermore, even a being who applied the principleof logic, if it did so out of instinct, or because it was forced to by someexternal power, would not be thought of as having (itself) made arational judgment. Calling a judgment rational, and, by extension, abeing rational insofar as it makes rational judgments, is only appropriatewhen the being has itself adopted and correctly applied the relevantprinciple of logic. If the being does not do this for itself then it is like asimple computer (one for which there is no question of artificialintelligence). It never deserves credit for the conclusions that it drawsbecause its application of logical principles is solely the result of forcesexternal to itself, e.g. the skill of its programmer.Thus, with respect to logical judgments, a being can only think of itselfas rational if it thinks that it has adopted and applied the principles oflogic for itself. Of course, one can adopt and apply these principles foroneself only if one is free in Kant’s positive sense. Thus, to think of oneselfas rational, at least in one’s logical judgments, one must think of oneself asfree, and as having freely adopted the laws of logic. Nevertheless,although one must freely adopt these laws if one is to think of oneself asrational, that does not necessarily mean that one could adopt some otherlaws of logic and still think of oneself as rational. It is quite possible(though there are some who would question this claim) that there is onlyone set of fundamental logical laws that one can adopt without belyingone’s rationality. One’s freedom is still manifest, however, by the fact thatone has adopted the laws of logic for oneself, even though there is onlyone set of logical laws that one can adopt as a rational being.The situation with regard to morality is analogous. To consider oneselfpossessed of practical reason, i.e. to think that one applies reason indetermining one’s will and consequently one’s actions, one must think ofoneself as freely adopting one’s principles of action. In other words, onemust think of oneself as having a free will. However, the fact that onemust be free in adopting one’s principles of action does not mean thatthere must be some range of options for one to select from among. Asappears to be the case with logic, in the case of morality, there is exactlyone fundamental principle of action that can be freely adopted, and that isthe categorical imperative.These considerations lead to a common confusion with respect to Kant’sviews on freedom, which can be expressed in the following question: How isit possible for one both to be free and to have to adopt the categoricalimperative? This question manifests a misunderstanding of what Kantmeans by freedom. By freedom Kant does not mean the option of choosingone thing or another (which one might also call liberty), but rather, thepower of self-determination (which can also be called autonomy).Kant’s point is that if the moral law is truly to be freely adopted, then itcannot get its force from any contingent conditions external to the individual.However, the only principle of action that is independent of determination byany contingent external influences is the categorical imperative. Therefore,insofar as one thinks of oneself as a rational being, possessed of practicalreason, one must think of oneself as subject to the categorical imperative.A second common confusion with respect to Kant’s views on freedomis that he thinks that people are free only when they act in accord withthe categorical imperative. The concern is that Kant is claiming thatpeople are not acting freely on those occasions when they succumb to theinfluence of their inclinations and act contrary to the categoricalimperative. If this were true it would raise quite a problem, because itentails the claim that people who act immorally are not free, andtherefore cannot be held responsible for their actions. Kant, however,thinks of all rational beings as free insofar as they recognize thecategorical imperative as a constraint upon their actions. Those whoviolate this constraint, insofar as they are rational, recognize that theyhave done wrong exactly because they recognize the categoricalimperative as a proper constraint upon their wills (FMM, 41). A beingwho violates the categorical imperative, and does not recognize that ithas done wrong, must not have adopted the categorical imperative as aconstraint upon its will. Such a being cannot think of itself as rational.Thus, the categorical imperative expresses the definitive principle of howrational beings ought to act.PART II: KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHYIn his political writings Kant builds upon the foundations he establishedprincipally in his moral philosophy to provide a rather strong argumentsupporting the necessity and the legitimacy of the state. In particular, heargues that there must be a single institution among a people, which hecalls the state, that has the authority to use coercion to force people toleave others free to formulate and pursue the ends of their choice,provided that they are not violating the similar freedom of another. Kantargues both that morality requires people to exist within a state thatsecures their freedom to formulate and pursue the ends of their choice,provided that they do not violate the similar freedom of others, and thatmorality permits people to use coercion to force others to be members ofsuch a state.Kant suggests that his argument for the state grows out of theconsideration of how human beings are actually to apply the categoricalimperative (MM, 16).6 Nevertheless, this approach does not reveal all ofKant’s concerns in his argument for the state. Accordingly, I will alsodiscuss Kant’s argument that people necessarily view themselves as havinga certain role to fulfill in the world, and that they can only perform thisrole successfully if their freedom to formulate and pursue the ends of theirchoice is secured within a state.The domain of jurisprudence, the ends of nature, and thevalue of external freedomKant’s Metaphysics of Morals addresses the issue of how the categoricalimperative is to be applied by human beings. This work is divided into twoparts: the “Doctrine of Right,” in which Kant expresses much of hispolitical philosophy, and the “Doctrine of Virtue,” which is concernedexclusively with other aspects of his moral philosophy. Ostensively, thebasis for Kant’s division of the work is the difference between duties ofjustice, juridical (legal) duties, and duties of virtue, ethical duties (MM,18–21). Kant says that all legislation (juridical and ethical) consists of twoelements: the law, and the incentive to obey the law.Although two different types of legislation may agree about the law,e.g. both juridical and ethical legislation may prohibit murder, they can atthe same time differ with respect to their incentives:If legislation makes an action a duty and at the same time makes thisduty the incentive, it is ethical. If it does not include the lattercondition in the law and therefore admits an incentive other than theIdea of duty itself, it is juridical.(MM, 19)Kant is distinguishing ethics, according to which one must always do one’sduty exactly because it is one’s duty, and never for any other reason, fromjurisprudence, according to which one can have some other incentive for one’sactions that fulfill one’s duties. In fact, Kant begins the “Doctrine of Right” bydefining jurisprudence as “the body of those laws that are susceptible of beingmade into external laws, that is, externally legislated” (MM, 33)7 Thus, onemust determine exactly what laws can be externally legislated.First we should consider the difference between perfect and imperfectduties, and whether the laws that correspond with each of these can beexternally legislated. Perfect duties require the performance ornonperformance of specific actions. It is easy to imagine how lawscorresponding to these duties could be externally legislated, as it is easy toimagine how external incentives could be employed to coerce people eitherto perform or to refrain from performing specifie actions.It seems impossible, however, for external incentives to be employed tocoerce people to perform imperfect duties (MM, 45). After all, imperfectduties require people to adopt certain principles (e.g. beneficence), and toact on those principles in circumstances that they deem appropriate. Butpeople cannot be coerced either to adopt principles or to act on them.Since people’s wills are always free, and adopting a principle is an act ofwill, people cannot be forced to adopt principles. Furthermore, althoughpeople can be coerced to perform acts that follow from specifiedprinciples, since the act is merely a response to the coercion, it cannot beconstrued as an attempt to act in accord with the specified principle. Thus,people cannot be forced to act on a principle. Therefore, only imperfectduties can be the subject matter of jurisprudence, imperfect duties cannot.It might appear, then, that all perfect duties can be addressed byjurisprudence. Actually, however, there is good reason to believe that Kantmeans to exclude perfect duties to oneself from the domain ofjurisprudence.8 One clear statement to this effect follows: “The concept ofjustice…applies only to the external and—what is more—practicalrelationship of one person to another” (MM, 34). One can bestunderstand Kant’s political philosophy, and specifically his exclusion ofperfect duties to oneself from the domain of jurisprudence, by consideringthe broadest concerns that motivate him to write about the state.In a number of his writings, including some essays on history and, moreimportantly, the Critique of Judgment, Kant reveals a great concernfor the development of humanity. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant’sinterest in the development of humanity is revealed in the context of anextended discussion of teleology or purpose. He argues that people canonly make sense of a thing insofar as they understand it in terms of itspurpose (CJ, 280).9 The notion of a thing having a purpose, however, isambiguous, raising two issues, each of which is relevant (CJ, 312–13).Something can be organized in a way that manifests a purpose internal tothe entity, as a tree is organized to grow and reproduce, or the manifestpurpose can be external to the entity, as a tree is organized to helpmaintain the proper oxygen level in the atmosphere for animals to survive.When the question of purpose is asked of nature itself, the answer isquite revealing about humanity. Kant thinks that the ultimate internalpurpose of nature is human culture, by which he means the ability ofhuman beings, as sensible or physical beings constrained by the laws ofnature, to formulate and pursue whatever ends they may set forthemselves (CJ, 317–21). But human culture in this sense can only developif people are secure from others interfering with their ability to formulateand pursue the ends of their choice. Thus, the greatest development ofhuman culture, the ultimate end of nature, can only be realized if peopledo not violate their perfect duties to others (“UH,” 45–6).10 However,since the violation of perfect duties to oneself would also inhibit thedevelopment of human culture, it is not yet clear why Kant restricts therole of the state to include the enforcement of only perfect duties to others.Kant’s reason for excluding perfect duties to oneself from the domain ofjurisprudence is revealed through the consideration of his views on thefinal external purpose of nature (CJ, 322–3). The final external purpose ofnature can only be manifest in something that makes use of nature, but isnot itself a part of nature, i.e. is not subject to the laws of nature,otherwise it would merely be one more internal purpose of nature. It ishuman beings, insofar as they are intelligible, or purely rational, beingssubject to the moral law, who provide the final purpose for all that existswithin nature. However, to the extent that people are not acting on themoral law, but are responding to their inclinations, nature is not beingused toward any ends that themselves come from outside of nature. Thus,the final end of nature is only realized to the extent that humanity hasdeveloped toward moral perfection.Kant, however, thinks that the final end of nature cannot be realized solong as people remain in the state of nature because morality is necessarilyinefficacious when people remain in this condition. Among people whochoose to remain in the natural condition, without a state that enforcesthe fulfillment of perfect duties to others, it is as if they have agreed withone another that anything goes:If men deliberately and intentionally resolve to be in and to remainin this state of external lawless freedom, then they cannot wrongeach other by fighting among themselves; for whatever goes for oneof them goes reciprocally for the other as though they had made anagreement to that effect.(MM, 72)In such circumstances, there is reason to believe that none of the duties thatpeople have to one another will be fulfilled. Thus, only if there is a state thatenforces the fulfillment of perfect duties to others is it possible that moralitywill develop to the point that all duties to others can regularly be fulfilled.Therefore, the existence of the state is viewed by Kant as a necessarycondition for the development of morality.It is now clear that Kant requires a state that enforces at least thefulfillment of perfect duties to others, but why should it not also enforcethe fulfillment of perfect duties to oneself? The problem is that theenforcement of perfect duties to oneself would undermine the developmentof the moral character necessary among people who are to fulfill all oftheir ethical duties. Although the argument is too involved to pursue fullyhere, the basic point is that one’s perfect duties to oneself are fundamental,and only one who truly fulfills these duties, i.e. fulfills them preciselybecause they are duties, can develop the character necessary for thefulfillment of all of their duties. But if one is coerced to fulfill these dutiesto oneself, instead of fulfilling them solely because they are one’s duties,this will undermine the development of one’s character as one who fulfillsall one’s duties.11 Thus, although the external legislation of perfect dutiesto oneself may facilitate the realization of the ultimate end of nature, itwould actually undermine the development of humanity toward moralperfection, the final end of nature. Kant’s greatest interest, thedevelopment of humanity toward both the ultimate and final ends ofnature, can be realized only within a state that enforces the fulfillment ofperfect duties to others, thereby securing people’s external freedom andpermitting them to formulate and pursue the ends of their choice, providedthat they leave a similar freedom for others.External freedom and the concept of justiceHaving, at least briefly, explained Kant’s non-political reasons for beingconcerned with securing people’s external freedom, the foundation hasbeen laid for showing how Kant argues within his political philosophyfrom the presumed value of external freedom to the necessity andlegitimacy of a state that uses coercion to force people to fulfill theirperfect duties to others. The outline of Kant’s argument is as follows:1 People have an innate right to external freedom.2 The only legitimate limitation on this right to external freedom is theright of others to a similar freedom.3 The condition of the universal realization of this right to externalfreedom is the condition of justice.4 Justice entails the authorization to use coercion, as necessary, tosupport the condition of justice.5 The innate right to external freedom entails botha the right to security in oneself, andb the right to possess things external to oneself.6 Someone who remains in proximity, and in the natural conditionrelative to others, i.e. not in a state, interferes with their externalfreedom by not providing them a guarantee of security with respect tobotha their right in themselves, andb their rightful possession of objects external to themselves.7 Existing within a state, subject to juridical law, is the only way toguarantee this security to others.8 It is just to use coercion to force anyone in proximity into a state,subject to juridical law.Kant claims that there are two types of rights: innate rights and acquiredrights (MM, 43). Innate rights belong to people by nature, independentlyof any act of law. Acquired rights, on the other hand, only come to existthrough an act of law. Since acquired rights are dependent on acts of law,they cannot themselves provide the basis for considering people obligatedto accept the lawful authority of a state. Any right that is to provide alegitimate basis for considering people obligated to accept the authority ofa state must be an innate right. The innate right of external freedom playsthis crucial role in Kant’s argument for the necessity and the legitimacy ofthe state. Kant begins the section entitled “There is only one innate right”as follows:Freedom (independence from the constraint of another’s will),insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else inaccordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original rightthat belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.(MM, 43–4)The innate right to external freedom, therefore, is the only right that canprovide the justification for imposing a system of juridical law on others.This innate right to external freedom provides the basis for Kant’sconception of “justice,” which he defines as “the aggregate of thoseconditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with thewill of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (MM, 34).What are the conditions under which people’s wills can be conjoined inaccordance with a universal law of freedom? Kant thinks that two willscan be conjoined if they include no incompatibility. But what does thismean? Following Kant’s description of willing as “the summoning of allthe means in our power” (FMM, 10), two wills can be conjoined if eachwill, while summoning all of the means in its power applicable toward itsend, does nothing incompatible with the activity of the other.Suppose that two people will to hold the same political office. They willboth summon all of the means that are in their power to gain this office,which, taken to its literal extreme, will undoubtedly include the violentelimination of their rival. In this case their wills cannot be united sinceeach of them, by seeking to eliminate the other, is acting in a manner thatis incompatible with the other’s pursuit of the goal. It is not possible forthem jointly to will that they act in the manner described, since it entailsboth of them willing their own death, and also willing to survive after thedeath of the other.The question of justice, however, is not merely whether their wills canbe conjoined, but whether they can be conjoined in accordance with auniversal law of freedom. This restricts the range of maxims upon whichthey can will to act to those that are in accord with the universal law offreedom, which, for human beings, is expressed in the categoricalimperative. If the rivals restrict their wills to maxims that meet thisrequirement, then they each will act on no maxim (employ no means) theuniversalization of which would be incompatible or inconsistent with thefreedom of the other to act on similarly acceptable maxims. If thepoliticians so restrict themselves, then all of their acts, e.g. distributingbuttons, or advertising their virtues on television, will be compatible withthe like freedom of others. Their wills can be conjoined since there is noincompatibility or inconsistency between their willing to act in thisrestricted manner, and others willing to act similarly.Although it was made to seem above, during the discussion of theuniversal law of freedom and its relationship to the categorical imperative,that justice requires one to act fully in accord with the categoricalimperative, it is clear from Kant’s definition of justice that it is limited toperfect duties to others. The exclusion of duties to oneself is clear from thereference to conjoining the will of one person with the “will of another.”The exclusion of imperfect duties is entailed by the reference to theconditions in which one person’s will “can be conjoined” with that ofanother. When asking if the wills can be conjoined, one is asking onlywhether it is logically possible for the maxims to hold at the same time,the test for perfect duties, not whether one could will them to hold at thesame time, the test for imperfect duties.With this understanding of Kant’s conception of justice, it is easy to seethat it amounts to nothing more than the condition of the universalrealization of the innate right to external freedom. For all people to beindependent of the constraint of others’ wills, to the extent that this iscompatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with auniversal law, i.e. for the innate right to external freedom to be universallyrealized, requires neither more nor less than that people be in a conditionin which their wills can be conjoined in accordance with a universal law offreedom, i.e. that people be in a just condition. Thus, if Kant can arguethat the concept of justice logically entails the right to use coercion insupport of the condition of justice, then he will have shown that there isno inconsistency in using coercion to support and maintain externalfreedom.Kant wants to show that such coercion as is truly employed inopposition to injustice is itself consistent with justice (MM, 35–6). Itfollows from Kant’s definition of justice that injustice would be anycondition in which one person’s will could not be conjoined with the willof another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. This conditioncannot be eliminated, but can only be furthered, by an act that is itselfunjust. Since every unjust act entails a will that cannot be conjoined withat least one other will in accordance with a universal law of freedom,every unjust act itself necessarily furthers the existence of the condition inwhich one person’s will cannot be conjoined with the will of another inaccordance with a universal law of freedom, i.e. the condition of injustice.Thus, any coercion that actually opposes the condition of injustice must,by definition, itself be just.Kant goes on to argue that it is not merely just, but required by justice,to use coercion against anyone who acts unjustly (MM, 36–7). Of course,there are conditions on how that coercion is to be justly applied, but,assuming that these conditions are met, the application of coercion insupport of the innate right to external freedom is itself a requirement ofjustice. It is particularly important to Kant, in light of the broadestconcerns of his political philosophy, that external freedom can besupported by coercion. He is concerned with external freedom because itis a necessary condition for the development of humanity toward the finalend of nature, moral perfection. But if people have to be moral to respectone another’s external freedom, then Kant would have a circular argumentin which the conditions for the development of morality were themselvesdependent on morality. Kant needs the condition in which people respectone another’s external freedom to be established entirely independently ofthe morality of the people. Thus, it is essential for Kant’s argument thatexternal freedom can be supported entirely by external legislation(independent of people’s internal moral motivations).The components of external freedomHaving shown that coercion can and ought to be used in support of the innateright to external freedom, the question of exactly what is entailed in this rightmust now be addressed. Based on his definition of the innate right to externalfreedom it is clear that Kant wants people to be independent of constraintsthat come from the will of others, when they are formulating and pursuing theends of their choice in a manner consistent with others having a like freedom.It would seem then that Kant thinks that the innate right to external freedomentails independence from others willfully acting in a way that interferes withone’s right to formulate and pursue the ends of one’s choice. A right to thisson of freedom may be commonly recognized, and may provide an adequatebasis for a derivation of the necessity and legitimacy of the state. However, itis clear from Kant’s argument for the state that he has a significantly strongersense of “freedom” in mind. This freedom includes independence from otherswillfully acting in a way that interferes with one’s right to formulate andpursue the ends of one’s choice in a manner consistent with the similarfreedom of others, but it also includes independence from othersevenwillfully maintaining a condition that interferes with this right(see MM,35).If he is to provide an a priori argument for the necessity of the state, Kanthas to be concerned with the possibility of one’s external freedom beinginterfered with by the conditions that others maintain, and not only by theiractions. Kant’s argument is dependent on the fact that someone who is inproximity, and in the natural condition relative to others, necessarilyinterferes with their external freedom. If Kant based his argument for the stateon the fact that people will commit acts that interfere with the externalfreedom of others, then his argument for the state would be contingent onpeople actually committing such acts. Thus, Kant says:I am injured by the condition of other people who are in the naturalstate. For [when others remain in the natural condition] I have nosecurity and my property is always in danger. I am not obligated toremain in this fear.12Kant’s point is that people who remain in proximity, and in the state ofnature relative to others, interfere with others’ freedom by interfering withboth their security in themselves and their right to things external tothemselves. Furthermore, one need not tolerate this situation of insecuritythat undermines freedom, because people can be forced to join the state, theonly condition in which freedom is guaranteed, without violating theirfreedom.The last two sentences constitute, in effect, a restatement of steps 5–8of Kant’s argument as outlined above. According to the innate right toexternal freedom, people have the right to formulate and pursue the endsof their choice, provided that they leave a similar freedom for others. Kantthinks that this right entails both the right to security in oneself and theright to possess things external to oneself.Any violation of one’s right in oneself, which would seem necessarily toinvolve some son of assault, clearly entails the victim’s being constrainedby the will of another (the perpetrator). Furthermore, Kant thinks thateven the threat of a violation of one’s right in oneself interferes with one’sexternal freedom, as Hobbesian reasoning reveals. If people are in fear fortheir personal security, they will have to focus a great portion of theirefforts on securing themselves, and will not be able to formulate andpursue those ends that truly interest them. Thus, the innate right toexternal freedom entails the right to security in oneself.The explanation of why the innate right to external freedom entails theright to possess things external to oneself is much more complicated. Onesimple explanation that Kant alludes to at times is that human culture isadvanced through people engaging in complex projects, but people willonly engage in such projects if they have a fixed expectation of theirefforts being undisturbed, and of being able to work from the results ofearlier efforts in subsequent, more involved projects. Thus, the right topossess things external to oneself is necessary for the development ofhuman culture, the ultimate end of nature. Kant’s more complicatedexplanation of the right to property is basically that freedom can only berestricted to preserve the like freedom of others, owning property does notrestrict the like freedom of others, and, therefore, freedom includes theright to own property. Thus, to restrict the possibility of the rightfulpossession of things external to oneself is to restrict freedom for somethingother than freedom, which is necessarily inconsistent with the final end ofnature (MM, 52–3).The necessary conditions of external freedomWhat remains to be shown is that anyone who remains in proximity, andin the natural condition relative to others, interferes with both of therights that are entailed in the innate right to external freedom. First weshall look at Kant’s argument that such an individual interferes withothers’ right to possess things external to themselves. Kant maintains thatthe right to possess anything, although land is the most importantexample, depends on a relationship of the wills of all those who are inproximity (MM, 65). There are no material conditions, which could beverified empirically, that constitute having a right to a thing. AlthoughLocke argued that one can make something one’s property by mixingone’s labor with it, Kant would respond that this begs the question, sinceit can now be asked: By what right does one mix one’s labor withsomething?Kant thinks that a person can rightfully possess something only ifeveryone in proximity relinquishes their right to will the use of that thing.Thus, one cannot take rightful possession of something through one’s ownwill alone; there must be a union of wills manifesting the agreement of allto respect the property of each:Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, aunilateral Will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone, since thatwould be a violation of freedom in accordance with universal laws.Therefore, only a Will binding everyone else—that is, a collective,universal (common), and powerful Will—is the kind of Will that canprovide the guarantee required. The condition of being subject togeneral external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by poweris the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours ormine only in a civil society.(MM, 65)For Kant, existing within a state is the form in which the people expresstheir mutual respect for one another’s rightful possession of thingsexternal to themselves. What happens, however, if there are people inproximity, and in the state of nature relative to the others? These peopleare not parties to the union of wills by which each person’s rightfulpossessions are guaranteed. These people are in a position to will the useof things that would otherwise be rightfully possessed by others. But sincerightful possession depends on the agreement of the wills of all those inproximity, the presence of these people who are outside the union of willsmakes rightful possession impossible, thereby interfering with the freedomof those within the union. Thus, Kant concludes this discussion by sayingthat if rightful possession must be possible (and it is entailed in the innateright to external freedom), “then the subject must also be allowed tocompel everyone else with whom he comes into conflict over the questionof whether such an object is his to enter, together with him, a societyunder a civil constitution” (MM, 65). In summary, Kant argues that theinnate right to external freedom includes the right to possess thingsexternal to oneself; that this right can only be realized within a state; thatanyone in proximity and outside of the state interferes with this right; and,therefore, that it is just to use coercion to force such people to enter the state.Kant also argues for the necessity and the legitimacy of the state fromthe fact that the innate right to external freedom entails a right to securityin oneself that can only be realized within a state. While it is true thateveryone has an ethical duty to respect everyone else’s rights in themselves,nevertheless, since people have no way of knowing the intentions ofothers, they are not secure in their rights in themselves until such time asthey guarantee to one another that they will respect these rights:The necessity of public lawful coercion does not rest on a fact, buton an a priori Idea of reason, for, even if we imagine men to be everso good natured and righteous before a public lawful state of societyis established, individual men, nations, and states can never becertain that they are secure against violence from one another.(MM, 76)Kant’s point is that, despite the requirements of morality, people’s rights inthemselves are insecure outside of a state. Paralleling his argument for thestate from the right to possess things external to oneself, Kant argues herethat the only way that the rights entailed in the innate right to externalfreedom can be realized is if people make their will not to violate theserights publicly known, and that the form of this mutual guarantee is thestate.Kant’s argument that the necessity and the legitimacy of the state can bederived from the fact that people have the right to security in themselves iswell summarized in the following:It is usually assumed that one cannot take hostile action againstanyone unless one has already been actively injured by them. This isperfectly correct if both partics are living in a legal civil state. For thefact that one has entered such a state gives the required guarantee tothe other, since both are subject to the same authority. But man (oran individual people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any suchsecurity and injures me by virtue of this very state in which hecoexists with me. He may not have injured me actively (facto), buthe does injure me by the very lawlessness of his state (statu iniusto),for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him either toenter into a common lawful state along with me or to move awayfrom my vicinity.(“PP,” 98 n.)13The innate right to external freedom can be universally realized onlywithin a state, in which each person guarantees this right of everyone elseby participating in a union of wills resolved to use coercion in support ofthis right. Furthermore, since it is just to use coercion in support of theinnate right to external freedom, it is just to use coercion to force into thestate those people who would otherwise maintain a condition thatinterferes with the external freedom of others (e.g. by remaining inproximity and outside of civil society).Kant on international relationsBefore discussing Kant’s views on how one is forced to join a state, and theversion of hypothetical social contract theory toward which theseconcerns lead Kant, it is interesting to consider the relationship betweenKant’s argument for the necessity of the state and his views oninternational relations. Kant has argued that people who remain inproximity, and in the natural condition relative to others, because theynecessarily interfere with the freedom of those others, may therefore justlybe forced to join together with them in a state that secures their freedom.However, what if these people are already members of a state, but adifferent neighboring state? Two related problems arise: First, themembers of each state interfere with the freedom of the members of theother state just as they would if they were not members of a state at all: ifthere is no formal relationship between the states, there is no guaranteethat the members of each state will respect the rights of the members ofthe other state. Second, the two states, which can each be thought of as a“moral person,” are in the state of nature relative to one another, andsuffer all the difficulties that led Kant to argue for the need for civilsociety.Kant recognizes that these are serious difficulties which, unchecked,would very much undermine the possibility of the sort of humandevelopment that he thinks should be facilitated. His solution to theproblem is to suggest that the same forces that lead individuals into a stateshould lead states into a federation of states (“PP,” 102–5; “UH,” 47;“TP,” 90).14 This federation of states would then fulfill the same roleamong states that a state fulfills for its citizens, and would also provide thenecessary guarantee of external freedom among the citizens of differentstates.Although it is clear what Kant provides through his suggestion of afederation of states, there is also a significant problem raised by thissuggestion: Who is ultimately sovereign? Since Kant argues that for astate effectively to fulfill its role it must be ruled by an absolutesovereign, it would seem to follow that the federation of states caneffectively fulfill its role only if it is ruled by an absolute sovereign. Thus,it appears to be a clear implication of Kant’s argument that thereshould be a single world nation, without lesser sovereign states.However, Kant never supports the notion of a single world state, and atone point discusses the concern that such a world state “may lead tothe most fearful despotism” (“TP,” 90). Thus, while Kant was right torecognize that his argument for the necessity and the legitimacy of thestate has important implications for international relations, he wasnever able to give a clear and satisfactory account of how thoseinternational relations should be organized.Kant’s hypothetical social contract theoryKant has shown that people who remain in proximity, and in the naturalcondition relative to others, can be forced to join together with others in astate. Before one can understand what Kant thinks is entailed in forcingsomeone to join a state, one must understand what Kant thinks is entailedin being a member of a state, and how this membership is manifest. Theseissues are all addressed by what might best be described as a hypotheticalsocial contract theorist.Kant’s hypothetical social contract theory follows from his a priorireasoning about human beings, and his recognition of both the rights ofhuman beings, and the impossibility of realizing those rights outside of astate:A state (civitas) is a union of a multitude of men under laws ofjustice. Insofar as these laws are necessary a priori and follow fromthe concepts of external justice in general (that is, are not establishedby statute), the form of the state is that of the state in general, that isthe Idea of the state as it ought to be according to pure principles ofjustice. This Idea provides an internal guide and standard (norma)for every actual union of men in a commonwealth.(MM, 77)Kant is concerned with the Idea of the state, which is based on a priorinecessary laws of justice, and thus ought to serve as the blueprint for allactual states. It is the possibility of deriving the state a priori that groundsthe possibility of a hypothetical social contract theory.Kant is a social contract theorist, maintaining that one’s politicalobligations can only result from one’s having consented, along withothers, to be subject to the authority of the state. Kant, however, departsfrom the more traditional social contract theorists in that he does notthink that this consent is actual, either explicit or tacit. Thus, Kant’ssocial contract theory is best described as hypothetical, to distinguish itfrom those theories according to which people must actually manifesttheir consent through their behavior. Under Kant’s hypothetical socialcontract, human beings can be treated as if they have consented to thesocial contract, because their consent is a necessary manifestation oftheir humanity, i.e. it is known a priori that, inasmuch as a being isrational, and one to whom the concept “human” applies, this beingnecessarily consents to the social contract. Thus, Kant says that being amember of a state is a “requirement of pure reason, which legislates apriori” (“TP,” 73).It is in accord with this pure reason that people are parties to the socialcontract, and organize themselves into a state. Being organized into astate, however, does not require that individuals actually apply their ownreason and recognize the necessity and the legitimacy of the state; rather,the state is legitimate because a priori reason reveals it to be so: “The actby means of which the people constitute themselves a state is the originalcontract. More precisely, it is the Idea of that act that alone enables us toconceive of the legitimacy of the state” (MM, 80).Kant places himself in the contract tradition through his reference tothe “original contract.” However, he then avoids any reliance on theactuality of this contract, and introduces what I have called a hypotheticalsocial contract theory. It is not any actual social contract, to which peoplehave actually consented either explicitly or tacitly, that lies at thefoundation of the state and accounts for its legitimacy. Rather, it is the“Idea” of the original contract, a necessary idea of a priori pure practicalreason that must, therefore, necessarily be assented to by all human beingsinasmuch as they manifest their rationality, that provides the foundationof the state, and accounts for its legitimacy.All that is required for one to be a member of a state, remembering thatit requires no actual consent, is to exist in a condition in which eachindividual has the rights and obligations that are necessary for themaintenance of a just condition, and which are enforced by the statethrough coercion. In fact, Kant argues that even if the state does notenforce exactly those rights and obligations that are necessary for themaintenance of a just condition, people must still accept its authority (forreasons that will be revealed shortly). In any case, membership in the stateamounts to nothing more than the fact that citizens have an obligation toobey the law, and will be punished if they do not. There is nothing thatmanifests citizens’ membership in the state save the fact that a priori purepractical reason requires people, as intelligible beings, to subjectthemselves to this system of laws, and that people, as sensible or physicalbeings, are actually subjected to the authority of the state.What about those people existing either within the borders of thestate, or otherwise in proximity, who, as intelligible beings, do notrecognize the a priori practical necessity of subjecting themselves to theauthority of the state, and, therefore, as sensible or physical beings, donot necessarily obey the authority of the state? Kant has said that suchpeople can be forced to join the state. But, since there is no particularbehavior by which people actually manifest their consent to the socialcontract, there is no act that people can be forced to perfom that willmanifest their joining the state.In the end, what it is to force such people to join the state can be seenby considering why it is necessary to do so. The fact that such people, asintelligible beings, do not recognize the a priori practical necessity of thestate is irrelevant, since justice is concerned with only the externalrelations among persons. The fact that such people, as sensible or physicalbeings, do not obey the authority of the state, however, means that, werethey members of the state they would have been subjected to coercion, asnecessary, to maintain the condition of justice. Membership in the stateamounts to nothing more than being subject to the threat of coercion inresponse to violations of the law. Kant’s claim, that people who do notaccept the authority of the state should be forced to join the state, reallyamounts to the claim that, in accord with the hypothetical social contractthat they necessarily accept insofar as they are rational beings, they shouldbe treated as members of the state.Kant on rebellion and resistanceKant has argued from the fact that people have an innate right to externalfreedom, and the fact that this freedom is not violated by the use ofcoercion against someone who is violating the freedom of another, to thefact that people can be treated as if they were parties to an originalcontract by which they agreed to accept the authority of the state. Theidea of an original contract, however, not only explains the politicalobligations of the members of a state, but also accounts for the limitationsthat exist on the authority of the state:[The original contract] is in fact only an idea of reason, whichnonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige everylegislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have beenproduced by the united will of a whole nation…. This is the test ofthe rightfulness of every public law. For if a law is such that a wholepeople could not possibly agree to it…it is unjust; but if it is at leastpossible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the lawas just, even if the people is at present in such a position or attitude ofmind that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted.(“TP,” 79)The idea of the original contract, to which all human beings, insofar as theyare rational, necessarily consent, includes restrictions on the possiblelegislation of a legitimate state. Basically, legislation is legitimate if it wouldbe possible for the people to consent to it. The fact that the people would belikely to choose not to consent to a given piece of legislation is not relevantto its legitimacy, provided that it does not require the violation of a perfectduty, and, thus, could at least possibly receive the people’s consent.Accordingly, it would not be surprising if Kant went on to argue thatrebellion and resistance against a state whose laws are legitimate isabsolutely prohibited, but that it is permissible to rebel against a state thatpasses unjust legislation, or at least to resist the specific unjust laws. Sucha position would be consistent with the fact that Kant, on certain grounds,applauded the French Revolution. This line of reasoning is also supportedby a passage in which Kant implies that resistance to illegitimatelegislation, which requires the violation of a perfect duty, is permissible, oreven required: “When men command anything which is itself evil (directlyopposed to the law of morality) we dare not, and ought not, obey them.”15Despite this apparent endorsement of resistance to unjust legislation,however, Kant repeatedly states that rebellion against states that enactunjust legislation, and resistance to illegitimate legislation, are bothabsolutely prohibited. At first blush this is rather surprising. After all,Kant’s interest in the state is grounded in his concern for the developmentof morality, which fundamentally entails the autonomy of the individual,and, yet, submission to an unjust state seems undeniably to entail theviolation of morality and the denial of individual autonomy. Nevertheless,Kant’s arguments for the absolute prohibition against rebellion andresistance are well grounded in his most fundamental concerns.Kant’s absolute prohibition against rebellion and resistance, whileholding a theory of illegitimate legislation, is evident. He says that “thepeople too have inalienable rights against the head of state, even if thesecannot be rights of coercion” (“TP,” 84). Kant both recognizes that thereare things beyond the legitimate authority of the state, and asserts that thepeople cannot use coercion in response to such transgressions. Theabsolute nature of this prohibition is stated unequivocally: “it is thepeople’s duty to endure even the most intolerable abuse of supremeauthority” (MM, 86). Another passage both expresses this absoluteprohibition, and begins to reveal Kant’s justification for it:It thus follows that all resistance against the supreme legislativepower, all incitements of the subjects to violent expressions ofdiscontent, all defiance which breaks out into rebellion, is thegreatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for itdestroys its very foundations. This prohibition is absolute.(“TP,” 81)Kant not only thinks that the prohibition against rebellion and resistanceis absolute, but that it must be absolute, because rebellion and resistancedestroy the very foundations of a state. Even a state that is unjust must besupported because the state is necessary for the realization of the innateright to external freedom, and to rebel or resist any state is to act on amaxim that makes all states insecure:For such resistance would be dictated by a maxim which, if itbecame general, would destroy the whole civil constitution and putan end to the only state in which men can possess rights.(“TP,” 81)For such procedures, if made into a maxim, make all lawfulconstitutions insecure and produce a state of complete lawlessness(status naturalis) where all rights cease at least to be effectual.(“TP,” 82)In his political philosophy, Kant argues for the necessity and thelegitimacy of the state because, without a state, the rights that peoplehave under the innate right to external freedom cannot be secured, andhumanity will not progress toward the ultimate and final ends of nature.Rebellion and resistance, however, entail the adoption of maxims thatmake the state impossible, rights ineffectual, and the hope for humanprogress vain. Thus, it is only if people live within secure states, that arethemselves members of a healthy federation of states, that humanity canpossibly progress toward the ultimate and final ends of nature, thecomplete development of human culture and the attainment of moralperfection.NOTES1 For Kant these identities are necessary, thus obviating the claim that he issubstituting into an intentional context.2 FMM stands for Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edn,revised, trans. L.W.Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1959).3 Kant wouldn’t consider this correspondence mere coincidence, but space doesnot permit a discussion of its grounds.4 It is clear that by “humanity” here Kant is referring to rational beings generally.5 Kant argues only that insofar as we think of rational beings as actors in theworld, i.e. from the point of view of practical philosophy, can we argue thatthese beings are free. This argument does not constitute a theoretical proof ofthe freedom of rational beings.6 MM stands for Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, the Preface, Introduction,and most of Part I (“Doctrine of Right”) of which constitute The MetaphysicalElements of Justice, trans. J.Ladd (New York: Macmillan, 1965).7 The word that is here translated as “jurisprudence” is the same word as istranslated “doctrine of right,” but the former corresponds to colloquial English.Furthermore, the root of this word, “Recht,” can be translated as either “right”or “justice” depending on the context. Thus, the “Doctrine of Right,” Kant’stheory of jurisprudence, is concerned with those duties that are duties of justice.8 There is rather good evidence both for and against this claim; however, I thinkthat much better sense can be made of Kant’s political philosophy on theassumption that it is correct.9 CJ stands for Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W.S.Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).10 “UH” stands for Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a CosmopolitanPurpose,” in Kant’s Political Writings, 2nd edn, ed. H.Reiss, trans. H.B.Nisbet(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).11 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. L.Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963), pp. 117–18.12 Kant, Reflection 7647 (my translation), in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 29vols, ed. Deutschen (formerly Königlich Preussische) Akademie derWissenschaften (Berlin: de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902–), Vol. 19, pp. 476–7.13 “PP” stands for Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant’sPolitical Writings, op. cit.14 “TP” stands for Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory,but it does not Apply in Practice’,” in Kant’s Political Writings, op. cit.15 Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T.M.Greene and H.H.Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 90 n.SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHYOriginal language editions3.1 Kants gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols, ed. Deutschen (formerly KöniglichePreussische) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: de Gruyter (andpredecessors), 1902–; the complete collection of Kant’s work.English translations of Kant’s work3.2 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. M.J.Gregor, The Hague: Nijhoff,1974.3.3 Critique of Judgment, trans. W.S.Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.3.4 Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L.W.Beck, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.3.5 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.Kemp Smith, New York: St Martin’s Press,1965.3.6 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edn, trans. L.W.Beck, NewYork: Macmillan, 1990.3.7 Lectures on Ethics, trans. L.Infield, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963.3.8 The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M.Gregor, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity, 1991.Preface, Introduction, and Part I (“Doctrine of Right”), trans. 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Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed.R.Beiner, Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1982.3.15 Aune, B. Kant’s Theory of Morals, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1979.3.16 Beck, L.W. A Commentary on Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason”,Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.3.17 Carnois, B. The Coherence of Kant’s Doctrine of Freedom, trans. D.Booth,Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.3.18 Gregor, M.J. Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant’s Method of Applying theCategorical Imperative in the “Metaphysik der Sitten” [“Metaphysicsof Morals”], New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963.3.19 Mulholland, L.A. Kant’s System of Rights, New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1990.3.20 Murphy, J.G. Kant: The Philosophy of Right, London: Macmillan, 1970.3.21 Nell, O. Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics, New York:Columbia University Press, 1975.3.22 Paton, H.J. The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,London: Hutchinson, 1947.3.23 Riley, P. Kant’s Political Philosophy, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield,1983.3.24 Shell, S.M. The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant’s Philosophy and Politics,Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.3.25 Sullivan, R.J. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989.3.26 Williams, H. Kant’s Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.3.27 Wolff, R.P. The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s“Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, New York: Harper &Row, 1973.3.28 Yovel, Y. Kant and the Philosophy of History, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1980.