John Scottus Eriugena and Anselm of CanterburyStephen GershINTRODUCTIONby John MarenbonJohn Scottus Eriugena came from Ireland, as his name indicates(‘Scottus’ meant ‘Irishman’ in the Latin of this period, and ‘Eriugena’,a neologism invented by John himself, is a flowery way of saying thesame thing). He worked on the Continent, however, under the patronageof Charles the Bald. The first mention of him, in a letter of 851 or 852about the predestination controversy, is as ‘an Irishman at the royalcourt’. After the disastrous reception of his own contribution to thisdispute,On Predestination(discussed in Chapter 5), it seems to havebeen Charles’s protection which saved Eriugena from punishment andensured he could continue his work. Glosses survive by Eriugena onMartianus Capella’sOn the Marriage of Mercury and Philology,a lateantique handbook of the seven liberal arts widely studied in the ninthcentury, and it is likely that these represent some of his teaching at thepalace school in the late 840s.1Already his comments show some ofthe characteristic themes of his thought. For instance, a reference byMartianus to the myth of Orpheus, who tries to rescue his wife,Eurydice, from the underworld, is glossed in terms of the relationbetween the beauty of sound (represented by Orpheus) and the art ofmusic ‘in its profoundest reasons’ (represented by Eurydice), whichthe musician must seek by descending into the depths of his discipline.Eriugena’s intellectual horizon was greatly enlarged in the 850s whenCharles commissioned him to translate from Greek the writings whichhad been issued as (and were taken to be) by Dionysius, the learnedpagan converted by St Paul, though they were in fact the work of afifth-century Christian deeply influenced by the Neoplatonism ofProclus. The manuscript of pseudo-Dionysius had been sent as a presentby the Byzantine emperor to Charles’s father, Louis the Pious.Anobscure translation had been made at the time by Hilduin, Abbot of StDenis. Eriugena had taught himself Greek much better and succeeded,not merely in producing a comprehensible translation which would beused for the next three centuries, but also in absorbing the ideas hefound in the text. He went on to translate various other Greek Christiantexts, by Gregory of Nyssa and the seventh-century Maximus theConfessor. All these influences, along with his wide reading of the Latinfathers (especially Ambrose and Augustine) and his enthusiasm forlogic (especially as found in the pseudo-AugustinianTen Categories),are combined in his masterpiecePeriphyseon(About Nature’; it is alsosometimes known asDe divisione naturae,‘On the division of nature’),written in the 860s. ThePeriphyseonhas been seen by some ascontinuing a tradition of Greek Neoplatonic thought, and by some asanticipating nineteenth-century German Idealist philosophy; whilstother scholars have concentrated on placing the work within the contextof Carolingian thought.2Yet other approaches, too, are possible (asStephen Gersh’s discussion below will illustrate)—a diversity ofinterpretation encouraged by a text of remarkable breadth and audacity,where bold strokes of the imagination sometimes stand in for rigourof argument and suggestiveness of imagery for clarity of thought.ThePeriphyseonbegins by setting out a fourfold division of universalnature—discussed below in greater depth by Stephen Gersh—into: (1)that which is not created and creates, (2) that which is created andcreates, (3) that which is created and does not create, and (4) thatwhich is not created and does not create. God, as creator, constitutes(1); the primordial causes—which are both like Platonic Ideas and theStoic seminal reasons Eriugena learnt about in Augustine’sLiteralCommentary on Genesis—make up (2); (3) is the created world ofmen, animals and things and (4), like (1), is identified with God, butGod as the Final Cause to which all things return. The underlyingcourse of universal history, seen as the progress from (1) to (4), isdescribed in the five books of the work, which takes the form of adialogue between master and pupil. Book I is mainly devoted to showingthat God does not belong to any of Aristotle’s ten categories. Drawingon pseudo-Dionysius’ negative theology, Eriugena argues that God doesnot even belong to the first category, that ofousia(substance or essence)as Augustine had held. The remaining four books are structured roundan exegesis of the story of creation and fall in Genesis, in which Eriugenadiscovers not only an account of divisions (2) and (3) but also that ofthe return of all things at the end of time to the uncreated and uncreatingGod of (4). Unusual positions abound: that (following Maximus) sexualdifferentiation arose only as a consequence of the fall; that the nothingfrom which God created all things is God himself who, being beyondall description, is nothing rather than something; that (continuing theline of thought fromOn Predestination,but hedging it around withqualifications and even contradictions) there will be no Hell, at least inthe ordinary sense.Eriugena also composed a commentary on pseudo-Dionysius’Celestial Hierarchy,a homily on the prologue to John’s Gospel andthe beginning of a commentary on that Gospel. The homily provides ashort and beautifully written summary of some of the main themes ofhis later work.Anselm was born at Aosta in Italy in 1033. He became a monk ofBec in Normandy in 1059, where he was taught by Lanfranc, whomhe went on to succeed as Abbot (in 1078) and as Archbishop ofCanterbury (in 1093). He died in 1109, after a stormy tenure of thearchbishopric in which he tried to assert the power and independenceof the Church. Anselm did not begin to write his theological andphilosophical works until he was over 40. From then up almost untilhis death he produced a series of writings distinguished by anextraordinary elegance of thought and clarity of purpose. Unlike almostevery other medieval thinker, Anselm makes no parade of philosophicalor theological authorities, although he clearly knew as well as anyoneof his time the logical texts of Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius thenavailable, and he had studied deeply Augustine’s more philosophicalwritings.3Anselm’s two earliest monographs, theMonologion(1076) and theProslogion(1077–8), are both concerned to provide rational argumentsfor the existence and attributes of God, although he assumes that hisreaders will be Christians who already accept by faith the truth of theassertions which he is setting out to prove. TheMonologionuses avariety of arguments designed to show that there exists a triune God.TheProslogionuses a single line of argument and does not attempt toargue for triunity, but restricts itself to the not specifically Christiandivine attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, perfect goodnessand eternity. The piece is built around the notion of that-than-whichnothing-greater-can-be-thought: what, for simplicity’s sake, may becalled the notion of a ‘maximal being’. Most of the work is devoted toshowing that, in the case of each presumed divine attribute, it mustbelong to a maximal being because, without it, the being would not bemaximal. But this would merely show that,ifit existed, a maximalbeing would be omnipotent, omniscient and so on. By far the greatestattention, in Anselm’s time and ever since, has been given to theargument placed at the beginning (often called Anselm’s ‘ontologicalproof’) to demonstrate that a maximal being does actually exist. Anselmadvances two premisses: (1) that a maximal being does at least exist inthought, and (2) that to exist in reality and thought is greater than toexist in thought alone. He considers (1) to be proven by the fact thateven someone who denies the existence of a maximal being (such asthe fool of Psalm 14, who denies that God exists) has the mental conceptof such a being; and he takes (2) for granted. He then argues that itmust be false to claim that a maximal beingAexists in thought andnotin reality, because such a being would be less great than a beingBexactly like it except that it existed in thought and also in reality, andsoAwould not be a maximal being. Therefore, given that a maximalbeing exists in thought, it must exist in reality too. The classic objectionto this argument, that existence is not a predicate, is not very powerful,since Anselm’s argument is based on the contrast betweenwaysofexisting, in thought and in reality. His premiss (2) may not beconvincing, but it is not obviously false or meaningless. Modern reworkingsof the ontological proof usually adapt premiss (1) to read:‘“God exists” is possibly true’, and, in order to make a plausibleargument, they need to add another claim (3), that if a maximal beingexists, it must exist in such a way that it cannot not exist: it must existnecessarily. (3) is found in the next chapter of theProslogion,but as afurther argument rather than as an additional premiss to the proofthat a maximal being exists. It remains a matter for dispute amongphilosophers whether any version of the ontological argument,strengthened in this way, is sound.4Besides writing a detailed reply to the criticisms raised by Gaunilo, amonk of Marmoutier, to his ontological proof, Anselm went on towrite, among others, worksOn Truth, On Free Willand on thecompatibility of grace and divine prescience with human freedom. HisCur Deus homo(Why God became man,1094–8) is especiallyambitious: basing himself on Scripture, but only on that part of itaccepted by Jews and Muslims as well as Christians, Anselm tries toshow that God needed to become incarnate if he was to remain justbut also maintain the benevolent purpose of his creation. Two worksof Anselm also survive which are more purely philosophical in content:De grammatico,an intricate logical discussion, following on fromAristotle’sCategoriesand Boethius’ commentary, of the semantics ofdenominative words such asgrammaticus(‘literate’), and the‘Philosophical fragments’, which examine modal notions and sketchout a philosophy of action.5QUESTIONS OF METHODLike any other object of critical analysis, the literary production of thosewriters of the ninth to eleventh centuries who are usually styled‘philosophers’ is approachable from various perspectives. One suchviewpoint, dominant in medieval philosophical scholarship until quiterecently, has been that of orthodox Thomism. However, the notion thatpre-thirteenth-century intellectual figures should primarily be valued fortheir tentative movements towards certain doctrines of high scholasticismis nowadays losing its appeal. There is obviously neither the socio-politicalpressure nor the metaphysical conviction to sustain it.John Marenbon’s survey, published in 1983 ([6.33]), makes the prescholasticsspeak, at least to a degree, in an idiom intelligible to a latetwentieth-century audience. That he should emphasize theirpreoccupation with problems of language is therefore perfectlyunderstandable. This is documented by their elaboration of the doctrinein Aristotle’sOn Interpretationabout words, thoughts, and things([6.33] 21–2, 32–3, 101–2) and by their rediscovery of the distinctionbetween sense and reference of terms ([6.33] 102–3, 106 ff.).6Oneonly needs to adopt a more comprehensive notion of the linguistic—including the structural element and the overlap with the semiotic—inorder to see such preoccupation in greater relief. However, that heshould limit their claim to be called ‘philosophers’ is perhaps too drastic.A careful reading ofEarly Medieval Philosophyreveals its author’spersonal conviction about the nature of philosophy. For him, it isprimarily methodological in a sense opposed to ontological realismand system building ([6.33] 6, 10, 15–16, 81). The methodology consistsof arguments from premisses to conclusions (pp. 4, 58), the premissesbeing generally open to doubt but ideally self-evident either toobservation or reason rather than textually given, the conclusions beingunknown in advance (pp. 4, 12). Philosophy also employs terms whichare literal rather than metaphorical and univocal rather than equivocalin its discussions (pp. 5–6, 9–10). Since these criteria define a disciplinerecognizable to Bertrand Russell but not to early medieval writers,Marenbon is left with relatively few illustrations of genuine philosophybefore the twelfth century. Although the traditions of logic and of logic’sapplication to theology represented by certain passages in Augustineand Boethius are to be excepted (pp. 10, 47–8), a substantial portionof the late antique and early medieval literature fails to meet one ormore criteria. The Latin translation of Plato’sTimaeusis toometaphorical (pp. 5–6), the Latin Platonic material of late antiquitytoo much concerned with system building and metaphorical expression(pp. 9–10, 15–16). Likewise, Eriugena’s thought involves too muchsystem building (p. 81), too many premisses derived from texts (p. 58),and too much equivocal language (pp. 65–9), Anselm of Canterbury’stoo many conclusions known in advance (pp. 95–7).Despite the persuasiveness of this discussion, a different approachto the philosophical writing of the ninth to eleventh centuries is possible.This would involve equal attention to the linguistic component but—since history shows this term to imply not universality but familyresemblance—fewer prior assumptions about the meaning of‘philosophy’. What follows is an attempt to investigate samples ofCarolingian and post-Carolingian philosophical literature from such aviewpoint. I shall suggest that these materials, in their concern forsystematic construction, pre-existing textual data, and the polysemyof etymology and metaphor, exhibit not intellectual weaknesses butintellectual strengths.ERIUGENAIn some respects, Western medieval philosophy can be viewed asbeginning with the brilliant and controversial ninth-century thinkerJohn Scottus Eriugena.7Marenbon values him for his ability to reasonabstractly yet criticizes his tendency to system building. However, it isEriugena’s notion of structure which perhaps makes him closer tomodern writers than to other medieval ones.Few would deny that a particular concept of ‘structure’ is one of theintellectual paradigms of our era.8This involves a priority of relationto related terms, such relations being either of opposite to oppositewhere one opposite exists through or is understood through the other,or else of whole to part where the whole exists through or is understoodthrough the part, or vice versa.9Originating in linguistics, where itdetermined both the phonological and semantic spheres—for exampleas the Saussurian concept of ‘value’,10the theory regarding presence(+) or absence (-) of distinctive features elaborated by Trubetzkoy andJakobson,11and the Hjelmslevian notion of ‘form’12—it has passedinto the currency of historical, anthropological, literary, psychoanalytic,and other studies. Although avoiding the term ‘structure’ itself, Eriugenabuilds his metaphysical system with identical components. Priority ofrelation is underlined by his discussion of the Aristotelian categoricaldoctrine inPeriphyseonI where the category of ‘relation’(relatio, adaliquid)or of ‘condition’(habitus)is found to be present in all theother categories.13Contrast of opposite with opposite is a recurrenttheme of Eriugena’s writing, as instanced by the negative and affirmativepredicates applied to God (I. 458A–462D, II. 599B–600A, III. 684D–685A, etc.) and the five dichotomies constituting nature (II 529C–545B);contrast of whole with parts is only slightly less frequent, an instancebeing God’s status with regard to created things of which man’s is themicrocosmic reflection (IV. 759A–B. Cf. II. 523D–524D). Strictrelatedness is clearly the writer’s underlying assumption in such cases,since each binary term is said to be dependent ontologically andepistemologically on its counterpart (V. 953C–954A, V. 965A–B).Eriugena exploits the notion of structure in developing his ownvariant of the classical Platonic Theory of Forms. The expression ofthis doctrine, acquired through intermediary Greek and Latin patristicsources, combines ontological and semiotic criteria.From the ontological viewpoint,14there exists a set of transcendenti.e. atemporal and non-spatial principles. These are termed ‘reasons’(rationes)in Latin, and ‘Ideas’(ideai),‘prototypes’(pr)totypa),‘predestinations’(proorismata),or ‘divine volitions’(theia thel%mata)in Greek.15They possess a metaphysically intermediate status sincethey depend upon a prior cause: God (the technical term for suchdependence being ‘participation’(participatio)), while subsequent terms,created objects, depend on them.16According to Eriugenian textualexegesis, when the Bible describes God as making heaven and earth ‘inthe beginning’, it means that the first principle establishes the reasonsor Ideas of intellectual or sensible creatures within its Word.17Examplesof the transcendent principles are Goodness, Being, Life, Wisdom, Truth,Intellect, Reason, Power, Justice, Salvation, Magnitude, Omnipotence,Eternity, and Peace (II. 616C–617A).From the semiotic viewpoint,18Eriugena proposes an analysis of theterm ‘nature’(natura)using a combination of traditional logicalprinciples like the square of opposition19and the division of genus intospecies versus the partition of whole into parts.20Within nature, four‘differences’(differentiae)are posited: creating (A), not created (D),created (B), and not creating (C), these combining to form four ‘species’(species):creating and not created (1), both created and creating (2),created and not creating (3), and neither creating nor created (4).21The relations between 1 and 3 and between 2 and 4 are described as‘opposition’(oppositio),those between A2 and Al, between B3 andB2, between C3 and C4, and between D4 and D1 as ‘similarity’(similitudo),and those between B2 and D1, between C3 and A2,between B3 and D4, and between C4 and Al as ‘dissimilarity’(dissimilitudo)(I. 441A–442A, II. 523D–528B). This semiotic analysisis applied to metaphysics when species 1 is identified with God as thebeginning of the cosmic process, species 2 with the reasons or Ideas,species 3 with the effects of the reasons or Ideas, and species 4 withGod as end of the cosmic process.22By endorsing the thesis that there is an analogy between the cosmosand a book, Eriugena can pass easily from assumptions about thestructure of reality to assumptions about the structure of texts.23Thathe has a systematic approach to texts is suggested by the possibility ofdissolvingPeriphyseoninto a mosaic of citations.24Of course, hepresents no formalized theory concerning the relations between a literarytext, its reader, and antecedent texts comparable with those developedin connection with modern fiction by Bakhtin, Kristeva and others.25Nevertheless, the combination of quotations in his writing indicatesseveral interpretative strategies.Among Eriugena’s citations,26a considerable number come fromthe Greek Fathers. Taking them in chronological order of authorship,there are lengthy passages from Origen on the end of the world (V.929A–930D), from Gregory of Nyssa on man as the image of God (IV.788A–801C), from pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite on the divinenames and on the celestial hierarchies,27and from Maximus theConfessor on the fivefold division of nature (II 529C–542B). Two LatinFathers contribute textual materials of importance: Augustine onmiscellaneous questions28and Ambrose on the interpretation of Paradise(IV. 815B–816C). Among Eriugena’s further quotations, a large groupcomes from Latin secular authors. Considering these also inchronological order of authorship, there are substantial extracts frompseudo-Augustine on the ten categories,29from Martianus Capella onthe measurement of the cosmos,30and from Boethius on the nature ofnumber.31The incorporation of all these antecedent texts intoPeriphyseonreflects one paramount exegetical purpose. This is to makethem agree in meaning so that, when two texts are perceived to disagreeon the denotative level, agreement must be sought in some connotativemeaning;32and when they are seen to disagree on the connotative level,the denotative meaning of one text should be accepted, its selectionbeing founded on a hierarchy of socio-political value.33The applicationof this exegetical principle can be documented by many examples. LatinChristian and Greek Christian writings are held to agree whenAugustine and pseudo-Dionysius discuss the divine ignorance beyondknowledge (II. 597C–ZZ598A), Latin secular and Greek Christianwhen ‘Plato’, Virgil and Gregory of Nyssa describe the four elements,34Latin secular and Latin Christian when ‘Plato’ and Augustine interpretthe world soul as principle of life (III. 727C–728D), and Latin secular,Greek Christian and Latin Christian when ‘Aristotle’, pseudo-Dionysiusand Augustine discuss the ten categories.35Disagreement on thedenotative level overcome by shifting to the connotative level of one orboth texts is instanced among Latin Christian and Greek Christianauthors when Ambrose, Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius and Maximusdescribe the indirect perception of God through theophany;36disagreement on the connotative level overcome by concentrating onthe denotative level of one text only is illustrated among Latin Christianand Greek Christian authors when pseudo-Dionysius and Maximusbut not Augustine discuss the threefold division of the soul intosubstance, power and activity,37and among Latin Christian and Latinsecular authors when Pliny and Martianus Capella but not Augustinecalculate the measurements of the cosmos (III. 719A, 721C. Cf. III.724A–C).Eriugena obviously exploits the notion of multiple meanings in texts.That this is in the late twentieth century part of the definition ofliterariness would hardly be questioned,38and that it is nowadays alsoa fundamental problem in philosophy is the legacy of Gadamer, Derridaand others.39But it is important to find the exact coordinates ofEriugena’s position. Of the theoretically possible views of meaningwhich are relevant here, one would connect the polysemy of individualtexts with an ultimate monosemy—metaphysical truth—and establisha limit for hermeneutical activity and a distinction between denotationand connotation.40This was the attitude of medieval theologians.41Another view would connect the polysemy of individual texts with anultimate polysemy—a linguistic ‘reality’—and establish no limits forhermeneutical activity and no distinction between denotation andconnotation. Such is the position of modern deconstruction.42A carefulstudy of Eriugena’s philosophical methodology reveals him supportingneither the first nor the second viewpoint exclusively but oscillatingbetween the two: a most unusual approach for a Western medievalthinker.The evidence for Eriugena’s concept of polysemy consists primarilyof various statements about thought and language.43Clearly the notionthat polysemy is a property to be exploited rather than a defect to beovercome in the pursuit of philosophy requires a fusion rather than aseparation of the cognitive and the verbal. Eriugena explicitly advocatessuch a fusion in several instances while commenting on MartianusCapella and Maximus the Confessor.Among Eriugena’s comments on the text of Martianus Capella, thosedealing with the meaning of its initial allegory are particularly relevant.This narrative depicts the god Mercury’s search for a bride, culminatingin his choice of the mortal Philology, and then the preparations for themarriage of Mercury and Philology, including a ritual of Philology’sdeification. Since Eriugena quite plausibly interprets Mercury andPhilology as figures of language and reason respectively, the marriageof the two protagonists for him indirectly signifies the fusion of discourseand thinking.44Naturally, this represents a primary rather than exclusivemeaning of such an inherently polysemous text.45Among Eriugena’s developments of Maximus the Confessor’steaching, those concerned with a threefold psychological process areparticularly important. Here, Eriugena sometimes contrasts two innercognitive functions: intelligence and thinking with an outer expressivefunction: sensation=sign-manipulation,46but sometimes describesthree inner cognitive and expressive functions: intelligence=noninterpretation,reason=expression, and interior sensation=quasi signmanipulation.47The shift between the first and second formulations—tantamount to replacing the traditional contrast of thought andlanguage with a more unusual combination of the two—results fromthe contextual pressure of a Trinitarian analogy in the latter case.48Just as God expresses himself to himself and to creation through hisWord, so does man reflect the same processes on a lower level ofbeing.In order to appreciate these developments, one should pausemomentarily to recall Aristotle’s theory inOn Interpretationthatspoken words are signs—symbolaors%meia—of mental affections andthat, although mental affections are identical for all mankind, spokenwords are different.49Thanks to Boethius’ translation and commentaryon this text, the radical cleavage between thinking and language whichit advocated became a medieval commonplace.50However, modernlinguistic theory in the tradition of Saussure’sCours de linguistiquegénéralewould insist that the acoustic image—the signifier, and theconcept—the signified, are inseparable components of one whollyarbitrary linguistic sign.51Further evidence for his concept of polysemy is provided by thewriter’s practice in connection with etymology. Here, Eriugena followsthe doctrine, established by the Stoics and transmitted to the LatinWest by Isidore of Seville, that study of the forms and derivations ofwords leads to knowledge of the things which they represent.52ThePeriphyseoncontains numerous examples of simple etymologiesexploited in this way. Becausemetoch% (‘participation’) is composedofmeta(‘after’) plusechein(‘to have’), it indicates the derivation of anessence from a superior one (III. 632B) and becausestere)ma(‘firmament’) is composed ofster% (‘solid’) plushama(‘together’), itindicates the common boundary of all corporeal things (III. 694B).Similarly the nounousia(‘substance’) comes from the verbeimi(‘Iam’) and therefore signifies subsistence of each thing in its transcendentcauses whereas the nounphusis(‘nature’) comes from the verbphuomai(‘I am born’) and therefore signifies the generation of each thing insome material substratum.53When Eriugena alternates etymologies ofa single term, the fusion of real and verbal begins to predominate overthe separation of the two.54For example, the wordtheos(‘God’) isderived both from the verbthe)r) (‘I see’), so that God is the one whosees all things in himself, and from the verbthe) (‘I run’), so that he isthat which itself runs through all things. (I. 452B–C). The wordangelos(‘angel’) is connected both with the prepositionengus(‘near’), meaningthat angels are the creatures immediately after God, and with the verbengigno(‘I engender’), meaning that they are the creatures who transmitdivine illuminations.55When Eriugena connects etymologies of differentterms, the fusion of real and verbal completes its ascendancy over theseparation of the two. Becausebonitas(‘goodness’) comes from theverbbo) (‘I call’), whilebo) is synonymous withkal),from whichcomes the adjectivekalos(‘beautiful’), the God who is both goodnessand beauty can be understood as calling all created things from nonexistenceinto existence.56The writer’s practice in connection with metaphor provides yet moreevidence for his concept of polysemy.57For Eriugena, ‘metaphor’(metaphora/translatio)represents the application to something of aname normally applied to something else (see I. 458C, 461C, 463B,464D, 512B–D, 522A, etc.). This is a notion derived from suchtextbooks as the pseudo-CiceronianTo Herennius,although Eriugenadoes not specify the ground of this transference of names in the perceivedsimilarity between the objects concerned.58‘Metonymy’(met)numia)is defined as a more specific version of the above, involving theapplication to the contained of a name normally applied to the container(I. 480B. Cf.To HerenniusIV. 32. 43). ‘Synecdoche’(sunekdoch%)is amore specific version of the above, involving the application to thepart of a name normally applied to the whole, or else the applicationto the whole of a name normally applied to the part (II. 560A–B, III.706B, IV. 744C. Cf.To HerenniusIV. 33. 44). When Eriugena advocatessuch transferences of terms either between a created thing and God59or between one created thing and another, he remains within thetraditional theory. When he treats these transferences as simultaneouslymetaphors, metonymies and synecdoches (I, 480B, III. 706B) he isperhaps metaphysically rationalizing certain imprecisions in thatestablished teaching. But when he understands such transferences ofterms not as unilateral between a literal and a figurative sense but asbilateral between two literal-figurative senses,60he passes beyond thetraditional doctrine. In fact, the writer seems to have developed thisnotion of ‘reciprocal metaphor’(reciproca metaphora)(III. 706A)against a twofold background. Within his theory of divine names, agiven term e.g. ‘goodness’ can be applied to the creator but is normallyapplied to the creature while that same term can be applied to thecreature but is ultimately grounded in the creator.61In connection withhis theory of the Incarnation, a certain term e.g. ‘air’ can be applied toa higher element but is normally applied to a lower one, while anotherterm e.g. ‘light’ can be applied to a lower element but is normally appliedto a higher one. This example is particularly interesting since air andlight are already metaphors of human and divine respectively.62Also inconnection with his theory of the Incarnation, a certain term relatingto salvation e.g. ‘flesh’ may be applied to the redeemed but is normallyapplied to the fallen, while another term e.g. ‘spirit’ may be applied tothe fallen but is normally applied to the redeemed.63The understanding of metaphor emerging from such texts movesaway from that implying comparison of two spheres of meaning, andassociated with the classical tradition from Aristotle to Quintilian andbeyond, towards that based on fusion of two spheres of meaning andadvocated by Richards and other modern critics.64Such a viewpointhas one important consequence which Eriugena intuitively grasps: thatthe traditional distinction between the verbal and the real is becomingquestionable. This is because the metaphorized and metaphorizing termsare no longer contrasted as verbal and real but as equally verbal-real.The same viewpoint has another consequence which he explicitly states:that the habitual distinction between ‘figurative’ and ‘literal’ languageis almost unworkable (see III. 705Aff.).It is because of this deliberate rather than accidental role of polysemyin his thought that we should be less ready than some have been toaccuse Eriugena of philosophical confusion. For example, Marenbonfinds serious fault in the handling of substance ([6.33] 65–70). He rightlynotes that Eriugena’s substance is primarily universal but, since he hasconfused two distinct types of universal: (a) classes of things wherewhatever distinguishes their members is present wholly in each one,and (b) universal qualities where whatever is characteristic of individualsis present to different degrees in each, concludes that this substance is anotion vitiated by ambivalence. However, it is also reasonable to seedeliberate polysemy rather than unconscious confusion here.65Eriugena’s‘substance’ is simply a lexeme whose semantic properties enter intonumerous configurations, forming a simple structure where it is opposedto non-substance (I. 461 A–464A)—the affirmative and negativetheologies. It forms a more complex structure where the opposition ofuniversal and particular is discovered within it and it is opposed toaccident (I. 467D–468B, 470Dff.)—the Aristotelian categories. It formsthe most complex structure where it is combined with form, opposedto quality in combination with form, metaphorically fused with ‘dryland’, and opposed to quality metaphorically fused with ‘water’ (III.698Cff.), the exegesis of Genesis 1:9–10. Any structure may actualizesemantic properties logically inconsistent with those of other structures.That inconsistencies are an ineradicable feature of natural languagesand of all literature and philosophy derived from them is a fact whichEriugena perhaps saw more clearly than did most of his contemporariesand successors.It had always been assumed by nineteenth-century historians ofphilosophy that Eriugena exercised little influence over later thinkers.Although various attempts have been made to counter this negativeassessment in recent times,66the only hitherto undiscovered influencesto be brought to light have been those on the immediately subsequentgeneration. Thus, Eriugena’s studies of the Latin Fathers are known tohave influenced one set of Carolingian glosses on Augustine’sDe Musica(edited by Boeuff [6.45]) and his studies of Latin secular authors ofvarious glosses of the same period on the pseudo-AugustinianTenCategories.67These latter glosses have been extensively discussed inrecent scholarship. From passages now published it is possible to seethat various commentators had grasped the semiotic ramifications ofEriugena’s work. Indeed, certain glosses recall the structuralpreoccupations of his thought in elaborating the notion of ‘nature’,68and others its polysemic tendency by applying ideas concerninghomonymy, synonymy, and paronymy or etymological arguments tometaphysics.69If Eriugenahadexercised influence over later thinkers, it wouldundoubtedly have run counter to the norm of medieval intellectualdevelopment. In general, writers of this period went back directly toantique sources for their material, and during the tenth and eleventhcenturies this meant primarily Boethius, whom Eriugena had onlypartially exploited.70For example, Notker Labeo makes extensive useof Boethius’ translation of Aristode’sCategories(see [6.63]), Abbo ofFleury of the Boethian monographs on logical division and on variouskinds of syllogism (see [6.64]), Gerbert of Aurillac of Boethius’ firstcommentary on Porphyry’sIsagoge,etc. Gerbert is arguably the mostimportant member of this group.71His treatiseDe rationali et rationeuti (On ‘rational’ and ‘to use reason’)is a discussion of logical problemssurrounding the extension of the two predicates ‘rational’ and ‘usingreason’ ([6.16] 1. 299) more interesting for the ideas arisingen routeto the solution than for the solution itself. Here, Gerbert reveals thestructural preoccupation of a typical Platonist in establishing three‘semiotic’ categories:72act without potency, act with potency, andpotency without act, which are applied to hierarchies of physical andmetaphysical principles,73yet a desire to reduce polysemy morecharacteristic of the re-emergent Aristotelianism ([6.16] 9. 304).ANSELM OF CANTERBURYThe next major figure in the Western intellectual tradition and thedominant thinker of the late eleventh century is Anselm of Canterbury.74Marenbon arrives at an ambivalent judgement in his case, on one handdenying him the title of ‘philosopher’ because his argumentation doesnot arrive finally at its conclusions but assumes them from the outset,and on the other conceding it in recognition of his contributions to thestudy of the language—thought relation and of the logic of possibilityand necessity. Yet it is possible to reevaluate Anselm’s philosophicalcontribution under the three headings proposed earlier: structure, textand polysemy (see p. 125).Anselm exploits the notion of structure in developing a variant ofthe classical Platonic Theory of Forms during the early chapters ofMonologionwhich combines ontological and ‘semiotic’ criteria. Theontological viewpoint is clearly indicated when he describes a set oftranscendent i.e. atemporal and non-spatial principles, each of whichis termed an ‘exemplar’(exemplum),‘form’(forma),or ‘rule’(regula)(Monologion9, 24. 7–20). It is either present in the divine mind or anaspect of the divine essence,75and is somehow the cause of lower i.e.spatio-temporal things.76The semiotic viewpoint is adopted implicitlywhen Anselm introduces the set of transcendent principles with adiscourse based on semantic permutation.77In the first place, there is an argument in the abstract. This is foundedon the following inventory of semantic elements: two terms—theplurality of things having propertyx(a1,a2…) and the single propertyx(b); two relations constitutive of terms—effect of another (R→) andeffect of itself (R←); two terms constituted by relations—the pluralityof things having propertyxthrough another (aa1, aa2…) and the singlepropertyxthrough itself (bb); and three relations—greater than (R),less than (R<), and equal to (R=). The inventory is activated graduallyas the argument proceeds through six stages:1 There are things having propertyx[a1, a2…];2 A thing having propertyxto greater, lesser, or equal degree thananother thing having propertyxhas this through the propertyx3 The propertyxis itselfx[b R←];4 Things having propertyxare things having propertyxthroughanother [a1, a2…R=aa1, aa2…];5 The propertyxis the propertyxthrough itself [b R=bb];6 The propertyxthrough itself is greater than things having propertyxthrough another [bb R> aa1, aa2…].In the second place, the argument is applied to three concrete instances:where propertyxis identified with ‘good’ sensed or understood, ‘great’sensed or understood, and ‘existent’ sensed or understood respectively.78Important features of Anselm’s philosophical method are revealedhere. For example, it seems that there is less an alternation of premissesand conclusions—as in formal logic—than a permutation of semanticproperties. In fact, the whole discourse can be understood in semanticterms with the exception of the idea (point 3 above) that the propertyxis itselfx.This is purely ontological in character, since it makes nosense to say that the semantic propertyxhas the semantic propertyx.79Furthermore, it appears that the permutation of semantic propertiesfollows a largely symmetrical pattern, the clearest indication of a writer’sthinking in structural terms.It would be inappropriate to seek the relation to textual authoritieshere which was apparent in Eriugena. The difference between the twophilosophers seems extreme, given that Anselm’s works—especiallyMonologionandProslogion—are attempts to construct a discourse‘by reason alone’(sola ratione)without explicit dependence onsources.80Nevertheless, Anselm’s relation to textual authorities isdifferent from that of his predecessor rather than non-existent.Although numerous Latin patristic sources are mentioned in theextant letters, the only authority cited in the treatises themselves isAugustine. But this citation is of overwhelming interpretativesignificance. In the preface toMonologion,the writer diverts potentialcriticism that he is advocating novel or false teachings by stressing thecomplete agreement between the doctrines of his book and those ofAugustine’sOn the Trinity([6.11] I:8. 8–14). Some modern scholarswould interpret this as the typical statement of a medieval writerendeavouring to conceal the novelty of his thought behind a declarationof traditionalism. However, Anselm’s remarks are more than a rhetoricalcommonplace. This becomes clear on analysing theMonologionintoan assemblage of Augustinian materials reorganized according to thestructural principles described above.Anselm’s relation to textual authorities is even indicated by theProslogion,which cites no source at all. This treatise contains a famouspassage where a premiss that God is ‘something than which nothinggreater can be thought’(aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit)ispostulated as self-evident, the premiss then being used as the startingpoint for an argument allegedly proceeding by the application of reasonalone to the conclusion that God exists ([6.11] I:101. 1–4, 104. 7). Buteven if one were to concede the premiss to be self-evident—a dubiouspoint in itself—one could not consider it independent of textualbackground. In fact, the premiss corresponds to a definition of Godfound in Christian texts like Augustine’sOn the Customs of the CatholicChurch and those of the Manicheans([6.11] I:11. 24) and Boethius’Onthe Consolation of Philosophy([6.11] I:10, 57–8), and in secular workslike Cicero’sOn the Nature of the Gods([6.11] I:77) and Seneca’sNaturalQuestions81to name only the most obvious parallels. So Anselm’s purposewas perhaps to recommend the faith to non-Christians by deducing itfrom a premiss stated by Christian and non-Christian authors alike.Anselm obviously does not exploit the notion of multiple meaningsin texts; indeed, the ideal of univocity would seem more consistentwith his method. Nevertheless, some of his ideas about signification,had they been extended in a different direction, would have supportedthe exploitation of polysemy.One suggestive idea is the distinction between appellation andsignification elaborated in the treatiseDe grammatico.Here, he arguesthat in statements like ‘the horse is white’, the adjective is ‘appellative’(appellativum)of the white thing but ‘significative’(significativum)ofits possession of the property ([6.11] I:159. 12–15, 161. 21). Since hestresses that what is appellated is an existent object but what is signifiedis not, the distinction seems to approximate that between referenceand sense in modern linguistic theory.82However, any Platonist wouldmaintain that in the statement ‘the horse isx’, thexsignifies atranscendentally existentx-ness in which Socrates participates. This isthe viewpoint which also seems to underlie the argument about divineattributes inMonologion1–4.83Another aspect of Anselm’s theory of signification conducive to thesystematic exploitation of polysemy is his notion of a ‘speaking’(locutio)within the divine nature. By explaining that the exemplar in the divinemind according to which all things are created is a speaking (see p.133), he follows traditional patristic teachings regarding the Word assecond person of the Trinity.84However, the use of the term ‘speaking’also requires a rational justification. Anselm therefore proposes todistinguish three ways of speaking about an object:851 Speaking of things by employing sensible signs in a sensible mannere.g. signifying a man by using the word ‘man’—such signs beingunmotivated and non-universal;862 Thinking by employing sensible and external signs in an insensibleand internal manner e.g. silently thinking the word ‘man’—thesesigns also being unmotivated and non-universal;3 Speaking things themselves by employing sensible signs in neither asensible nor an insensible manner e.g. perceiving a man either byimagining his sensible shape or by thinking his universal essence‘animal, rational, mortal’—such signs being motivated and universal.87It is the third type of speaking which can be attributed to the divinemind.88The exemplar in the latter, according to which all things arecreated, can therefore be described as a thinking process coextensivewith rather than anterior to the manipulation of signs.89With thisargument, Anselm points towards that elimination of the distinctionbetween cognitive and verbal characteristic of post-Saussurian linguistictheory albeit from a restricted theological perspective (cf. pp. 128–9).Another suggestive idea is the application of metaphor to philosophicalmethod underlying the entireMonologion. Towards the end of thattext Anselm raises an important question: given that the divine naturesurpasses human understanding and is accessible only through wordswhose meaning is transformed, how true are all the inferences constructedfrom such words in respect of the divinity?90He answers that there is acertain truth in things signified ‘not properly but through some likeness’(non proprie…sed per aliquam similitudinem). The passage should benoted by those modern scholars who agonize over the cogency ofAnselm’s arguments about God, since he shows clearly that the ‘logic’which they contain is intended to be not the embodiment but only thereflection of truth.91Apparently, logical metaphor is to logic in theMonologionwhat arithmetical metaphor was to arithmetic in Eriugena’sexposition of the divine names.NOTES1 See Leonardi, ‘Glosse eriugeniane a Marziano Capella in un codice leidense’, inRoques [6.57].2 For Eriugena and Greek Neoplatonism, see esp. Beierwaltes [6.44] and Gersh[6.49]. Dermot Moran [6.54] explores the connections with German Idealism;cf. also W.Beierwaltes, ‘Zur Wirkungsgeschichte Eriugenas im deutschenIdealismus. Ein kurze, unsystematische Nachlese’, in [6.44] 313–20. Accountsmore directed to the historical context will be found in Jeauneau [6.51], Marenbon[5–75] and Schrimpf [6.59].3 On Anselm’s knowledge of logic, see Henry [6.69] and his editions ofDegrammatico[6.14 and 6.15].4 See Bibliography [6.75–6.82] for some modern treatments of the ontological proof.5 OnDe grammatico,see the works by Henry listed in n. 3 above; on Anselm’stheory of modality and philosophy of action, see Serene [6.73].6 In addition, Marenbon stresses the relation between logic and language in generalexplored by Fredegisus (p. 51), Gottschalk (pp. 55, 105), ninth-century writersat St Gall (p. 105), the anonymous eleventh-century glossator of Priscian (p.106ff), etc.7 The most useful books providing a general introduction to Eriugena’s life andworks are Cappuyns [6.24] and Moran [6.54]. See O’Meara and Bieler [6.55],Allard [6.38], Beierwaltes [6.42] and [6.43], Jeauneau [6.51], for essays on specificaspects of his thought.8 This is true not only of the original ‘structuralists’ but also of the semioticiansand even the deconstructionists who have followed them.9 On these criteria see Lévi-Strauss, C.,Structural Anthropology,English trans.,New York, 1964, pp. 279–80 and Greimas, A.J.,Structural Semantics,Englishtrans., Lincoln, Neb. 1983, pp. 18ff.10 See Saussure, F. deCourse in General Linguistics,English trans., New York, 1959,pp. 114–15.11 This theory is conveniently summarized by Barthes, R.,Elements of Semiology,English trans., London, 1984, pp. 135ff.12 See Hjelmslev, L.,Prolegomena to a Theory of Language,English trans., Madison,Wis., 1961, p. 23.13 Eriugena,PeriphyseonI. 466A–467C. References to Eriugena’s work give thecolumn numbers of Floss’s edition [6.1] which are reproduced in the moderneditions and translations and so provide a standard form of reference. Because ofhis interpretation of pseudo-Augustine:The Ten Categories,Eriugena allows theseparate Aristotelian categories of relation and condition to coalesce. On Eriugena’stheory see Flasch [6.48].14 In discussing both Eriugena’s and Anselm’s notions of structure, I shall distinguish‘ontological’ and ‘semiotic’ components. By the former is meant any aspects ofthe metaphysical system stated in the texts, by the latter those aspects correspondingto elements in the notion of structure described earlier. Of course, neither Eriugenanor Anselm could have made such a distinction.15 II. 529A–C. Elsewhere, Eriugena calls these ‘primordial causes’(causaeprimordiales). See III. 622Bff.16 II. 616B. ‘And they are said to be the principles of all things since all thingswhatsoever that are sensed or understood either in the visible or invisible creationsubsist by participation in them, while they themselves are participations in theone cause of all things: that is, the most high and holy Trinity’. Cf. III. 630A–C,III. 644A–B, III. 646B–C, III. 682B–C.17 II. 546A–B. ‘But on considering the interpretations of many exegetes, nothingstrikes me as more probable or likely than that in the aforesaid words of HolyScripture—that is, within the meaning of “heaven” and “earth”—we shouldunderstand the primordial causes of the entire creature which the Father hadcreated before the foundation of all other things in his only begotten Son who isdesignated by the term “beginning”, and that by the word “heaven” we shouldhold the primal causes of intelligible things and celestial essences to have beensignified, but by the word “earth” those of the sensible things in which the entirecorporeal world is completed’.18 See note 14. That Eriugena was aware of the linguistic even if not semiotic startingpoint of his analysis is suggested by his reference to nature as a ‘generic term’(general nomen)rather than as a generic entity. See Cristiani, M., ‘Nature-essenceet nature-langage. Notes sur l’emploi du terme “natura” dans le “Periphyseon”de Jean Erigène’,Miscellanea Mediaevalia13/2:Sprache und Erkenntnis imMittelalter,Berlin and New York, 1981, pp. 707–17.19 The square of opposition was a classificatory schema applied by Greek writers oflate antiquity to (a) substance and accident and (b) the numbers 1–10. Thus, in (a)four terms: of a subject (A), not in a subject (D), in a subject (B), not of a subject(C) are grouped into four combined terms: of a subject but not in a subject (1),both in a subject and of a subject (2), in a subject but not of a subject (3), neitherof a subject nor in a subject (4) where 1=universal substance, 2=universal accident,3=particular accident, 4=particular substance. See Porphyry,On the Categories78, 25ff. In (b) four terms: generating (A), not generated (D), generated (B), notgenerating (C) are grouped into four combined terms: generating but not generated(1), both generated and generating (2), generated but not generating (3), neithergenerating nor generated (4) where 1 =the numbers one, two, three, and five,2=the number four, 3=the numbers six, eight, and nine, 4=the number seven. SeeTheo of Smyrna,Exposition of Mathematical Matters103. 1–16. Such schematawere repeated in Latin texts and thereby transmitted to Eriugena and others: seeMarius Victorinus,To Candidus8. 1–21, Macrobius’ commentary on Cicero’sDream of ScipioI. 5. 16, Martianus Capella,On the Marriage of Mercury andPhilologyVII. 738, Boethius,Commentary on Aristotle’s CategoriesI. 169Bff.The square of opposition in antiquity has been discussed by Hadot [6.31] 148ff.,Libera, A. de, ‘La sémiotique d’Aristote’, inStructures élémentaires de la signification,ed. F.Nef, Brussels, 1976, pp. 28–55. The square of opposition in Eriugena hasbeen examined most recently by Onofrio [6.56] and Beierwaltes [6.43] 17–38. Ananalogous schema applied to propositions was also traditional and certainly knownto Eriugena; see Martianus Capella,On the Marriage of Mercury and PhilologyIV. 400–1.20 See Martianus Capella,On the Marriage of Mercury and PhilologyIV. 352–4.21 I. 441A–442B. Eriugena himself seems to envisage a diagram in the form:The notation A, B…1, 2…is not provided by Eriugena.22 I. 442A–B, II. 525A, II. 526C–527A, II. 527C. The fourfold schema is repeatedlater inPeriphyseonbut with no additions to the basic doctrine. Cf. III. 688C–689A, IV. 743B–C, V. 1019A–B.23 See Eriugena,Homily on the Prologue to John[6.9] 14, 291B–C. The analogybetween the cosmos and a book was derived from Maximus the Confessor,Ambigua1245A–1248A. See Duclow [6.47] 131–40.24 Eriugena is here elevating a standard Carolingian literary practice—illustrated byAlcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, Ratramnus of Corbie, etc.—to a more philosophicallevel.25 For example, see Kristeva, J.,S%mei)tik%. Recherches pour une sémanalyse,Paris,1969, pp. 143ff., 181–2, etc.26 A complete inventory can be found in Madec [6.53].27 I. 509B–510B, II. 617A–620A. Cf. Eriugena,Commentary on pseudo-Dionysius’Celestial Hierarchy,passim.28 For the Augustinian citations see Madec [6.53]. These are peculiar in being (a)extremely frequent, (b) generally brief, and (c) somewhat oblique.29 I. 463Aff. This text is paraphrased rather than quoted. Eriugena associates thematerial with ‘Aristotle’, and tends not to quote secular authors verbatim.30 III. 716B–719A. Paraphrase only.31 III. 654A–655C. Paraphrase only. For Eriugena, naturally, Boethius ranks amongthe Christian authors. However, hisOn Arithmetic—the only text cited inPeriphyseon—is thoroughly secular in character.32 On connotation and denotation in Eriugena see below.33 The hierarchy is as follows: Greek Christian writers are preferred to Latin Christianwriters, and Christian writers to pagan writers.34 I. 476C–477B. ‘Plato’ may be considered a Latin author, since Eriugena knewonly Calcidius’ Latin translation of theTimaeus.35 I. 458Aff. ‘Aristotle’ may be treated as a Latin author, since Eriugena relied entirelyon Aristotelian testimonia in pseudo-Augustine and others.36 I. 446A–451C. A ‘theophany’ is an appearance of God. Eriugena held that God isnevercognized directly, but only in theophanies.37 I. 486B–D, II. 567Aff. Cf. II. 602D–603C, 610B–611A. It is highly significantthat the references to the Greek Fathers are made by the ‘Teacher’ and those tothe Latin Fathers by the ‘Student’ in thePeriphyseon’s dialogue.38 For example, see Barthes, R.,SZ,English trans., New York, 1974, pp. 1–16.39 For example, see Derrida, J.Margins of Philosophy,English trans., Brighton,1982, pp. 209ff.40 I shall follow the predominant usage of modern semantic theory where the‘denotation’ of a term is a primary meaning, the ‘connotation’ a secondary one.In realist semantics, where denotation can be associated with a term’s ‘reference’to an object and connotation with its ‘sense’—using Frege’s nomenclature—thedistinction between denotation and connotation is easy to maintain; but in strictnominalism where denotation cannot be associated with a term’s ‘reference’ toan object, the distinction between denotation and connotation becomesproblematic.41 Given that early medieval theologians assume (a) that a spiritual meaning residesbehind the literal meaning of biblical texts and (b) that the spiritual meaning isthe ultimate truth underlying the derivative truth of the literal meaning, theyshare one important assumption with the realist semantic theory discussed above:that there is an ontologically grounded primary meaning. On the relation betweenmedieval exegesis and polysemy see Eco, U.,Semiotics and the Philosophy ofLanguage,London, 1984, pp. 147–53.42 See Eco,Semiotics,pp. 153ff.43 Eriugena’s contribution to the understanding of this question—and therefore tomedieval semantic theory in general—has not been studied to date. However,there are some useful comments in Beierwaltes [6.41],44 Eriugena,Commentary on Martianus Capella[6.2] pr. 3, 16–22. ‘Wishing towrite about the seven liberal arts, he invented a certain story about the marriageof Philology and Mercury. And this was not without the display of a most subtleintelligence, for Philology represents the love of reason and Mercury the eloquenceof speech. If these have come together as though by a certain marriage in the soulsof those pursuing the study of wisdom, it is possible to arrive without any difficultyat knowledge and possession of the liberal arts.’45 The impact of the polysemous tendency initiated by Martianus Capella on medievalwriters has gone largely unnoticed. Thus Kristeva,S%mei)tik%,pp. 168–9, contrastsa ‘Menippean’ polysemy with the theocentric monosemy of the medievals. YetOn the Marriage of Mercury and Philologyis one example of ancient Menippeansatire which became standard reading in medieval schools.46 I. 454B ‘For our intellect, too, before it enters into thought and memory is notunreasonably said not to be. It is invisible in itself and known to nobody besidesGod and ourselves. But when it has entered into thoughts and acquires form incertain phantasies, it is not undeservedly said to come into being. For it comes tobe in the memory when it acquires certain forms of things, sounds, colours, andother sensibles, having had no form before it entered into memory. Then it receivesa kind of second formation when it is formed in certain signs of forms or sounds—I mean letters which are signs of sounds and figures which are signs of mathematicalforms—or in other sensible indicators by which it can be introduced into thesenses of those who are sentient.’47 II. 572C–573B ‘There are three universal motions of soul of which the first isaccording to mind, the second according to reason, and the third according tosense. The first is simple, above the nature of the soul itself, and devoid ofinterpretation: that is, knowledge of that around which it moves. “Through it, thesoul moves around the unknown God but, because of his excellence, in no wayhas knowledge of him derived from anything which exists” as to what he is—thatis, it cannot find him in any essence or substance or in anything which can be saidor understood, for he surpasses everything which is or is not and cannot be definedin any manner as to what he is. The second motion is that by which the soul“defines the unknown God as being the cause” of all things. For it defines God tobe cause of all things, this motion being within the nature of soul. It is that “throughwhich the soul moved naturally imposes on itself through the activity of knowledgeall the natural reasons formative of all things which subsist as having been eternallymade in him who is known only causally”—for he is known because he is cause:that is, it expresses them in itself through its knowledge of them, this knowledgeitself being born in the second motion from the first. The third motion is “thecomposite one through which the soul comes into contact with eternal things andreforms the reasons of the visible in itself as though through certain signs.” It isdescribed as composite not because it is not simple in itself as the first and secondmotions are simple but because it begins to know the reasons of sensible thingsnot through themselves.’ In this passage, a good example of Eriugena’s intertextualmethod, the words of Maximus appear between quotation marks.48 The Trinitarian analogy will be more explicit in Anselm of Canterbury’sdevelopment of the same theme. See p. 135.49 Aristotle,On Interpretation1, 16a1ff. See Kretzmann, N. ‘Aristotle on spoken soundsignificant by convention’, in J.Corcoran (ed.)Ancient Logic and its ModernInterpretations,Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 3–21; Lieb, H. ‘Das “semiotische Dreieck” beiOgden und Richards. Eine Neuformulierung des Zeichenmodells von Aristoteles’, inH.Geckeler (ed.)Logos Semantikos,Berlin, 1981, pp. 137–56; and Weidemann, H.‘Ansätze zu einer semantischen Theorie bei Aristoteles’,Zeitschrift for Semiotik4(1982): 241–57.50 This influence is documented in standard works on the history of medievalsemantics. See especially, Kretzmann, N., ‘Semantics, History of, in P.Edwards(ed.)The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol. 7, New York, 1967, pp. 362–3, 365ff.;Pinborg [6.36] 29ff. and Eco [6.29].51 See Saussure,Course in General Linguistics,pp. 65–70, 111ff. The same fusionoccurs in the semiotic theory of Peirce. See Peirce, C.S.,Collected Papers,vol. 5,ed. C.Hartshorne and P.Weiss, Cambridge, Mass., 1931–58, p. 314, etc.52 See Klinck [6.32] for the medieval tradition in general.53 V. 867A–B. These etymologies are all based on the Greek. However, Eriugenaalso explores Graeco-Latin etymologies at III. 697A(ouranos/caelum),V. 954D–955A(aid%s/infernus). An etymology based on the Latin occurs at I. 494D–495A.54 This situation is naturally conducive to polysemy. Fusion of real and verbal parallelsand complements the fusion of cognitive and verbal described on p. 128.55 III. 668C–D. Cf.Commentary on ‘Celestial Hierarchy’4. 314–25.56 II 580C–581A. The passage is particularly interesting when combined with III.624A–625A. Since this states that the order of the divine names is—according toEriugena’s philosophical idealism—partially dependent on the human mind’sperception, the etymological activity of II. 580Cff. must be not only the discoverybut also the positing of ‘reality’ itself. There is another complex etymology at V.1003B–D.57 The precise nature of metaphor is a matter of controversy. However, it clearlyrepresents a specific application of the concept of polysemy where the primarymeaning of a metaphorized term is the secondary meaning of the metaphorizingterm and vice versa.58 SeeTo HerenniusIV. 34. 45, Quintilian,Institutes of OratoryVIII. 6. 4ff.,Martianus Capella,On the MarriageIV. 359–60, Isidore of Seville,EtymologiesI. 37. 5, etc.59 See I. 458C, I. 461C, I. 463B, etc. This application of metaphor is discussed byBeierwaltes, W., ‘Negati affirmatio. Welt als Metapher. Zur Grundlegung einermittelalterlichen Ästhetik durch Johannes Scotus Eriugena’,PhilosophischesJahrbuch83 (1976):237–65.60 Traditionally, synecdoche occurs in two forms—transference from whole to partand transference from part to whole—and is therefore already bilateral. SeeToHerenniusIV. 33. 44.61 I. 459C. ‘But since the divine significations which are predicated of God bytransference from the creature to the creator in Holy Scripture—if indeed it isrightly said that anything can be predicated of him (which we should considerelsewhere)—are innumerable and cannot be discovered or collected together inthe smallness of our reasoning, only a few such divine names should be set downby way of illustration’; I. 461C. ‘For the statement “It is Truth” does not affirmthat the divine nature is Truth in a proper sense but that it can be called by sucha name in a metaphor from the creature to the creator. It clothes the divineessence which is naked and devoid of all proper signification with such words’;I. 463B–C. ‘But as we have said above, just as almost all things which areproperly predicated of the nature of created things can be said metaphorically ofthe creator of things in order to signify, so also the significations of the categorieswhich are discerned properly in created things can be uttered not absurdlyconcerning the cause of all—not to signify properly what it is but to suggest ina transferred mode what we should reasonably think about it when investigatingit in some fashion’; I. 480B. ‘So if all things which are are rightly predicated ofGod not properly but by a kind of transference since they derive from him, whyis it surprising that all things which are in place—since they seem to be enclosedeverywhere by greater things—can be called places although none of them isproperly a place but is contained within what is place in its proper nature?’ Cf.III. 624A–625A.62 I. 480B–C. ‘We see that those things which are contained are named after thethings which contain them through metonymy—that is, transferred naming—although they are not so contained by them that they are unable to subsist in theirnatural limits without them. It is the common practice of mortals to call the wifeor the family a “house” although these things are naturally distinct. For it is notthe house which confers substantial existence on the wife or the family but theplace of their own nature. Yet because they possess that existence in the housethey are accustomed to be named after it. Likewise the things which contain arenamed after the things which are contained. For example: air contains light, andso air which is illuminated is called “light”; the eye is called “sight” or “vision”although according to its proper nature it is neither sight nor vision’. Cf. I. 450A–B, I. 515B–C, V. 876A–B, V. 1021B.63 III. 706A–B. ‘Not unreasonably, given that it is the most common practice ofHoly Scripture to signify the natural subsistences and reasons of invisible thingswith words signifying visible things, in order to train pious philosophers. Andthis is not surprising, since the same practice has the very frequent custom ofsuggesting corporeal and sensible things with the names of spiritual and invisiblethings. Since there are many and innumerable examples of this reciprocalmetaphoricity and they are very well known to all those trained in Holy Scripture,it would appear to be a lengthy and superfluous task to amass them in the presentdiscussion. However, let us use a few illustrations: “That which is born of flesh isflesh”—here the entire man born in original sin is called by the name “flesh”—“And that which is born of the spirit is spirit”—the entire man reborn throughregeneration in Christ is expressed by the term “spirit”. And if somebody saysthat it is not the entire man but only the flesh of a man that is born of flesh, I shallreply that it is therefore not the entire man but only the soul that is born of spiritand if so it follows that there is no grace to benefit the baptized bodies. But if theentire man, namely soul and body, is reborn in Christ and becomes spirit, thennecessarily the entire man is born of flesh in Adam and is flesh, from which it isconcluded that the flesh is called spirit and the spirit flesh. The Word of God iscalled flesh and flesh the Word, and there are similar cases where both synecdocheand metaphor are understood simultaneously.’64 See Richards, I.A.,The Philosophy of Rhetoric,New York, 1936, pp. 89ff. Thedistinction between ‘comparison’ and ‘fusion’ theories of metaphor owessomething to Black, M.,Models and Metaphors,Ithaca, NY, 1962, pp. 25ff.,who sets out a complete typology consisting of substitutive, comparative, andinter-active approaches.65 The problems associated with polysemy were formally discussed in pseudo-Augustine,Ten Categories9. 135, 13ff., a text with which Eriugena wasparticularly familiar. Cf. Martianus Capella,On the MarriageIV. 355–7.66 The volume of essays, Beierwaltes [6.42], setting out to prove that Eriugenaexercised significant influence over later medieval thinkers, has not achieved thedesired result. In fact, the following conclusions now seem to have been established:(1) Eriugena’s influence was considerable for one or two generations after histime (the evidence: Heiric of Auxerre, Remigius of Auxerre, and other glossators);(2) In the eleventh century there are only a few traces of his influence, e.g. inHrotsvitha of Gandersheim; (3) Eriugena’s influence becomes more noticeablefrom the beginning of the twelfth century but only in certain respects: (a) Hisideas influence many in a negative sense (the evidence: copies of Eriugenian MSS,polemic against him), (b) He is influential as translator of pseudo-Dionysius, (c)His ideas influence a few in a positive sense (the evidence: HonoriusAugustodunensis, ‘Marius’,On the Elements). See also Lucentini [6.52].67 Edited by Marenbon [5.84] 173ff. Eriugena also influenced the gloss tradition onMartianus Capella in a manner now difficult to describe precisely; see Schrimpf[6.58].68 Gloss I in Marenbon’s edition.69 Gloss IIIb in Marenbon’s edition.70 On the Boethian logical tradition in the Middle Ages see van de Vyver [6.37] andMinio-Paluello [6.34].71 On Gerbert’s work in general see the collectionGerberto, Scienza, Storia e Mito[6.61]. This includes papers by Riché [6.62]—stressing the important of Boethius—and Frova [6.60].72 On the term ‘semiotic’ see note 14.73 Gerbert, [6.16] 6, pp. 301ff. Gerbert here systematizes material in Aristotle,OnInterpretation13. 23a 21–5.74 The most useful book providing a general introduction to Anselm’s life and worksis Hopkins [6.22]. Among other modern studies, Kohlenberger [6.70] and Evans,G.R.,Anselm and Talking about God,Oxford, 1978 should be mentioned.75 The first interpretation predominates at 9, 24. 7 to 10, 25. 27, the second at 1,13. 1 to 4, 18. 3. Both are perfectly standard in the Augustinian tradition whichAnselm represents.76 The type of causality (efficient) is discussed at 6, 18. 18 to 7. 22, 10.77 The semiotic always implies the semantic even though the reverse is not the case.78 [6.11] I: 14. 5ff. ‘It is therefore easy for someone to say to himself silently: Sincethe goods are so numerous whose great diversity we both perceive through thebodily senses and discern by the reason of the mind, should we believe that thereis one thing through which alone whatever things are good are good or are thingswhich are good good through one another? But it is absolutely certain and clearto all those willing to pay attention that whatever things are called something insuch a way as to be called this in greater or lesser or equal degree in respect of oneanother, are called this through something which is understood not differently indifferent things but the same in each case, whether it be considered as equally orunequally present in them… Therefore, since it is certain that all good things, ifcompared to one another, are either equally or unequally good, it is necessarythat all good things are good through something which is understood as the samein different things, although sometimes good things seem to be called good throughone another… But who would doubt that that through which all good things aregood is a great good? So it is good through itself, since every good is good throughit. Therefore it follows that all other goods are good through something otherthan that which they are themselves, and that only this other is good throughitself. But no good which is good through another is equal to or greater than thatgood which is good through itself. So that alone is supremely good which is onlygood through itself, for that is supreme which so excels others that it has neitheran equal nor a superior.’79 This is one feature reinforcing the picture of Anselm as a Platonic realist. That hewas moving away from this position was argued by Schmitt [6.72]. However, theonly evidence for such an interpretation is an apparently non-realist handling ofabstract terms to be discussed on p. 135. Anselm’s position as a Platonic realist isexamined by Flasch [6.67] and Adams [6.65].80 In Anselm’s writing, the termratioitself has a multiplicity of connotations givenby the earlier textual tradition: ontological, theological, epistemological,psychological and logical. See Gersh [6.68].81 [6.11] I, pr. 13 On the textual background to Anselm’s argument see Audet [6.66]and Nothdurft [6.35].82 The modern discussion seems to have begun with Frege about 1892. See Frege,G., ‘On sense and reference’, pp. 118–40 and Russell, B., ‘On denoting’, pp. 143–58, both in F.Zabeeh (ed.)Readings in Semantics,Urbana, Ill., 1974.83 Cf. note 79. To the question whether Anselm saw any inconsistency betweenthese two positions the answer is uncertain. However, since he probably viewedthe signifieds ofDe grammaticobut apparently not the transcendent propertiesofMonologionas universals in the logical sense, the philosophical problems raisedby the two treatises were more easily separated for him than they are for hismodern reader. The issue of universality is first raised atMonologion27,[6.11] I.45. 1–22.84 See Augustine,On the TrinityX. 1ff., XV. 10–16. On the history of this theorysee Colish [6.28] 50–1, 99.85 The threefold division in this text: sensible signs+sensible manner, sensiblesigns+insensible manner, sensible signs+neither sensible nor insensible manner,juxtaposes semiotic categories in a manner recalling Eriugena. See n. 19.86 Anselm does not himself employ the terms ‘unmotivated’ and ‘non-universal’here. However, he clearly views the first type of sign as defined negatively withrespect to the third type. The latter will be specified as motivated and universal.87 Anselm says that the third type of sign is ‘natural’(naturalis)apparently meaningthat it is motivated. In modern linguistic theory, a motivated sign is one whosesignifier and signified are related analogically. See Barthes,SZpp. 114ff.88Monologion10 [6.11] 1:24. 29ff. ‘It is noted in common usage that we can speakof a single thing in three ways. We speak of things either by using sensible signs—that is, signs which can be perceived by bodily senses—in a sensible manner; orby thinking the same signs which are sensible externally in an insensible mannerwithin ourselves; or by neither using these signs in a sensible nor an insensiblemanner but by speaking of the things themselves inwardly in our mind throughimagination of the bodily or through a rational understanding in place of thediversity of things themselves. For I speak of the man in one way when I signifyhim with the name “man”, in another when I think the same name silently, and inanother when my mind contemplates that same man either through an image ofthe bodily or through reason. It is through an image of the bodily when the mindimagines his sensible shape, but it is through reason when it thinks his universalessence which is “animal, rational, mortal”. Of these three ways of speaking eachconsists of its own kind of words. However, the words of that speech which Ihave posited as third and last—when they are of things which are not unknown—are natural and the same among all races.’ In this passage, Anselm develops thetheory which he found in Aristotle’sOn Interpretation;see p. 129.89 Anselm states unambiguously that even the third type of speaking constitutessign-manipulation of a sort.90Monologiom65 [6.11] I:75. 17–65, 77. 3. The reference to transformation ofmeaning indicates metaphoricity.91 It is possible to treat the statement atProslogion15 [6.11] I:112. 12–17 that Godis ‘something greater than can be thought’(quiddam maius quam cogitari possit)as a correction of the famous premiss ofProslogion2 [6.11] I:101. 4–5. If so,Anselm is pointing out that the ontological argument is in the final analysis onlyan image of the truth.BIBLIOGRAPHYOriginal Language EditionsEriugena6.1 Floss, H.J. (ed.)Joannis Scott of era quae supersunt omnia(MPL 122), Paris,1853.6.2 Lutz, C.E. (ed.)Annotationes in Marcianum,Cambridge, Mass., 1939.6.3 Jeauneau, E. (ed.) Commentary on Martianus, Book I, in Oxford, BodleianAuct. T. II. 18, inQuatre thèmes érigéniens,Montreal and Paris, 1978.6.4 Madec, G. (ed.)De praedestinatione,(CC c.m. 50), Turnhout, 1978.6.5 Sheldon-Williams, I.P. (ed.)PeriphyseonI–III with facing English translation,Dublin, 1968–81 (Scriptores latini hiberniae 7, 9, 11). (On this problematicedition, see P.Lucentini, ‘La nuova edizione del “Periphyseon” dell’Eriugena’,Studi medievali,3a serie, 17(1), 1976.)6.6 Jeauneau, E. (ed.)PeriphyseonIV with facing English translation by J.J.O’Mearaand I.P.Sheldon-Williams (Scriptores latini hiberniae 13), Dublin, 1995.6.7 ——(ed.)PeriphyseonI (CC c.m. 161), Turnhout, 1996.6.8 Barbet, J. (ed.)Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem(CC c.m. 31), Turnhout,1975.6.9 Jeauneau, E. 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Zur Grundlegung einermittelalterlichen Ästhetik durch Johannes Scotus Eriugena’,PhilosophischesJahrbuch83 (1976): 237–65; repr. in Beierwaltes [6.44], 115–58.6.40 ——(ed.)Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen,Heidelberg, 1980.6.41 ——‘Language and object: Reflections on Eriugena’s valuation of the functionand capacities of language’, in [6.38] 209–28.6.42 ——(ed.)Eriugena Redivivus: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Denkens imMittelalter und im Übergang zur Neuzeit,Heidelberg, 1987.6.43 ——(ed.)Eriugena: Begriff und Metapher,Heidelberg, 1990.6.44 ——Eriugena. 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