AUGUSTINE

Augustine: translation

AugustineGerard O’Daly1LIFE AND PHILOSOPHICAL READINGSAugustine was born in Thagaste (modern Souk Ahras in Algeria) in RomanNorth Africa in AD 354. He died as bishop of Hippo (now Annaba,Algeria) in 430. His education followed the standard Roman practice ofthe later Empire (Marrou [12.59]), in schools at Thagaste, Madauros, andCarthage, and it involved some study of philosophical texts, if only fortheir literary and rhetorical qualities. At the age of 18 he read Cicero’sHortensiusas part of the syllabus at Carthage, and it affected himprofoundly, introducing him to philosophy, and in particular to ethicaleudemonism (conf.3.7). He cites theHortensiusregularly in his writings.&LT;sup&GT;1&LT;/sup&GT;But, although already a Christian catechumen (his mother Monnica was apious believer), and inclined to think of Christ when ‘wisdom’(sapientia)was spoken of, he found himself more attracted to the Manichees than towhat he perceived as the crudities of style in the Latin translations of theChristian scriptures available to him. What attracted him to Manichaeismwas its appeal to reason rather than authority (a polarity that was todominate his mature thought: see section 3): to the modern readerconfronted with the bizarre cosmic mythology of the Manichees, this seemsan odd claim. But the Manichees proffered a universal system,encompassing cosmology, psychology, and a synthesis of several religions,including Christianity; and they prescribed a way of life consistent withtheir revealed ‘knowledge’. Augustine was to be deeply influenced by theiraccount of evil, based on the belief in an evil principle in the universe andin humans, a ‘substance’ at war with the good principle in the individualand the universe(duab. an.).It was many years before he shed this belief.Furthermore, Manichaean criticism of the Old Testament enabled him toreject what he took to be its primitive concept of God and its moralambiguities.As a young man at Carthage Augustine read Aristotle’sCategoriesandclaims not to have found them difficult (conf.4.28). His other earlyphilosophical readings are not easy to determine. Cicero, especially theTusculan Disputations,theDe re publica,theDe natura, deorum,and theAcademica(and to a lesser extent theDe fatoand theDe officiis), is hisprincipal source of information about every period of Greek philosophy (heprobably read Plato’sTimaeusin Cicero’s translation).&LT;sup&GT;2&LT;/sup&GT; In his firstpublished work,De pulchro et apto(not extant), on aesthetics, written in380–1, Augustine reveals knowledge of the distinction between beauty(kalon)and ‘appropriateness’(prepon),the Stoic theory of beauty asproportion of the parts of a thing, and the monad/dyad principles (conf.4.20–1),Augustine adopted the career of arhetor,teaching at Carthage, Rome(from 383), and Milan (from 384), where he held the post of public orator(Milan was then the seat of the Western imperial court). At Milan (possiblyin a Platonist circle including figures like the retired high public officialManlius Theodorus) he encountered Neoplatonism, reading—in the Latintranslation by Marius Victorinus—works, probably by both Plotinus andPorphyry, in 386 (conf.7.13–27;beata v.4;c. Acad.3.41).&LT;sup&GT;3&LT;/sup&GT; Hisknowledge of Greek was mediocre. He expresses distaste for the way inwhich it was taught at school (conf.1.23), and he was always to bedependent upon translations for his access to Greek philosophy, Scripture,and theological literature.&LT;sup&GT;4&LT;/sup&GT; At Milan he also heard the sermons ofAmbrose, whose Platonizing Christianity undermined the materialisticconcept of God that Augustine found in both Manichaeism and Stoicism,and who initiated him into the subtleties of exegetical method, based uponthe distinction, taken from Philo of Alexandria and Greek Christiantheologians such as Origen, between literal and figurative readings ofScripture. He underwent a conversion experience in autumn 386, resigninghis post at Milan and spending the winter of 386–7 in retreat at a countryvilla in nearby Cassiciacum.From this period came his first extant works, a series of philosophicaldialogues whose form is much influenced by Cicero, which includes theContra Academicos,a critique of Academic scepticism (Cicero’sAcademicais Augustine’s principal source), and, in theDe ordineand theDe beatavita,discussions of the nature of happiness and its relation to knowledge,God’s nature, order in the universe, and the problem of evil. In another‘inner’ dialogue between Augustine and reason, theSoliloquia,he exploresthe nature of mind, the identification of truth with being, and the problemof error. Neoplatonist influences permeate these dialogues. Augustine’scharacteristic theories of the will and semantics were not developed untilafter his baptism in 387 and his return to Thagaste in 388(De liberoarbitrio, De Magistro). Anti-Manichaean polemic dominated his writingsat this time. The first mature synthesis of his thought,De vera religione,was written in 390.From 371 to 386 Augustine had lived with a concubine: the couple had ason, Adeodatus, who stayed with Augustine after his mother was sent backto Africa in 386, at a time when Augustine was planning to marry anheiress of high social standing (Adeodatus died young, probably in 389).Augustine’s conversion led to the abandonment of his marriage plans andthe adoption of a life of celibacy. At Thagaste he established a religiouscommunity. In 391 he was ordained priest at Hippo, becoming bishop in396. Several of his works at this time reveal the influence of Paulinetheology upon his thought. When he wrote his autobiography, theConfessions,from 397 on, he was able to apply his analysis of the will andPauline principles to his conversion experience of 386: both elements weremissing from the Cassiciacum dialogues.&LT;sup&GT;5&LT;/sup&GT;By 397 Augustine’s philosophical views were largely formed, and there isno new encounter with other thinkers or fresh ideas in his later career. Buthe elaborated his thought in several major works, all written over severalyears: theDe trinitate(whose psychological schemes reveal much of hisphilosophy of mind), theDe Genesi ad litteram(on creation, the soul,sense-perception, and imagination), theDe doctrina christiana(onhermeneutics), and theDe civitate dei(on ethics and social theory). In thelast two decades of his life he wrote much on free will, grace, and thecauses of evil, in a series of polemical works directed against Pelagius andhis followers, in particular Julian of Eclanum.Augustine’s philosophical readings were eclectic and haphazard. OnlyCicero was studied systematically, as part of an educational syllabus. Platowas read either in translation or in extracts (or both), the Neoplatonistslikewise. The Middle Platonists were known indirectly, through thedoxographical tradition (Solignac [12.61]): Apuleius was an exception, butwas chiefly exploited for his demonology. Christian writers were moreoften targets of criticism than sources of new ideas: Tertullian’scorporealist views on the soul, and Origen’s theories of the soul’s preexistence,periodic reincarnation, and embodiment as punishment forpreviously committed sin, all invited Augustinian objections. But Augustinemade a lot of his limited philosophical background, exploiting it withacuity and imagination.2AUGUSTINE’S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHYAugustine philosophizes throughout his writings. But, despite the fact thatsome of his earlier works concentrate on specific philosophical themes, thegreat majority of his writings are responses to a variety of personal,theological, and church political circumstances (Bonner [12.32]).Speculation for its own sake, although it may determine the amount ofspace that he devotes to analysing particular problems, is never whatmotivates Augustine to write in the first place. The polemical aspect cannotbe neglected. TheDe libero arbitriois directed against the Manichees, forexample (retr.1.9). In longer works, such asDe Genesi ad litteram,whichwere not composed under pressure of time and whose subject-matteroffered scope for open exploration of certain (for example cosmological)questions, Augustine speculates most freely (Gn. litt.1.18.37–21.41; 2.9.20–1; 2.18.38). Augustine does not construct a philosophical system. Butcertain themes preoccupy him, and his treatment of them evinces acontinuity of development or a coherence of treatment that allows us todescribe his position with some confidence. At times he understands by‘philosophy’ the Graeco-Roman tradition of rational inquiry, as opposed toChristianity; and he distinguishes between rational method in philosophyand Christian belief in religious principles that are often historical events(above all, Christ’s Incarnation) (beata v.4;c. Acad.3.37–42;vera. rel.2–8, 30–3;conf.7.13–27;civ.8.1–12). He deprecates pagan philosophy,when he wishes to throw Christian doctrine into sharp relief. At othertimes, however, he does not distinguish between the philosophical andtheological aspects of his thought. Christianity is the ‘one true philosophy’(c. Iul.4.72), and the ‘true religion’ ofDe vera religioneis inconceivablewithout its Platonist components. Thus he can speak of a ‘Christianphilosophy’ (c. Iul.4.72;c. Iul. imp.2.166), arguing that the love ofwisdom, the search for, and discovery of, truth, and the quest forhappiness all find fulfilment in the Christian religion. Augustineappropriates traditional philosophical questions, but the answers which heprovides are religious ones. Thus the universal desire for happiness, whichhe grants to be the proper activity of the highest human faculty, the mind,is, he argues, only fully satisfied in the afterlife, and not in a disembodiedmental state, but in the resurrected heavenly body of the saints.&LT;sup&GT;6&LT;/sup&GT; At thesame time, the questions which he asks are those of the Greek and Romanphilosophical tradition. When he investigates problems of the soul, heinquires into its origin or source, its substance, the nature of the body-soulrelationship, its immortality, its condition after death, and so on.&LT;sup&GT;7&LT;/sup&GT; He doesnot pretend to answer all questions: for example, when human souls arecreated (see section 7).The scope of Augustine’s Christian philosophy may be appreciated whenwe realize that he fuses the ‘wisdom’ of theHortensiuswith the ‘intellect’ ofthe Neoplatonist writings and the ‘word’ of the beginning of John’s gospel(conf.3.7–8; 7.13–27;civ.10.29). He establishes several parallels betweenthe themes of the Johannine prologue and Neoplatonist writings. Platonismenjoys a special status in his thought. ‘If Plato were alive’ (vera rel.3), hewould recognize in Christianity the realization of his striving: amonotheistic religion with a belief in immaterial principles, God, and thesoul. But, despite its theoretical monism, Platonism is, Augustine believes,vitiated by polytheistic demonologies (civ.8–10).Augustine’s familiarity with the doxographical tradition means that hefollows the school division of philosophy into three areas of physics,ethics, and logic (vera rel.30–3;civ.8.4;ep.118.16–21). But he employsno such division in any stringent sense in his discussion of philosophicalissues. It serves chiefly to articulate his reporting of philosophicaldoctrines, as well as to assess the achievement of Platonism in fusingPythagorean physics with Socratic ethics, and completing the fusion by thedevelopment of dialectic(c Acad.3.37;civ.8.4).Augustine embraces the traditional definition of philosophy as thescience of things divine and human, and he sometimes distinguishesbetweensapientiaas knowledge of things divine (including truth in thestrict sense), andscientiaas the knowledge of temporal things (trin.14.2–3). He understands it to be the achievement of Christianity to establish thetrue relationship between eternal immutable truth and the beliefs that wemay have about temporal things. The proportion ofTimaeus290 (being:becoming : : truth: belief) expresses an ontological and epistemologicalclassification that Augustine approves (trin.4.24). But he believes that thelinks between the temporal and the eternal are only realized in theincarnate Christ, who is bothsapientiaandscientia,and in the doctrineswhich emerge in Christianity (Gn. litt.1.21.41).Augustine knows the termtheologiafrom Varro’s scheme of the threekinds of ‘theology’—mythical, natural, and civil—but he uses the word torefer to Christian doctrine only once (civ.6.8) and in passing. Nor does heproffer a natural theology in the sense in which this is understood inmedieval and modern contexts, namely, a theology that refuses to admitdoctrinal propositions that are not also accessible to reason as premises. Buthe is arguably the founder in the Western tradition of ‘philosophicaltheology’, which does accept such doctrinal premises as assumptions,testing their coherence by analysis and argumentation, explaining them andanalysing their implications and connections. Augustine’s programme aimsat illuminating faith, which is based on authority, by the understandingwhich reason provides, inasmuch as this is possible. Nor is this attempt atrational inquiry merely something in which Christians may indulge, but itis a duty incumbent upon them, for it involves use of their God-givenreason, the same reason which enables them to believe in the first place(ep.120.3). Augustine interprets the Latin translation of the Septuagintversion of Isaiah 7:9 (‘Unless you believe, you shall not understand’) as anassertion of temporal conditionality (faith precedes understanding), as wellas of confidence that ‘God will aid us and make us understand what webelieve’ (lib. arb.1.4; 2.6). But if ‘authority is temporally prior, reason isprior in reality’ (ord.2.26). Augustine argues that even if Christian beliefsare initially credible only because the believer subjectively accepts divineauthority, these beliefs are in principle accessible to, and explicable by,rational inquiry. And he attempts to broaden the basis of authority,stressing, for example, the role of historical evidence and wide acceptabilityin the tradition of Christ’s life and teaching. His stand is in sharp contrastto Tertullian’s anti-intellectualism, which uses the argument that themysteries of faith are inaccessible to reason, and that their veryinaccessibility constitutes their status as mysteries (De carne Christi5.4;Depraescriptione haereticorum7.2–3). Augustine appears to claim that allmysteries may be understood, if not in this life, then in the afterlife. Andsome, such as the Trinity, may only be partly understood (ep.120.2).Augustine’s claim, he assumes, is strengthened by his observation that thesame reason is operative in belief and in understanding.&LT;sup&GT;8&LT;/sup&GT;3BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGEAlthough he sometimes distinguishes sharply between the certainty ofknowledge and the insubstantial nature of belief (c. Acad.3.37, 43;div,qu.9, 48;ep.147.7, 10), Augustine, not least because of his Christianity,more often grants belief, if properly founded, the status of a kind ofknowledge. If believing is nothing other than ‘thinking with assent’ (praed.sanct.5), belief is rational. The validity of our beliefs depends upon theauthority by which they are held, the evidence or testimony whichcommands assent (c.Acad.3.42–3;ord.2.26–7; lib.arb.2.5;util. cred.).Different kinds of authority are in play in, for example, historical evidenceand the truths of religion, but it is the same kind of mental activity whichengages in belief in each case. Yet the objects of belief may differ radically.Historical evidence can only be believed: it can never be scientificknowledge (mag,37;div. qu.48). But religious truths may one day beunderstood, and so known, by believers. In fact, the progression frombelief to understanding is a fundamental tenet of Augustine’s views aboutour knowledge of truths about God, though the transformation of this kindof belief into knowledge will, he argues, occur only in the afterlife (trin.9.1;ser.43;en. Ps.118,ser.18.3). This theological postulate betrays afundamental attitude of Augustine’s, that belief is inferior to understanding.True belief may be rational, justified, and trustworthy, but it lacks the firsthandjustification of knowledge, and the comprehensive synoptic overviewof a complex field achieved by understanding (mag.31, 39–40, 46;ep.147.21; Burnyeat [12.67]). It also lacks the first-hand justification of senseperception:properly authenticated sense-perception is a form of knowledge(ep.147.38;trin.12.3;retr.1.14.3) in the sense that historical testimonynever can be. It is only when Augustine is arguing against sceptics that he ismoved to talk of our ‘knowing’ historical facts (trin.4.21; 15.21).Augustine’s knowledge of Academic scepticism is chiefly informed byCicero’sAcademica,and it was his disenchantment with Manichaeism thatmade him a temporary sceptic (conf.5.19, 25). His arguments againstsceptics inContra Academicosare concerned with exposing inconsistenciesand inadequacies in the Academic position (such as the concept of the‘persuasive’ or ‘probable’, and the claim that there can be an Academicsage (c. Acad.2.12, 19; 3.30–2)), and preparing the ground for anacceptance of the possibility of epistemic certainty in general.&LT;sup&GT;9&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine’s premise that the sage alone is happy is tested by the scepticalargument that wisdom may be the quest for truth rather than itsattainment. In his answer he argues that nobody can be happy if shecannot attain something which she desires greatly, such as the truth (c.Acad.1.9). But this argument presupposes that happiness entailsaccomplishment of desired goals rather than the conviction that the pursuitof a worthwhile desire, even if unfulfilled, is satisfying (Kirwan [12.42] 17–20). In fact, Augustine never repudiates the premise that the unremittingsearch for truth may in itself be a worthy human activity, and that wisdommay consist in the path that leads towards truth and not merely the goal oftruth discovered (c. Acad.1.13–14).The Academic claims that things may be credible or probable withoutthose or other things being known. Augustine exploits the fact that Cicerotranslates the Greek termpithanon(‘persuasive’ or ‘credible’) byverisimile,‘like truth’ (c. Acad.2.16, 19, 27–8). Augustine argues that it is absurd toclaim that something is like a truth when one purports not to know whatthe truth is, applying a version of Plato’s thesis (Phaedo74d–e) thatcomparing x with y entails previous knowledge of y. But I can say that x islike y if I know how y would seem if it existed. The Academic claim standsif the Academic knows ‘how a truth would seem if there were any’.&LT;sup&GT;10&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine’s argument fails.Augustine’s critique of scepticalepochêor suspension of judgement—itself an intended safeguard against the risk of error—concentrates on theinevitability of risking error if one habitually assents to what one does notknow (c. Acad.2.11). This is a neat rejoinder. Since action and the formingof judgements are not to be avoided, as the Academic concedes, theAcademic cannot claim that suspension of judgement is either possible orbrings with it avoidance of error (c. Acad.3. 33–6).&LT;sup&GT;11&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine’s attack on scepticism takes the form of a defence of the Stoiccriterion of truth (c. Acad.2.11; 3.18, 21; cf. Cicero,Academica priora18,113). He believes that the evidence of sense-perception does not, strictlyspeaking, satisfy the conditions of the criterion. His search for propositionswhich satisfy the conditions, as he understands them, leads him to look forpropositions of such a kind that they cannot be taken for false. He arguesthat propositions of logic (such as ‘not p and q’, ‘if p, then not q’) satisfythe conditions, as do mathematical propositions (c. Acad.3.21, 23, 25, 29;cf.doctr. chr.2.49–53). So do such propositions as ‘I exist’, ‘I am alive’, oreven ‘If I am deceived, I exist’ (beata, v.7;sol.2.1;lib. arb.2.7;vera rel.73;trin.10.14;civ.11–26). It is arguable that propositions of this last kindare intended to demonstrate the impossibility of thinking of any kindwithout existing, and that Augustine is inferring the certainty of ourexistence from the fact of consciousness. But it may be that Augustine isarguing that he cannot mistakenly believe that he exists, or is alive, etc.&LT;sup&GT;12&LT;/sup&GT;Does Augustine anticipate Descartes’scogito?When Descartes’s firstreaders suggested to him that this was so, Descartes replied that there wasa difference between Augustine’s use of the argument and his own.&LT;sup&GT;13&LT;/sup&GT; But infact Augustine puts hiscogitoargument to various uses, to argue for theimmateriality of the mind, or as part of a demonstration of God’s existence.In his account of what we can indubitably know Augustine follows thePlatonist tradition in asserting that knowledge is not derived from senseperceptionor experience, but that truths are somehow impressed upon ourminds a priori. What are these truths? They certainly include themathematical and logical propositions alluded to above. But they alsoinclude ideas or concepts like that of ‘unity’ (lib. arb.2.21–3, 26, 28–9, 40;trin.8.4). For knowledge is not just of propositions; it is also directacquaintance with entities that correspond to the Forms of Plato and thePlatonist tradition, in which particular things in our world participate (div.qu.46). Augustine contrasts the immutability of the eternal Forms with themutability even of the human reason which apprehends them (imm. an.7;ser.241.2). He adopts the Middle Platonist view that the Forms are thethoughts of God, who looks into his mind in order to create the universe (div.qu.46;civ.12.27). In Christian terms, Augustine links the concept of theForms to the belief that the son of God is both wisdom and ‘word’, in thesense of a causal creative power (vera rel.66, 113;ep.14.4;civ.9.22;Gn.litt1.18.36).Augustine considers but rejects the Platonic doctrine ofanamnêsisas anexplanation of the presence in the human mind of knowledge that is notderived from sense-experience. Knowledge is recollection, an exercise of thememory, but in the sense that when I know I actualize what is latent in mymind, eliciting truths by a process of concentration. This sounds Plotinian,but it is combined with a reluctance to believe in the pre-existence of thesoul (c. Acad.1.22;sol.2.35;imm. an.6;ep.7;conf.10.16–19).&LT;sup&GT;14&LT;/sup&GT; Nor isthe human mind able to realize knowledge unaided. Augustine believes thatdivine illumination is required to achieve this. God is the light of the mind,and knowing is a kind of mental seeing. The divine light illumines notmerely what is apprehended, but also the apprehending mind. Moreover,the light of truth is also the light in which we make judgements, whetherabout intelligible phenomena or sense-perceptions. But illumination’s roleis not just normative or formal: illumination attempts to account for themind’s access to concepts and ideas, not merely its power to judge (sol.1.12, 15;ep.120.10;conf.9.10;div. qu.46;trin.4.4; 14.21;Gn. litt.12.31.59).&LT;sup&GT;15&LT;/sup&GT; Although it is obvious that the illumination theory is an aspect of thedoctrine of divine grace, it is not an attempt to deny the mind its propercognitive activity. Rather, it is a realization of the mind’s natural capacity.Knowledge of this kind is a result of introspection. Augustine powerfullyreiterates the Neoplatonist themes of conversion or return to oneself, ofself-knowledge as the means to all knowledge, the fulfilment of a deepdesire to possess wisdom, as deep as the desire to be happy (vera rel.72;sol.2.1;trin.9.14; 10.1–16).&LT;sup&GT;16&LT;/sup&GT; Self-knowledge is a realization of self-love,but self-love moves beyond itself to the knowledge of truth (beata v.33, 35;ord.2.35;trin.9.18). In a sense, God is the truth which I know. But God isnot the Forms. Transcending them, he is both known and unknowable,‘touched’ rather than apprehended, a vision like our seeing the Forms, butunlike our seeing them a vision that cannot be complete in our temporalcondition (conf.9.24; 10.35–8;trin.15.2;ser.117.5).4SEMANTICS AND HERMENEUTICSThe most discussed aspect of Augustine’s philosophy of language in thiscentury is the account of language-acquisition criticized by Wittgenstein forconcentrating on words as names of objects and on ostensive definition asthe means by which words are understood (Philosophical Investigations1–3, 32, citingconf.1.13). Wittgenstein’s critique is, at least in part,misplaced. Whereas Augustine tends to insist that single words are names,he does not regard ostensive definition as the sole or even principal way inwhich understanding of language is achieved. For Augustine, language is asystem of signs conveyed in speech: every word signifies something. Whatwords signify is not immediately obvious. They convey thoughts fromspeaker to hearer, but it is not clear whether Augustine maintains that theysignify those thoughts, or the objects of those thoughts, or both thoughtsand objects. Augustine adapts to an explicitly linguistic context Stoicdiscussions (themselves indebted to Aristotle) of signs as a means ofinference in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.&LT;sup&GT;17&LT;/sup&GT; Verbal signs refer tosomething ‘beyond themselves’. But verbal signs are not the kind of signupon which Stoic theory concentrates: these Augustine calls ‘natural’,whereas verbal signs are ‘given’ by a speaker to express something, toprovide evidence of, at the very least, mental contents (mag.1–31;doctr.chr.1.2; 2.1–4;dial.5;conf.1.7, 12–13, 23).If verbal signs are evidential, they will signify not merely specific things,but also facts, actual or purported. Thus sentences as well as individualwords signify, and some individual words (conjunctions or prepositions,for example) are more readily understood as signifiers when they areconsidered as parts of a sentence or proposition. But Augustine also attemptsto show that all individual words are names, and that every word can beused to refer to itself: every word is a sign inasmuch as it can be used tobring itself to mind (this is how Augustine deals with words like ‘if’ and‘because’) (mag.3, 13–19).In theDe dialectica&LT;sup&GT;18&LT;/sup&GT; Augustine distinguishes between words and whatis ‘sayable’(dicibile),the conception of a word in the mind, what isunderstood by a word, the mental perception of a word (dial.5). Thisaccount has something in common with the Stoiclektadoctrine. Butthere are substantial differences between the two concepts. Iflektaare theincorporeal meanings of words, they are only ‘complete’ as the meanings ofcompleted sentences. Their principal function is to be true or false, andtheir linguistic form is propositional. Parts oflektaare not meanings.Augustine’sdicibileconcept is underdeveloped. In part, it resembles hisconcept of the inner word, the notion that thought is a kind of inner speechin no particular language, but capable of being verbalized, even if, as in thecase of God’s word, it is not vocal (see section 9).&LT;sup&GT;19&LT;/sup&GT; Language expresses thespeaker’s will, verbal signs signify states of mind (‘if’ indicates doubt,‘nothing’ a perception that there is no object or real thing there (mag.3, 19)).We explain words by means of other words, using signs to signify othersigns (mag.7–18). Likewise, gestures, whether mimic or not, function assigns that make things known (mag.4–6). But we can also make thingsknown by performance, for example of an action like walking, where nosigns are used (mag.29). Signs point beyond themselves to that which theysignify, and cognition of what is signified is superior to perception of itssign. Augustine suggests that this is so because the sign is functionallydependent upon the thing signified, or is a means to an end, but he doesnot resolve satisfactorily the question of value (mag.24–8). Why are wordsinferior to things?The reason why Augustine raises the value-question may be that, despitehis initial thesis that language teaches something, Augustine eventuallyadopts the position that nothing is learnt by means of signs (mag.32–5).&LT;sup&GT;20&LT;/sup&GT;Rather, it is perceptions of things that teach us the meaning of signs likewords. Words do not convey their meaning unless we know that to whichthey refer. More precisely, words have the function of calling to mind thethings of which they are signs (mag.33). But ‘calling to mind’ or ‘makingknown’ or ‘showing’ is not the same as ‘teaching’, and having something‘made clear’ is not the same as ‘learning’ it (mag.33–5). Knowledge isdirect acquaintance with what is known, signs have an instrumentalfunction, they serve to remind us of what we know. Augustine expressesthis theory in Christian terms by asserting that the one teacher is Christ,the divine ‘inner teacher’, the wisdom whereby we know what we know(mag.2, 38–40, 46). But we only achieve knowledge because we teachourselves, through introspection: we are no passive recipients of that whichwe learn. This Platonist position leads to the devaluation of signs in thelearning process. Their function is auxiliary. They may prompt the directacquaintance that is knowledge. And they also serve as vehicles forcommunication of thoughts and ideas. When communication occurs,something is indeed transferred from one mind to another, but once againit is not a case of communication from an active sign-giver to a passive signrecipient.Rather, what one mind has apprehended is apprehended throughthe sign by another mind: it is simply another instance of cognition (mag.39–46).The focus of Augustine’s semantics is epistemological rather thanlinguistic, although he has interesting observations to make aboutlanguage and meaning. The uses of his sign-theory in theological contexts,such as its application to his views on non-literal, figurative meanings ofScripture or to the Church’s sacraments, proved to be highly influential.&LT;sup&GT;21&LT;/sup&GT;Together with his North African contemporary Tyconius, Augustine,especially in theDe doctrina christiana,develops a hermeneutics of readingScripture that is profoundly original, with repercussions beyond Biblicalinterpretation.5ETHICS, POLITICAL THEORY, AESTHETICSAugustine appropriates the eudemonist ethics of ancient philosophy.&LT;sup&GT;22&LT;/sup&GT;Happiness(beatitudo)is a universal human desire (c. Acad.1.5–9;beata v.10, 14;civ.10.1), the goal(finis)of human endeavour (civ.19.1): it is thehighest good for humans (in one version of this thesis Augustine positspeace, rather than happiness, as the universal goal (civ.19.10–13). Incommon with the eudemonistic tradition since Aristotle, Augustineinvestigates what constitutes the well-being of the human being as arational being (beata v.30–7;lib. arb.2.7, 26;Gn. c. Man.1.31). He doesnot equate happiness with pleasure or enjoyment, any more than Aristotleor the Stoics do, although he argues that the happiness appropriate tohumans, if realized, is accompanied by delight and enjoyment (doctr. chr.1.3–5; trin. 1 11.10). The happiest form of life is living in accordance withreason, whether this consists in the search for truth or its discovery andpossession, the state of wisdom(sapientia)that reflects divine wisdom (seesection 3). The proper end or goal for humans is to ‘enjoy God’quatruthas an end in itself, and this teleological goal should also determine all ourmoral choices (lib. arb.2.35–6;civ.8.8; 15.7;c. Faust.22.78).In one sense, Augustine’s account of happiness equates it with a form ofknowledge, namely knowledge of what is best and highest: happinessconsists in contemplation of stable eternal being, something that enduresand, unlike other kinds of possessions, cannot be lost (beata v.11;lib. arb.1.32–4;vera rel.86;mor.1.5). But Augustine qualifies this equation ofperfect virtue with knowledge by an insistence that enjoying or ‘possessing’God entails doing what God wills, living well, performing virtuous actions.On the one hand, therefore, wisdom is contrasted (Stoically) with folly(beata v.28–9). But Augustine also argues that being virtuous and itscontrary are not merely instances of knowledge or ignorance. In thiscontext his concepts of use and enjoyment, and his notion of the will, arecrucial.The Augustinian contrast between use and enjoyment is influenced byrhetorical and philosophical antitheses in Cicero, in particular the ‘usefulgood’(utile-honestum)contrast (div. qu.30). At first sight, however, it isnot so much a distinction between kinds of evaluation of temporal thingsas a contrast between the eternal and the temporal (lib. arb.1.32–4). Inorder to enjoy God, who is eternal being, we may use temporal things, asmeans to an end, in an instrumental way. Augustine includes other humanbeings among the objects of use, but only by arguing that my use of them isappropriate if it involves love of them ‘on God’s account’(propter deum)(doctr. chr.1.3–4, 20–1).&LT;sup&GT;23&LT;/sup&GT; In Augustine’s maturer thought the category ofuse is not seen in exclusively instrumental terms, but as a pointer towardsthe activity of willing, so that even enjoyment becomes a sub-category ofuse. God’s love for us is not ‘enjoyment’, for that would imply that Godneeds us for his blessedness. Divine love is rather ‘use’ in a providentialsense (doctr. chr.1.34–5). If there is order and hierarchy among beings, itis an ‘order of love’(ordo amoris)(civ.15.22). A difficulty with humanbeings is that, whereas their relations with one another are temporal, theyare not just temporal beings. Augustine’s vision of the afterlife for thosesaved is of a heavenly community of God and the saints: thus loving (orenjoying) one another in God becomes a frequent expression in hisattempts to escape from problematic consequences of the application of theuse-enjoyment category to human relations (doctr. chr.1.36–7;trin.9.13).Augustine appropriates the Greek philosophical principle that what isespecially valuable about truth and knowledge is that they cannot be lostinvoluntarily (mor.1.5). He understands the principle in terms of love,rather than merely of choice (trin.13.7–11). This is in part because, inthinking about truth, he is thinking about a person, God, and our relationto that person. But the principal reason why he talks of love in this contextis to be found in his psychology. It is commonplace in Augustine that whatI do depends upon what I love, not merely in the sense of what I value, butabove all in the sense that I act in accordance with a settled inclination(conf.13.10;civ.14.7). Acting in accordance with a settled inclination is,for him, acting voluntarily in the strict sense. He finds no place for theAristotelian view thatenkrateia(self-mastery) may involve actingvoluntarily and morally despite inclining to the wrong things. For Augustineit is not possible to love and value the wrong things and at the same time tochoose what is right (conf.8.19–24). Loving the right things is a question ofcharacter, not just of rational insight.&LT;sup&GT;24&LT;/sup&GT;Loving something is a necessary condition of willing it: sometimesAugustine suggests that it is tantamount to willing it. Loving the rightthings for the right reasons is a pre-condition of acting well. Loving thewrong things, or the right things for the wrong reasons, leads to evilactions. Reacting against the Manichaean belief that evil is a substance or anature in the universe and in ourselves, and also to some extent reactingagainst the Plotinian view that metaphysical evil (matter or bodies formedin matter) somehow helps to determine moral evil,&LT;sup&GT;25&LT;/sup&GT; Augustine argues thatwhatever exists is,quacreated by God, good in some degree (civ.19.13). Ifthings ceased to be good in any sense, they would cease to exist. On thisprinciple things are relatively evil to the degree that they lack goodness.Evil is privation of good, but not in an absolute sense. This is notnecessarily a moral distinction: a stone has less goodness than a mind, but Icannot speak of the stone’s moral status. Evil in the moral sense is,Augustine suggests, the fact or consequence of willed evil action, chosen bya mind (angelic or human) that remains essentially good, whose nature isgood (civ.12.1–9). Persons are, strictly speaking, not evil: actions may be.If love determines action and is a symptom of character, self-love is thesource of sin: more specifically, the source is pride, understood as a refusalto accept subordination to God, to acquiesce in one’s place in the hierarchyof beings. In Platonist terms, this is a ‘turning away’ from God to selfabsorption(sibi placere),a failure to understand the relationship betweenGod and humans. Adam’s fall results from the delusion that he is anautonomous being. His sin is a ‘perverse imitation of God’ (conf.2.12–14;civ.12.6–8; 14.12–14).Virtue is defined in terms of order (doctr. chr.1.28;civ.15.22). In the earlyDe beata vita,Augustine understands the virtues to possess a kind ofmeasure that is without either excess or defect (beata v.30–3). In that workhe suggests that the attainment of wisdom by the sage entails possession ofthe virtues. In his later writings he is less sanguine about the perfectibility ofhuman nature in this life. Life is a continuing struggle with vices; virtue isnot a stable, attainable state (civ.19.4). The virtues control but do notextirpate emotions. Augustine recognizes the traditional four cardinalvirtues (mor.1.25;div. qu.31). Virtue is a form of love (mor.1.25, 46),primarily of God, but also of other humans. Justice is ‘giving God his due’(civ.19.21) as well as loving one’s neighbour. The practice of the virtuesexpresses the inherently social nature of humans: we are naturally membersof societies (civ.12.22; 19.12;ep.130.13). Augustine subscribes to thenatural law theory (div. qu.53;spir. et litt.48). Our awareness of thenatural law derives from self-love, or the instinct for self-preservation, andit extends (as does the Stoic concept from which it derives) to a realizationof the need for justly regulated relations with others (civ.19.4;doctr. chr.1.27). Primarily, this realization is a form of the Golden Rule&LT;sup&GT;26&LT;/sup&GT; in itsnegative version ‘Do not do to others what you would not have others doto you’ (ep.157.15;en. Ps.57.1;Io. ev. tr.49.12). Augustine gives thenatural, or, as he often calls it, eternal law the status of a Platonic Forminasmuch as he says of it, as he says of the Forms, that it is ‘stamped onour minds’ (lib. arb.1.50–1;trin.14.21;ser.81.2). Strictly speaking, thelaws of human societies should be framed in accordance with divineeternal law (vera rel.58), but it is political authority, rather than strictconformity to natural law, that gives validity to positive law (ep.153.16;civ.19.14). Only those human laws that are explicit contraventions ofdivine commands may be disobeyed, and Augustine’s understanding ofwhat constitutes divine commands is specific: they are commands directlyrevealed in Scripture, such as the prohibition of idolatry (doctr. chr.2.40,58;civ.19.17;ser62.13). Augustine is otherwise reluctant to assert as aprinciple that individuals may decide for themselves whether an individualtemporal law is just or unjust, even if promulgated by an unjust ruler orwithout reference to the natural law. One obvious exception is a law thatmight sanction something contrary to nature (Augustine’s example issodomy (conf.3.15–16)). Other laws (for example, about monogamy orpolygamy) merely reflect the customs of different societies (conf.3.12–13;c. Faust.22.47). Hence there is scope for great differences in the laws ofdifferent societies.&LT;sup&GT;27&LT;/sup&GT;The peace which is the highest good is also the proper aim of humansocieties. They should aspire to practise justice, to be stable, to be equitablein their dealings.&LT;sup&GT;28&LT;/sup&GT; In practice, this is often only realized by coercion,punitive measures, and harsh exercise of authority: Augustine finds thisappropriate to our fallen human nature, vitiated as it is by original sin.Controlling humans driven by greed, pride, ambition, and lust calls for arule of law that, at best, contains vestiges or traces of authentic justice(Simpl.1.2.16;trin.14.22). Certain features of his society—privateproperty and slavery, for instance—Augustine regards as consequences ofthe Fall, not, strictly speaking, natural, at least not natural to our pristinecreated selves (civ.19.15–16;Io. ev. tr.6.25–6). In general, Augustineinsists that it is the proper use of wealth and possessions that counts. Heproffers no moral critique of the economic or social institutions of hissociety. Misuse of wealth is wrongful possession of it, not in the legal sense(unless the misuse is also criminal), but in the moral sense that, in strictjustice, the individual has forfeited his right to a material good (ep.153.26;ser.113.4;en. Ps.131.25). Renunciation of property and wealth is part ofthe ascetic ideal, but it is the desire for unnecessary wealth, rather than thepossession of wealth, that is immoral. Curbing desires is a central functionof political authority, and it often has to take the form of merely restrictingthe harm that those who misuse the world’s goods would do: Augustinetakes a sanguine view of government, which will not be required in theideal state of heaven, where the tranquillity of order that is only realized bythe rule of law in earthly societies (and only infrequently) will be realizedspontaneously by the community of saints (civ.19.11, 13–14; 22.30).&LT;sup&GT;29&LT;/sup&GT;One social institution which Augustine defends is matrimony. Hisdefence argues that it is not merely for the procreation of children but alsoto provide fellowship for the partners (b. coniug.3). But a state of sexualabstinence is preferable. Augustine’s one argument for this view revolvesaround his understanding of sexual arousal. He has many grounds forchampioning abstinence as the supreme form of ascetic renunciation,&LT;sup&GT;30&LT;/sup&GT; butthey usually reflect his attitude to sensuality in general and control ofemotions in particular. The argument concerning sexual arousal is that it isinvoluntary, not subject to the will or consent (civ.14.16, 24;ep.184A.3).It seems to be an exception to the rule that other bodily organs can beactivated by the will, with or without emotional stimulus, indeed requiresome kind of willing in order to operate. But sexual arousal happenswithout the will’s consent, and neither can it be aroused at will. Even whendesire has fired the mind after arousal (and so some kind of willing hasoccurred), the sex organs may fail to be responsive. Augustine considersthis to be a consequence of original sin, and can envisage a pre-lapsarianform of sexual activity that is controlled by the will. His Pelagian adversaryJulian of Eclanum argues that sexual desire is not merely necessary forcopulation but also natural and in itself morally neutral (c. Iul. imp.1.70–1; 3.209). But why are anarchic genitals so bad? What distinguishes sexualarousal from, say, sneezing or coughing?Augustine seems to argue that what distinguishes it is its power overboth body and mind: it overwhelms a person emotionally, physically, andmentally. This he finds sinister. There is, by implication, no emotion whichcannot be brought under the control of reason, but sexual arousal isimpervious to reason and to will (civ.14.16). Augustine’s other arguments—such as the sense of shame attending sexual desire and acts—cannotexplain why sex is tainted. But he finds that sexual arousal occurs even inthe dreams of those who, like him, have devoted themselves to a life ofcontinence, and that in dreams he seems to consent to sexual acts that hiswaking self repudiates. He argues that this cannot involve any moralresponsibility, but feels that such dreams are a symptom of his imperfectmoral status, as well as being yet another indication that the sex instinct isbeyond our conscious control (conf.10. 41–2;Gn. litt.12.15.31).&LT;sup&GT;31&LT;/sup&GT;In several areas of ethics where Augustine’s ideas are not necessarilyoriginal he exerted, because of his authority and the wide dissemination ofhis views, a considerable influence. This is the case with what he saysabout the ethics of warfare, which does not advance much beyond Cicero(civ.1.21; 4.15; 19.7;ep.189.6; 229.2;c. Faust.22.75),&LT;sup&GT;32&LT;/sup&GT; or his viewsabout suicide, which contain the arguments that we do not dispose of ourlives (a Platonic argument) and that killing oneself is a kind of cowardiceand of despair, the triumph of emotion over reason (civ.1.17–27;ser.353.8).&LT;sup&GT;33&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine’s Platonism makes him equate the beautiful with the good.The God whom we love is the supreme beauty which we desire (conf.7.7;10.8, 38;sol.1.22;trin.1.31;civ.8.6, 11.10;ser.241.2;en. Ps.44.3).Beauty consists of a numerically founded form or relation whose sensiblemanifestation is a reflection of a higher, immutable divine ‘reason’.Beauty’s structure is rational and accessible to the judging mind (ord.1.18,2.33–4;mus.6.30, 38;Gn. litt.3.16.25). But the formal beauty of the artsis to be transcended no less than natural beauty, and all perceptible beautyis an ‘admonition’ to mind to ascend to a spiritual plane where intelligiblebeauty is one with truth and wisdom (conf.7.23; 10.9;vera rel.101). Inhis creation account, Augustine uses the craftsman-analogy: God is the trueartist and the universe is an artefact whose perfection is both numerical andhierarchical (civ.11.18, 21–2; 12.24–5;Gn. c. Man.1.25). If we couldperceive the whole, we would realize that evil in the universe does notdetract from its overall goodness, and that the presence of antitheses andcontraries in it may enhance its beauty (ord.1.18;conf.7.18;civ.11.18,22; 12.4). Augustine recognizes the temptations inherent in aestheticpleasure, as in any pleasure. He perceives, for example, that piety andfervour can be nourished by church music, but that the senses maysometimes usurp the place of reason when we delight in song (conf.10.49–50). Once more, it is a question of proper use of a lesser good. To delightin the beauty of the universe for its own sake, even if the delight isintellectual rather than sensual, is to confuse reflected goodness and beautywith the truly and perfectly good and beautiful. This would be a failure toknow the Good and to love God. It would also, Augustine believes, leaveus dissatisfied, our potential for the perfecting of our natures unrealized.&LT;sup&GT;34&LT;/sup&GT;6THE WILLAugustine’s concept of the will&LT;sup&GT;35&LT;/sup&GT; and defence of free will rest on theparadox that God determines our wills when we will the good, but thatsuch willing is nonetheless free choice, for which we are responsible. Thisapplies as much to Adam before the Fall as to humanity’s postlapsarianstate. Divine help for Adam in paradise was a necessary, but not sufficientcondition of his free choice of the good, and neither was freedom of choicesufficient. Only divine grace and human free choice together are sufficientfor attaining the good (civ.14.26;corrept.28–34). Augustine argues,puzzlingly, that Adam, and all created beings, have a tendency to choose evilrather than good because they are created out of nothing and are possessedof an ontological weakness that does not entail their sinning but makes itpossible that they will choose evil (civ.12.6; 14.13;c. Iul. imp.5.3).In an early work, theDe libero arbitrio,Augustine describes the facultyof free will as a middle good whose activity is necessary to virtue: theneutral will can be used either rightly or wrongly, it is morally indifferent(lib. arb.2.50–3). But as his thought develops, Augustine argues for theconcept of a will that is morally determined, that is good or evil dependingupon the value of what is willed. This is in part a reaction against Pelagianviews. Pelagius describes human choice as a ‘power to take either side’,neither good nor evilper se:‘in the middle’. Augustine denies that the samewill can choose good and evil. Will is either good or evil, or, moreaccurately, the power of free choice(liberum arbitrium)of the will(voluntas)may be exercised in a good or an evil way (lib. arb.2.1). ThePelagians had a strong case when they argued that Augustine’s views inDelibero arbitriowere akin to theirs (retr.1.9;conf.8.19–21;pecc. mer.2.18–30;spir. et litt.58;gr. et pecc. or.1.19–21).Will for Augustine is a mental power or capacity, like memory, butbecause it is morally qualified it reflects a person’s moral standing in a waythat memory cannot. As well as referring to a good or bad will in thesingular, Augustine talks of two or more wills in us, where there is moralconflict: in this latter case, our wills are the range of possible courses ofaction open to us (lib. arb.2.51;conf.8.19–21;gr. et lib. arb.4).If God determines my good will, how can I be free? Augustine believesthat the fact that God has foreknowledge of my will does not determinethat will, for God’s knowledge (strictly speaking, not foreknowledge) istimelessly eternal (Simpl.2.2.2;civ.5.9; 11.21;praed. sanct.19). Divineomniscience is compatible with free choice of the will. Yet predestination tosalvation is actively caused by God. Augustine argues that this does notmake us passive recipients of divine grace. The notion of ‘compulsion ofthe will’ is to him an absurd one (c. Iul. imp.1.101;c. ep. Pel.2.9–12).Willing entails the power to do X through, and only through, the means ofwilling X. Augustine’s psychology is based upon the belief (which hederives from analysis of our behaviour) in the centrality of concentrationor attention(intentio)in all mental processes. The mind is activated by thewill, not in the sense of one faculty or ‘part of the soul’ affecting another,but inasmuch as we cannot perceive, or imagine, or remember withoutconcentrating or paying attention or willing to do so. Thus grace may onlybecome operative in humans when the will is attracted to the good. For thewill is always goal-directed, and will entails assent. Willing is a form ofaction, not a reaction to external stimuli (gr. et lib. arb.32;c. ep. Pel.1.5,27). If divine grace is irresistible, this does not entail that grace compels us.People are ‘acted upon that they may act’ (corrept.4). It is seemsimpossible to argue that this is not determinism. What Augustine isstressing is that consent is necessary to themodus operandiof the will’sreception of grace.Augustine’s arguments against Pelagius’ description of human choice as‘a power to take either side’ is based upon the observation that it posits thesame cause (the indifferent will) of opposite effects (gr. et pecc. or.1.19–21).Augustine appears here to reject the so-called ‘freedom of indifference’ ofthe will. His position seems to be closer to freedom of spontaneity, whereabsence of force or compulsion, rather than absence of external causation,is characteristic. Will is not self-determining, yet humans are not accuratelyto be described as being instruments of God’s will. Thus the Stoic exampleof the dog tied to, and dragged by, the cart (SVFII 975 [7.2]) cannot applyto Augustine’s understanding of spontaneity. Freedom is not merelyacquiescence in God’s activity, but rather the exercise of a human facultythat involves both consent and power to act, or to initiate action. Both inhis account of Adam’s freedom in paradise and in his early version of hisfreewill theory inDe libero arbitrioAugustine subscribes to the liberty ofindifference account; but it is not applicable to fallen humanity. However,the fallen human being possesses both the ability and, it may be, theopportunity, to act otherwise, even though that ability is not, in fact,exercised when the will is determined by the good. Exercising the ability tocommit sin is not, of course, an exercise of freedom of the will for themature Augustine. Rather, it is an instance of the enslavement of the will toevil, from which only divine grace can liberate it. If freedom to sin is a formof slavery, then willing and obedient slavery to the will of God is truefreedom (ench.30). On the other hand, sin is the price of having free will,and having free will is a necessary condition of acting rightly. Sin is theprice of freedom, because freedom entails absence of compulsion. This isAugustine’s version of the free will defence (ench.27;lib. arb.2.1–3).&LT;sup&GT;36&LT;/sup&GT; Itreveals why defence of free choice of the will seems to be so important toAugustine. Heavenly rewards (and hellish punishments) make no sense ifthey are not a consequence of acting rightly (or wrongly), even if God is theauthor of our virtuous actions. The argument does not explainsatisfactorily why God tolerates sin. Augustine’s characteristic strategy hereis to concede that nothing happens ‘apart from God’s will’, even thosethings, like sin, that happen ‘against God’s will’ (ench.100). God lets ussin, but does not cause us to do so. But it is difficult, on these premises, toavoid the consequence that God is responsible for sin, in the sense that heis responsible for states of affairs brought about voluntarily, if notintentionally, by him. The distinction between causing and permitting seemsimpossible to maintain.&LT;sup&GT;37&LT;/sup&GT;God’s grace precedes (in Augustine’s terminology) acts of the free will.God makes good decisions possible, but also causes them, for grace isirresistible. Prevenient grace is more than merely enabling, nor is it a formof co-operation between God and humans. Rather it is operative. Again,the question arises: can a decision caused by God be free? Augustine’sanswer is the one discussed above. God causes the reception of his gifts bythe mechanism of human consent. But since God’s will is never thwarted, itis as true to say that what happens as a consequence of divine will happensby necessity, as it is to maintain that human realization of good behaviouris an instance of human freedom. ‘God cannot will in vain anything that hehas willed’ (ench.103), and the human being whom God wills to savecannot be damned. But neither will such a human being be saved againsther will.7SOULAugustine’s concept of soul as an immaterial, naturally good, active,inextended, and indivisible substance owes much to his Neoplatonistreadings. It is also likely that Porphyry is a major source of his knowledgeof the contents of Plato’sPhaedo, Phaedrus,andTimaeus.Scripture andthe Christian tradition provide Augustine less with a concept of soul’snature than with texts requiring exegetical elucidation by means ofPlatonist psychology, and attempts at philosophical exegesis which herejects, such as Tertullian’s corporealist theories and Origen’s arguments forpre-existence, embodiment as punishment for sin, and reincarnation.&LT;sup&GT;38&LT;/sup&GT;Soul is the life-principle, and to various kinds of life—vegetative,sentient, intelligent—correspond degrees of soul (civ.7.23, 29;en. Ps.137.4). The awareness that we are alive is awareness that we are, or have,souls: Augustine argues that we are empirically conscious of the fact that wehave a soul, even if we do not perceive soul with any of the senses (beata.v.7;trin.8.9). The single soul in humans has rational and irrationalfaculties: the latter include the powers of impulse, sense-perception, andcertain kinds of memory, and they can be disturbed by the passions. It isthe function of the rational soul (and mind is a part of soul) to control theirrational element (civ.5.11; 9.5;en. Ps.145.5). There is an inescapablemoral dimension in Augustine’s accounts of the levels of soul, and it islinked to the Neoplatonist concept of soul’s conversion to the Good, seenin terms of an ascent from the corporeal and percipient levels, throughthose of discursive reason and moral purification, to the intellection of thehighest principle by a mind that is morally and mentally prepared forunderstanding. This conversion or return makes good the ‘turning-away’from divine wisdom and interiority that characterizes sin: rejecting thedistracting multiplicity of what is external, it discovers the divine within us(imm. an.12, 19;ord.1.3; 2.31;conf.2.1; 7.23; 13.3; trin. 8.4; 10.7; 14.21).Soul, the principle of movement in bodies, is itself a self-movingprinciple: my consciousness of my self-movement is my consciousness ofmy power to will (div. qu.8). Soul’s movement is not local, nor does itentail substantial change, but impulse and will often result in bodilymovement (ep.166.4;quant. an.23). Rejecting all corporealist theories ofthe soul’s substance, Augustine engages in polemic against them, be theyEpicurean, Stoic, Manichaean, or Christian. Examination of the nature ofsoul’s activities rules out even the most subtle of corporeal soul-substances.Memory and imagination are not subject to the physical law that corporeallikenesses correspond in size to the bodies in which they are reflected, likethe image in the pupil of the eye. Perception, concentration, and volitionare indicators of immateriality, as is the mind’s power of abstraction andintellection of non-corporeal objects, such as geometrical figures (quant. an.8–22;Gn. litt.7.14.20; 7.19.25–20.26). Although physical and mentalpowers appear to develop concomitantly in growing humans, there is nostrict correlation between their development, still less any evidence that soulphysically grows or diminishes (quant. an.26–40). Augustine isnonetheless aware that it is paradoxical to maintain that soul is present asan entirety throughout the body and is yet inextended and indivisible. It isomnipresent not in a spatial sense, but as a ‘vital tension’(vitalis intentio),which, for example, enables it to perceive in more than one bodily partsimultaneously (imm. an.25;quant. an. 26,41–68;ep.166.4).Soul is mutable: that makes it substantially different from God’sunchangeable nature (conf.7.1–4). As a Manichee, Augustine had believedthat the good human soul is part of the divine, and he sees Stoic pantheismas leading to the same conclusions (duab. an.16;vera rel.16;civ.7.13,23). The soul is subject to various kinds of mutability. Learning, theaffections, moral deterioration and progress, all effect changes in the soul(imm. an.7). Soul exists in a temporal medium in which it can and mustchange. It is maintained in its continued existence by God’s will (div. qu.19;ep.166.3;trin,4.5, 16, 24). To characterize soul’s changeabilityAugustine uses the Aristotelian distinction between a subject andqualitative changes in that subject which do not entail substantial change init (Aristotle,Categories2). For the soul’s identity persists through change.In fact, the necessarily unchangeable nature of certain kinds of knowledgeentails the substantial identity of the mind in which, as in a subject, suchknowledge is present. Augustine regards this as proof of the soul’simmortality (imm. an.5, 7–9;sol.2.22, 24). He also argues for itsimmortality from its equation with life. If being alive is the definingcharacteristic of soul, soul cannot admit the contrary of life and so cannotcease to live (imm. an.4–5, 9, 12, 16;trin.10.9): this is the final argumentfor the soul’s immortality in Plato’sPhaedo(102a-107b). Augustinebelieves that the irrational human soul is also immortal, and that we haveboth memory and feelings in the afterlife (civ.21.3;Gn. litt.12.32.60–34.67). The soul, like God inasmuch as it has a similar creative and rationaldomination over subordinate creation, cannot, in its nature, be evil. It is acorruptible good, occupying a medial position between God and bodies. Itsposition on the scale of being and its moral standing should coincide.Pride, a desire for self-mastery in an order where the soul is not the master,degrades it morally to animal level (conf.7.18;civ.19.13;en. Ps.145.5;ep.140.3–4;trin.12.16). But this degradation can only be understood in ametaphorical sense. Augustine repudiates Manichaean and Platonistdoctrines of transmigration of human souls into, or from, animal bodies,agreeing with what he takes to be Porphyry’s rejection of the view that arational soul, whose reason is not accidental but belongs to its substance,could become the essentially different irrational soul of an animal, or viceversa (civ.10.29–30; 12.14, 21, 27; 13.19;Gn. litt,7.10.15–11.17).The incorporeal soul cannot be a condition of the body, such as itsharmony or the proportion of its parts (imm. an.2, 17;Gn. litt.3.16.25; 7.19.25). Yet soul is entirely present in every part of the body, and itsvarious activities and conditions point to a symbiosis in which body andsoul influence one another (ep.9.3–4). Soul is mixed with body in a waythat allows each element to maintain its identity, as in the mixture of lightand air (ep.137.11;Gn. litt.3.16.25). The ‘vital tension’ (ep.166.4) bywhich soul is present to body has also a volitional dimension (mus.6.9;Gn.litt.8.21.42). Augustine is aware of the Platonist view that, even when notembodied, souls may inhabit a vehicle, but doubts the truth of the theory,considering pure spiritual existence to be possible, even if he also believesin the future resurrection of the body: it is natural for souls to governbodies (ep.13.2–4;Gn. litt.8.25.47; 12.32.60; 12.35.68).On two traditional problems Augustine remains agnostic: the origin ofsouls, and the existence of a world-soul. On origins he vacillates betweenthe view that souls are propagated by parents, like bodies, and the theorythat they are created directly by God as each individual is conceived. Theformer is difficult to explain, the latter seems to compromise thecompleteness of God’s creation. Augustine considers various forms of preexistencetheory, including the view that all souls are created individually inthe moment of creation, and embodied at different times. But hisdiscussions remain inconclusive, just as he remains uncertain about themoment when the foetus is animated (lib. arb.3.56–9;Gn. litt.6; 7; 10).&LT;sup&GT;39&LT;/sup&GT;Hevacillates on the question of the world-soul because he finds it plausibleto believe that the ordered and cohesive universe owes its continuedexistence to the presence of a cosmic soul. He objects to particularconsequences of world-soul theories (dual good and evil cosmic principles,as in Manichaeism; Stoic views on the world as the body of a divine mind)rather than the theories as such, and is benevolent towards what he takesto be Plotinus’ position, that cosmic soul is created and illuminated by atranscendent divine principle. But his tentative conclusion is that theuniverse is an inanimate body full of stratified soul-kinds (imm. an.24;ord.2.30;civ.4.12, 31; 7.5–6, 23; 10.2, 29; 13.16–17).&LT;sup&GT;40&LT;/sup&GT;When Augustine analyses human behaviour, he recognizes that impulseor assent(appetitus)is the cause of action, whether it is the impulse of selfpreservation,or motions of appetency or avoidance or simply the motor ofa proposed course of behaviour (div. qu.40;ep.104.12;civ.19.4;trin.12.3, 17). Augustine’s views on impulse and assent are crucial to his account ofthe will. The links between impulse, assent, will, and desire arefundamental in his psychology: to eradicate desire is impossible, and desirecan be for good things—knowledge, happiness, God (lib. arb.3.70;div.qu.35.2;civ.10.3;conf.13.47). Assent is good if it results in moralbehaviour, if desire is directed towards appropriate goals, and for the rightreasons. It is the same with the emotions. They are expressions of theirrational faculty, and forms of intention. They should be controlled byreason and used properly. They are an inescapable feature of ourcondition: Augustine does not believe in the existence of a dispassionatesoul (civ.9.4; 14.6–10).Augustine’s insistence upon the value of introspection, both as a means ofdiscovering the truth and as a condition of moral purification (vera rel.72;trin. 9.4; 10.2–15), leads him to talk of senses of the soul, of inner senses,inner speaking, and—using a Pauline analogy (Romans 7:22–3, etc.)—ofthe ‘inner man’ (ser.126.3;Io. ev. tr.99.4;civ.13.24). Augustine supposesthat such locutions are about our souls or our minds, and that thephenomena which they describe entail mind-body dualism. But they donot. They may describe the contrast (or consistency) between model casesof human behaviour and how we actually behave, or they may refer todissembling or insincere behaviour.&LT;sup&GT;41&LT;/sup&GT;In Christological and Trinitarian contexts Augustine speaks of theconcept of a person, whether he is talking about the unity ofChrist’spersona,despite his human and divine natures, or about the relationbetween the three persons of the single substance that is the Trinity (trin.7.7–11;ep.137.11;Io. ev. tr.19.15). Sometimes he equates the person withthe self, as distinct from the emotional or mental powers or activities (trin.15.42), or as the subject of personal attributes. But his conclusions do notlead to any concept of personality as distinct from traditional views ofwhat it is to be human. The distinction between person and substance inhis Trinitarian theology, and the relational aspect of his definition ofperson there, are not exploited in his account of human psychology.&LT;sup&GT;42&LT;/sup&GT;8SENSE-PERCEPTION AND IMAGINATIONAugustine’s theory of sense-perception has a physiological bias. LikePlotinus, he exploits the discovery of the nervous system by Alexandrianmedicine (Plotinus 4.3.23; see Solmsen [12.106]). The sensory nervestransmit stimuli to the brain from the various sense-organs. The nervescontain soulpneumaas a means of communication between brain andsenses (Gn. litt.7.13.20; 7.19.25). Augustine co-ordinates this belief withother traditional philosophical accounts of perceptive processes, such as theray theory of vision (trin.9.3;ser.277.10). The senses are not reflexive,and awareness of their activity is a perception of the internal sense (whichcorresponds to Aristotle’skoinê aisthêsis), which controls and judgessensations (lib. arb.2.8–12). Sensation is a form of motion or change.Augustine believes that it is a motion running counter to the motion set upin the body by sensory stimuli (mus.6.10–11, 15). Sentience is the productof the interaction of two movements of qualitative change. Most likely it isthesoul pneumathat is set in motion in this process. Because of thepresenceof pneumain the sensory nerves, they are themselves sentient. Theperceiving subject, soul, is entirely present in them, and is not merelylocated in a central receptive organ with which they communicate in a nonsentientway (imm. an.25;c. ep. fund.16.20).But if sensation has a physiological mechanism, perception is nonethelessa psychological process. The body-soul interaction in perception is a kind oftempering by mixture(contemperatio);its mental aspect is calledconcentration(intentio).In vision, for example, the visual ray is thenecessary physical counterpart of mental concentration.Intentiois anactivity, the active concentration of soul power: perception is exercisedupon the sensory stimulus rather than being a passive reception of thelatter (quant. an.41–9;mus.6.7–11;trin.11.2;Gn. litt.7.20.26; 12.12.25; 12.20.42). Body does not act upon soul: ‘perception is somethingdirectly undergone by the body of which the soul is aware’ (quant. an.48).Augustine extends the notions of concentration and counter-motion to hisaccounts of feelings like pleasure and pain (mus.6.5, 9, 23, 26, 34–58).The awareness implicit in any perceptive process is underpinned by theinstantaneous operation of memory. A series of memory-impressions isstored in the mind in the course of even the shortest perception, and thisprocess is essential to the functioning of perception (mus.6.21;Gn. litt.12.11.22). Some texts of Augustine dispute that perception gives us anyknowledge of the external world, suggesting that there are nocharacteristics of our sense-perceptions that enable us infallibly todistinguish between true and false (c. Acad.3.39;div. qu.9). But manyother texts make claims for our ability to know the external world, thekind of knowledge that Augustine callsscientia,contrasting it withsapientia,the knowledge of eternal and immutable truths (trin.12.16–17,21; 15.21). Even optical illusions have a kind of consistency (c. Acad.3.36). Augustine maintains that if our perception of an object iscomprehensive and our faculties are functioning normally, reliableinformation may be acquired about the external world (ep.147.21;civ.19.18).Sense-perception is perception of images of objects, not of the objectsthemselves, and these images are not corporeal. Like Aristotle (De anima2.12), Augustine argues that perception is the ability to receive formswithout matter (quant. an.8–9). Moreover, perception is the perception oflike by like. There is an affinity between the percipient’s reason and theimage or form of the object perceived, and it is this affinity which makesperception possible as well as reliable (ord.2.32–3;trin.11.2, 4, 26). Nowthe objects of perception are themselves formed by the Forms or Reasonsor Ideas in the mind of God, to which they owe their existence (div. qu.23,46). In sense-perception these Forms function as standards(regulae)accessible to our minds whereby we may distinguish between the truth andfalsity of the images conveyed by perception (vera rel.58;trin.9.9–11).When the mind errs in its evaluation of perceptions it does so because itapplies itself to the phenomena in question in some deficient way: access tothe Forms is no guarantee of infallibility in perception (Gn. litt.12.25.52).Assembling of evidence and common sense will prevent mistakes beingmade: Augustine believes that we are capable of establishing workingdistinctions between reliable and illusory perceptions. Strictly speaking,perception does not convey certainty, but empirical processes operate on thebasis of a distinction between true and false, and there is a ‘truth appropriateto this class of things’ (ibid.). That this is so is due to our access to thetranscendent criterion, the Form, because of divine illumination of ourminds (sol.1.27;trin.9.10–11).The reproductive exercise of the imagination (often calledphantasiabyAugustine) depends on remembered images that are reactivated, but sodoes the creative activity of imagination (often calledphantasmaby him)(mus.6.32;trin.8.9; 9.10). Imagination may be willed and subject to ourcontrol, but not necessarily so. Creative imagination is a process ofcontracting and expanding the images of what we have perceived, or ofcombining or separating their data (ep.7.6;trin.11.8). In such casesconcentration or will is operative (trin.11.6–7). But there are imaginativeprocesses that seem to be involuntary, such as dreams and hallucinations.Augustine adds to this category prophetic inspiration, arguing that somedreams are also prophetic. Dreaming is imagining, often on the basis ofimages derived from the day’s preoccupations, and it is beyond rationalcontrol (Gn. litt.12.18.39; 12.23.49; 12.30.58). Thus consent to sinfulactions in dreams is not morally reprehensible although it is the case thatour dreams reflect our moral character (see section 5). In dreams thecreative imagination is more usually in operation. But not all dreams orvisions are entirely dependent upon our mental powers. Augustinerecognizes external agencies, divine, angelic, or demonic, and is curious toexplain a wide variety of paranormal phenomena in terms of theimagination (O’Daly [12.46] 118–27). In such cases a reciprocal influenceof body and soul upon one another is often discernible (ep.9.3–4;Gn. litt.12.13.27; 12.17.37–8).Anticipation of intended actions is an activity of imagination, as is theprediction of future events, and both of these processes depend uponexperience and the creative manipulation of images (conf.10.14; 11.23–4,26, 30, 36–8;trin.15.13;Gn. litt.12.23.40).Augustine is also interested in the pathology of the imagination, wheresome physical disruption of the link between brain and sensory nervoussystem occurs. In such cases concentration takes place, but because itcannot function normally, it generates images in a wholly introspectiveway. Or the disturbance may be in the brain itself or in the sense-organ.The hallucinatory states which ensue have something in common withdreams (Gn. litt.12.12.25; 12.20.42–4).There is no single influence upon Augustine’s accounts of senseperceptionand imagination. The Stoic concept ofsunaisthêsislies behindhis definition of perception, as it does behind Plotinus’ account. There areNeoplatonist traces in his concept of internal sense. But he is notreproducing other men’s doctrines.&LT;sup&GT;43&LT;/sup&GT;9MEMORYAugustine argues that memory is indispensable to our perceptions ofspatiotemporal continua and to the exercise of the imagination. But howare memory-images formed? The series of images stored in the mind in thecourse of every perception is not merely essential to the process ofperception itself, but also to the recollection of perceptions (conf.10.12–15;quant. an.8–9;Gn. litt.12.16.33). Incorporeal sense-impression leads toincorporeal memory-image, and memory depends upon and corresponds toperception in quality, quantity, and kind (trin.11.13, 16;c. ep. fund.16.20). But memory-images are not formed spontaneously. They are willed, aconsequence of concentration. And if memory, like expectation, is aprerequisite of deliberate action, concentration is the necessary linkbetween memory and expectation, if the moments of such action are tocohere (imm. an.3–4;trin.11.15).In his account of the process of remembering Augustine applies theanalogy with sense-perception. The will directs the mind towards thememory’s contents, and the mind’s vision is formed by memory-images.Recollecting is perceiving memory-images: it actualizes memory-traces(mag.39;trin.11.6). However, this model of the memory process is onlyfully satisfactory as an account of how we remember sense-perceptions,and, in addition, it only serves as an analogy between types of mentalactivity (perceiving and remembering), not between the objects of theseactivities. The images perceived in sense-perception are those of objectsactually there and perceptible by other percipients. The truth-value of theimages is verifiable. But Augustine has a difficulty with memory-images ofperceptions, for they are images of things absent, no longer there in thestate in which they were perceived. Augustine suggests that they must haveevidential character as ‘proofs[documenta]of previously perceived things’(mag.39), but, strictly speaking, only for the percipient: their verifiabilityremains problematic.&LT;sup&GT;44&LT;/sup&GT; Augustine does not offer a direct solution to thisdilemma. But elements of his solution may be constructed from his accountof the functional relations between words and images. That he mustenvisage a solution is evident, for memory is essential to every type ofknowledge claim, including claims about the objects of sense-perceptions.What we perceive is an articulated image, a rational structure which hasan affinity with our minds, and is stored in our memory as a form ofknowledge. When we wish to reactivate this knowledge by directing ourconcentration upon it, we generate an ‘inner word’, co-extensive with thememory-image. The image appears to be stored in the memory pre-verbally,as a word-potential (trin.8.9; 15.16, 19–22). The linguistic metaphor hereemployed, and the reason for its employment, are clarified by Augustine’sremarks about the understanding and retention of the meaning of words(dial.5). The meaning(dicibile)grasped by the mind is also a wordpotential,capable of being expressed in language. But meaning is alwayspresent to the mind in a verbal manner. Also, it may have a generalsemantic function: the meaning of ‘city’, if understood, enables me, notmerely to recall or recognize known cities, but also to identify new citiesand classify them, and so on. Identifying, understanding, naming, andrecalling are inextricably linked. Not every perception must beaccompanied by overt naming of the object perceived, but naming isusually at least implicit or expected. The metaphor of the ‘inner word’recognizes this. But Augustine also feels that he can best elucidate themechanism of perceiving, storing, and recalling by the linguistic illustration:grasping a word’s meaning, storing it as adicibile,and expressing it.Recalling my memory-image of an object is like actualizing the semanticcontent of a known word, it is like bringing its meaning to mind. What thisanalogy emphasizes is the coherence and objectivity of our recollectedperceptions: memory claims are meaningful.&LT;sup&GT;45&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine does not apply this solution to the problem of the verifiabilityof memory-images. But the implication of his argument is that, if senseperceptionleads to knowledge of the external world, memory is the storingof such knowledge. Verifying memory-claims may involve decidingwhether another person’s claims are worthy of credence on grounds ofinherent plausibility: it involves deciding what I should believe, and forAugustine belief is a form of knowledge (see section 3).Augustine extends the mental-image theory to one other type ofmemory, that of past emotions, but he does so tentatively (conf.10.21–3).For recalling a past feeling need not entail re-experiencing that feeling,whereas the memory-image of a past perception conveys some distinctivequality of what is remembered. Augustine adduces his famous metaphor ofmemory as the mind’s ‘stomach’ (conf.10.21), taking in but transformingdifferent emotions. But he is clearly not at ease with the application of themental-image theory to this kind of memory, chiefly because the ideas ofpast feelings have not been perceived by any of the senses, but are derivedfrom the mind’s introspection of its own experiences. However, if he wereto claim that they can be recalled without an image, he would be making aclaim about them that is made for recalled ideal numbers, scientificprinciples, and Forms. Affections may be mental phenomena, but we canrecall them only because we have experienced them, unlike numbers,principles, and Forms. Against the trend of his argument Augustineconcludes that memories of past f feelings are more like memories of pastperceptions than the privileged category of remembering that does notrequire images.Augustine puts forward a criterion for establishing that something is inthe memory. If I can name P and recognize what the name P refers to, Iremember P (conf.10.23). He applies this criterion to the fact of forgetting(conf.10.24–5, 27–8). But how can I actualize forgetting in my mindwithout, in fact, forgetting? Augustine first suggests that the image theorymay solve the problem: recalling forgetting may be like recalling a pastfeeling, and I must not actually experience forgetting every time I recall it.But he is not satisfied with this suggestion, and embarks upon analternative argument. When I forget the name of a person I know, both myrejection of wrong names and my recognition of the right name, when Irecall or am told it, are possible only because I have not entirely forgottenit. Remembering forgetting is related to an object: it is remembering that Ihave forgotten something. But to remember that I have forgottensomething entails that I have not entirely forgotten it. And the experience offorgetting does not entail having a mental image of forgetting. Withoutsuch an image I can recognize what ‘forgetting’ means and so rememberforgetting something. Augustine also suggests that I can recall thecircumstances or context of something which I have forgotten, and thatthis can help me recollect it. There may be certain indicators(signa)whichare contextual and remind me by association of what I have forgotten(trin.11.12; 14.17).Memory is the focal point of consciousness, in which past, present, andfuture are related: it appears to underwrite the continuity of mentalprocesses and provide the subject’s sense of his identity (conf.1.12; 10.14,21, 26). Mind, memory, and the self are inextricably linked, and Augustinemay seem to argue that my identity is dependent upon continuity ofconsciousness, as does Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding2.27.9). But Augustine is not making any such claim. He points out thatareas of my past, such as infancy, are not accessible to my memory, yetnonetheless constitute my identity: my knowledge of myself, past andpresent, is imperfect (conf.1.7–12; 2.1; 10.15). Nor is memory the mindwithout qualification, but rather the mind engaged in certain activities, justas understanding and will are the mind engaged in equally distinctiveactivities (trin.10.18–19). Augustine is familiar with the Platonic theory ofrecollection(anamnêsis)as an explanation of the presence in the mind ofknowledge that is not derived from sense-experience. He mentions thecomplementary doctrine of the soul’s pre-existence as a possibility for thecreated human soul (lib. arb.1.24; 3.56–9), but never adopts the doctrine,preferring to use Platonic language about recollection to convey active andlatent states of the mind’s possession of knowledge (see section 7).&LT;sup&GT;46&LT;/sup&GT;Recollection is eliciting what is latent in the memory by a process ofmental concentration and ordering (quant. an.50–6). Because of themind’s intelligible nature it is ‘joined…to intelligible object in a naturalarrangement[naturali ordine]’ (trin.12.24). Such objects are known bydirect acquaintance, and no mental image is required in recollecting them(conf.10.16–19).It might seem appropriate for Augustine to say that God too is in mymemory, like ideas. But he is careful to stress that God cannot be in mymemory before I learn of him. The reason is, that God is both knowable(as the truth and the Good) and unknowable to the human mind (sol.1.15;ord.2.44, 47;ep.130.28;Gn. litt.5.16.34), whereas Forms and scientificprinciples are fully known by us. Knowing God is a different matter,attainable only in a paradoxical sense, and by submission of the will. I maylove God before I know him, but I can only remember God after I have, insome respect, learnt about him (conf.10.8–11, 35–8).Augustine’s use ofmemoriaand of terms f or remembering covers a widerange of activities, not all of them self-evidently kinds of memory: selfconsciousness,self-knowledge, understanding a scientific principle. In thishe is influenced by Platonistanamnêsistheory and discussions about therediscovery of one’s true self by self-reflection. His account of memory isrecognizably part of ancient philosophical discussions of the problem. Butit is not possible to identify a specific influence to which he is indebted.He neither agrees with Aristotle that all memory processes depend uponthe mental image, nor with Plotinus that such an image theory isunnecessary. He implicitly concurs with Stoic theory in his account ofmemories of sense-perceptions, and his account owes much to Stoic viewson presentation and assent (SVF2.83, 115 [7.2]). But he cannot accept theStoic theory as a global account of memory. His view that in some kinds ofmemory the mental image is a prerequisite, whereas in others it is not, isclosest to Plato’s position, even if it cannot be based on extensive readingof Plato’s dialogues. Several elements of Augustine’s account areanticipated in Cicero (Tusculan Disputations1.57–71): memory as animpressive power of the immaterial mind, and as a means of understandingthe mind’s self-knowledge and obtaining knowledge of God through hisworks and by analogy with the human mind. But if the themes aretraditional, Augustine’s analysis is of sustained originality.&LT;sup&GT;47&LT;/sup&GT;Some uses of memory-language in Augustine appear questionable oruntenable. One such case is his claim that memory is essential to theperformance of serial operations such as perception or speaking a sentence.These are not cases of actual reminiscence or memory performance. Notforgettingor bearing in mind are not instances of recalling orremembering, and the concomitant concentration is neither rememberingnor does it entail self-consciousness in the sense implied by Augustine.&LT;sup&GT;48&LT;/sup&GT;10TIMEAlthough Augustine occasionally refers to time as a trace or copy ofeternity (mus.6.29;en. Ps.9.17;Gn. litt. imp.13.38), he departs from thePlatonic tradition in not attempting to analyse time with reference toeternity (conf.11.17–39). The contrast between God’s eternity and humantemporality leads Augustine to consider time empirically, as a fact ofeveryday experience, a practical problem. The ensuing speculative freedomof his discussion has attracted much modern attention: for Wittgenstein(Philosophical Investigations89–90) it is an example of a typical butflawed kind of discourse about time.&LT;sup&GT;49&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine’s puzzles about the difficulty of defining something as familiaras time are traditional in ancient philosophy since Aristotle (Physics4.10–14). They lead him not to a definition of time, but to an attempt to answertwo questions: how do we measure time? how can stretches of time haveany length? Augustine admits, if only by implication, that time may not beexplicitly definable. His celebrated description of time as adistentio animi(conf.11.33) is not so much a definition as a metaphor evoking thepsychological state (more ‘tension’ or ‘distraction’ than ‘extension’) thataccompanies the mental act of time-measurement.&LT;sup&GT;50&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine believes that time is an infinitely divisible continuum. Thereare no time-atoms. There are extended time-stretches, but at anygiven instant time has no actual measurable extent (conf.11.20, 34).Nevertheless, Augustine erroneously asserts that the present ‘is’ (exists now),despite being extensionless and without duration (conf.11.22–6). This ispartly due to the fact that, like most ancient philosophers, he views time asa flow of events of which each instant successively constitutes a present or‘now’ (Plutarch,De communibus notitiis1082A).&LT;sup&GT;51&LT;/sup&GT; But heal so assumesthat ‘now’ is a point or part of time, failing to see that the division of anextended time-stretch will always result in extended time-stretches. ForAugustine, the past and the future do not exist (in the sense of existing now),but are present in memory and expectation. Past events are present in theimages derived from sense-perception; the presence of the signs or causes offuture events enables us to anticipate or predict them. Like the Stoics (SVF2.509, 518–19 [7.2]), Augustine criticizes conventional languageconcerning three grammatical tenses: we should, strictly speaking, talk onlyof three present tenses, and of a ‘present of things past’ and a ‘present ofthings future’ (conf.11.22–4, 26).Time is measured in the mind, and is a measurement of duration, whichmay be a duration of change or motion, but need not be so. Augustine is atpains to demonstrate that our ability to make temporal measurements isprior to, and independent of, any observed physical movement. Time unitslike day and year are indeed derived from observation of the motion ofheavenly bodies, which form an astronomical clock, but our time sensedoes not presuppose a clock, depending rather upon memories of timestretches.When the sun stood still in Joshua’s war against the Amorites(Joshua 10: 12–13), timequa,duration still passed (conf.11.27, 29–30).Time is the measurement of a relation, by comparison with known(remembered) time-stretches, but we do not make direct temporalcomparisons with the standard unit of measurement: measuring time is notlike measuring length, for example. Nor do we measure time as it passes,for time at any given instant is extensionless. What we measure is not thetime-process itself, but the impress(affectio)which memory retains afterperceptions. In the case of future processes, we measure them byanticipation when we possess the necessary knowledge to enable us tomake advance calculations (conf.11.31, 33–8).Augustine’s insight that our ability to measure times depends upon thefact that durations can be remembered is vitiated by his inference that thetime-impress(affectio)is the time-stretch itself. He is led to the inferencebecause he believes that when a time is not present it does not exist, andthat the past and the future must somehow currently exist, if they are to bethe objects of currently existing memory or expectation. But the properobjects of present memories and expectations are past and future events(not times), and it is they which do not have present existence. Yet that factdoes not entail that my dealing with them can take place only throughpresent images and signs of them.&LT;sup&GT;52&LT;/sup&GT; Elements of Augustine’s analysis of timemeasurementreflect Stoic views: the assumption that time is infinitelydivisible; the distinction between loose and strict language about temporalphenomena, especially the criticism of grammatical tenses; the distinctionbetween infinite duration and least perceptible times. It is likely that hisanalysis develops from a Stoic or Stoic-influenced discussion. But hisconclusions form a personal contribution of great ingenuity to traditionalquestions.&LT;sup&GT;53&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine believes that there cannot be time before the creation, for timerequires change and there was no change in God’s eternity. Time,therefore, had a beginning (conf.11.12–16;civ.11.6;Gn. litt.5.5.12). Theprinciple that time requires change is common to Plato, Aristotle, and theStoics, but Augustine appears to repudiate it when he argues for theprimacy of time sense over measured time units. Perhaps he should haveconcentrated upon the argument that, since creation is a first event, therecannot be time before that event.&LT;sup&GT;54&LT;/sup&GT;11GOD AND CREATIONAugustine’s concept of divine immutability developed gradually. Initially heseems to have accepted the Manichaean belief that there is a changeabledivine principle partly immanent in nature. Later he thought of God asimmanent and material, but infinite, incorruptible and immutable. Hisencounter with the Platonists changed his concept of God definitively: Godis transcendent, immaterial, and his timelessness entails unchangeability(duab. an.16;vera rel.16;conf.7.1–2, 26;en. Ps.101). God is subjectneither to decay nor death, he is perfect living being, in whom substanceand qualities are identical (trin.6.6, 8; 7.1–3).The ‘present’ of God’s existence is extensionless, like the ‘present’ of aninfinitely divisible time continuum, but God’s present is indivisible, acondition of permanent stability (vera rel.97;conf.11.12;ser.6.4). Divinesubstance is mental: the eternal Forms(rationes, ideae)are, in MiddlePlatonist fashion, understood to be in the divine mind, and the secondperson of the Trinity is often said to be divine wisdom or truth, and henceGod is truth (div. qu.46.2;mag.38;trin.4.3). Divine perfection is perfectlife, thought, and will (conf.3.10;div. qu.28).God is omniscient. His knowledge necessarily embraces events in time,but he does not and cannot know these as past and future occurrences.God apprehends temporal events timelessly as present events. It is morecorrect to say that he has knowledge, rather than foreknowledge, of eventsthat have not yet happened, and this knowledge is immutable (civ.5.9; 11.21;Simpl.2.2.2).&LT;sup&GT;55&LT;/sup&GT; Although Augustine does not apply this notion ofGod’s not knowing the future as future to the question whether divineforeknowledge entails determinism, he in fact argues that divineforeknowledge is compatible with free choice of the will (lib. arb.3.4–9).God the creator timelessly causes the universe to begin. The ‘Why notsooner?’ argument against its beginning is countered by Augustine’sinsistence that there was no time before the creation, since time depends onchange and God is unchanging. Nor does creation entail that God’s willchanges: he changelessly wills to create the universe. The notions that theuniverse persists for ever or that worlds endlessly recur derive from themisconception that there is otherwise a time prior to creation in which Godis idle (conf.11.8, 12–17; 12.18, 38;civ.11.4–6, 21; 12.15, 18).&LT;sup&GT;56&LT;/sup&GT;The Greek philosophical principle that nothing comes from nothing ledsome authors in the Judaeo-Christian tradition to assert that God made theworld out of a pre-existing, beginningless matter. But others violated theprinciple by asserting that God created the world out of nothing.&LT;sup&GT;57&LT;/sup&GT;Augustine adopts the latter viewpoint, which had become dominant by hisday (Gn. litt. imp.1.2;sol.1.2;mus.6.57;conf.11.7; 12.7; 13.48;verarel.35;c. Fel.2.19). But he also argues that God creates unformed matterfrom nothing, to be the subject of change. Matter is the necessary conditionof change, but its creation does not precede that of created beings. Evencreated immaterial beings have a ‘spiritual’ matter (conf.12.4–8, 38;Gn.litt.1.4.9–5.11; 5.5.12–16; 7.6.9–9.12;Gn. litt. imp.4.11–15; Armstrong[12.117]).Creation is instantaneous and complete, but living organisms areproduced at different times throughout the history of the world. In order toaccount both for the completeness of creation at the moment of creationand the gradual realization of created organisms Augustine adopts andadapts the theory of seminallogoi (rationes causales, seminales).These areimmaterial causes and conditions of living organisms, potentials that arerealized in the material seeds from which plants and animals develop, withall their specific differences. Therationesare created in the primal creation,along with the heavenly bodies, the firmament, and the elements of earthand water (Gn. litt.5–7;trin.3.13, 16).&LT;sup&GT;58&LT;/sup&GT;ABBREVIATIONSb. coniug. De bono coniugalibeata v. De beata vitac. Acad. Contra Academicosc. ep. fund. Contra epistulam fundamentic. ep. Pel. Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorumc. Faust. Contra Faustum Manichaeumc. Fel. Contra Felicemc. Iul. Contra Iulianum Pelagianumc. Iul. imp. Contra Iulianum opus imperfectumciv. De civitate Deiconf. Confessionescorrept. De correptione et gratiadial. De dialecticadiv. qu. De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIIIdoctr. chr. De doctrina christianaduab. an. De duabus animabusench. Enchiridion ad Laurentiumen. Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmosep. EpistulaeGn. c. Man. De Genesi contra ManichaeosGn. litt. De Genesi ad litteramGn. litt. imp. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus libergr. et. lib. arb. De gratia et libero arbitriogr. et pecc. or. De gratia Christi et de peccato originaliimm. an. De immortalitate animaeIo. ev. tr. Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannislib. arb. De libero arbitriomag. De magistromor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribusManichaeorummus. De musicaord. De ordinepecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissionepraed. sanct. De praedestinatione sanctorumquant. an. De quantitate animaeretr. Retractationesser. SermonesSimpl. De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianumsol. Soliloquiaspir. et litt. De spiritu et litteratrin. De trinitateutil. cred. De utilitate credendivera rel. De vera religioneNOTES1 Hagendahl [12.57] 79–94, 486–97.2 Hagendahl [12.57] 52–156, 498–553.3 Courcelle [12.56] 159–76; O’Meara [12.38] 131–55.4 Marrou [12.59] 27–46; Courcelle [12.56] 183–94.5 Fredriksen [12.51]; Markus [12.52].6 Miles [12.88] 99–125.7 O’Daly [12.46] 7–79.8 Kretzmann [12.64].9 Rist [12.48] 41–8, 53–6.10 Kirwan [12.42] 22.11 Kirwan [12.42] 22–3.12 Matthews [12.69]; Kirwan [12.42] 30–4; Sorabji [12.120] 289; Rist [12.48]63–7.13Letter to Colvius,Adam-Tannery 3.247;Philosophical Letters,tr. A.Kenny,Oxford 1970, 83–4; Matthews [12.70] 11–38.14 O’Daly [12.104]; cf. O’Connell [12.102].15 Nash [12.71] 94–124; O’Daly [12.46] 203–7.16 O’Donovan [12.47] 60–92.17 Rist [12.48] 23–40.18 Stock [12.77] 138–45.19 Kirwan [12.42] 55–9.20 Stock [12.77] 145–62.21 Markus [12.73]; Mayer [12.75].22 Rist [12.48] 48–53.23 O’Donovan [12.89].24 Kirwan [12.42] 187–92.25 Rist [12.98].26 Dihle [12.81].27 Deane [12.80] 78–94.28 Rist [12.48] 203–55.29 Deane [12.80] 94–153; Markus [12.85] 72–104.30 Brown [12.79] 387–427.31 Matthews [12.70] 90–106; Kirwan [12.42] 192–6.32 Markus [12.86]; Swift [12.92].33 Kirwan [12.42] 204–8.34 Harrison [12.83]; Svoboda [12.91].35 Rist [12.48] 148–202.36 Kirwan [12.42] 78–81.37 O’Daly [12.96] 93–7; Kirwan [12.42] 82–150.38 O’Daly [12.46] 8–11.39 O’Daly [12.105].40 O’Daly [12.46] 62–70.41 Matthews [12.101].42 Lloyd [12.100], criticizing Henry [12.99],43 Schwyzer [12.60]; O’Daly [12.46] 103–4.44 Matthews [12.110]; Bubacz [12.109].45 O’Daly [12.46] 141–5.46 O’Daly [12.104]; O’Connell [12.103].47 O’Daly [12.112] 44–6.48 G.Ryle,The Concept of Mind,London, Hutchinson’s University Library,1949, 6.4.49 Mundle [12.115]; McEvoy [12.114].50 O’Daly [12.116].51 Sorabji [12.120] 35–51.52 Kirwan [12.42] 182–3.53 O’Daly [12.46] 153–9; Rist [12.48] 73–85.54 Sorabji [12.120] 232–8; Kirwan [12.42] 163–6.55 Sorabji [12.120] 255–6, 263–4; Kirwan [12.42] 171–4.56 Sorabji [12.120] 232–8; Kirwan [12.42] 159–63.57 Sorabji [12.120] 193–202; May [12.118] 122–82.58 TeSelle [12.49] 216–18; Meyer [12.119].BIBLIOGRAPHYNote: A full synopsis of Augustine’s works and of modern editions isprovided in [12.30] 1.xxvi–xli.ORIGINAL LANGUAGE EDITIONS12.1Sancti Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Opera Omnia,ed. J.-P.Migne, Paris,11 vols, 1841–2 (=Patrologia Latina32–47). A reprint of the Benedictineedition of St Maur, Paris, 1679–1700.12.2Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum,Vienna, Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1866–. Several vols devoted to Augustine (in progress).12.3Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina,Turnhout, Brepols, 1953–. Several volsdevoted to Augustine (in progress).12.4Bibliothèque Augustinienne. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin,Paris, Desclée deBrouwer and Etudes Augustiniennes, 1936–. In progress. With French trans.,introductions, and notes.12.5S.Aureli Augustini Confessionum libri XIII,ed. M.Skutella. Stuttgart, B.G.Teubner, 2nd edn, 1969.12.6Sancti Aurelii Augustini Episcopi De Civitate Dei libri XXII,ed. B.Dombartand A.Kalb.Leipzig, B.G.Teubner, 4th edn, 1928–9.12.7Augustine, De Dialectica,ed. B.Darrell Jackson and J.Pinborg. Dordrecht/Boston, Mass., North-Holland Publishing, 1975.ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS12.8The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo,ed. M.Dods. Edinburgh,T. and T.Clark, 15 vols, 1871–6. Wide selection of Augustine’s works.12.9A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the ChristianChurch,New York, 1887–1902. Wide selection of Augustine’s works(reprinted by W.B.Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1979: vols 1–8=Augustine).12.10Ancient Christian Writers,Westminster, Maryland (later New York),Newman Press, 1946–. Several vols devoted to Augustine (in progress).12.11The Fathers of the Church,Washington DC, Catholic University of AmericaPress, 1947–. Several vols devoted to Augustine (in progress).12.12 V.J.Bourke (ed.),The Essential Augustine,selection with commentary,Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1974.12.13Augustine: Confessions,trans. H.Chadwick. Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1991.12.14Augustine: City of God,trans. H.Bettenson. Harmondsworth, PenguinBooks, new edn 1984.12.15Saint Augustine: On Free Choice of the Will,trans. A.S.Benjamin and L.H.Hackstaff. Indianapolis/New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.12.16Saint Augustine: On Christian Teaching,tr. R.Green, with introduction andnotes. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.COMMENTARIES12.17 J.J.O’Meara (ed.),St. Augustine: Against the Academics,Ancient ChristianWriters, vol. 12 (see [12.10] above), 1951.12.18 T.Fuhrer (ed.),Angustin: Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis) Bücher 2und 3,Patristische Texte und Studien, 46. Berlin and New York, de Gruyter,1997.12.19 J.J.O’Donnell (ed.),Augustine: Confessions,introduction, text, commentary.Oxford, Oxford University Press, 3 vols, 1992.12.20 G.Clark (ed.),Augustine: Confessions I–IV.Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995.12.21 E.P.Meijering (ed.),Augustin über Schöpfung, Ewigkeit und Zeit. Das elfteBuch der Bekenntnisse,Philosophia Patrum, 4. Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1979.12.22 G.Watson (ed.),Augustine: Soliloquies and Immortality of the Soul.Warminster, Aris and Phillips, 1991.12.23 P.Agaësse and A.Solignac (eds),De Genesi ad Litteram,BibliothèqueAugustinienne, vols 48–9 (see [12.4] above), 1972.See also [12.7] and the notes in the individual vols of [12.4].BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND RESEARCH REPORTS12.24 C.Andresen,Bibliographia Augustiniana.Darmstadt, WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, 2nd edn, 1973.12.25 T.J.van Bavel and F.van der Zande,Repertoire bibliographique de saintAugustin 1950–1960.Stenbrugge/Den Haag, M.Nijhoff, 1963.12.26 R.Lorenz, ‘Augustinliteratur seit dem Jubiläum von 1954’,TheologischeRundschauNF 25 (1959) 1–75; id., ‘Zwölf Jahre Augustinusforschung(1959–1970)’,Theologische RundschauNF 38 (1974) 292–333; 39 (1974)95–138, 253–86, 331–64; 40 (1975) 1–41, 97–149, 227–61.12.27Augustine Bibliography/Fichier Augustinien,Boston, Mass., G.K.Hall, 4 vols,1972. Supplementary vol. 1981.12.28Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes(1955–) incorporates an annualbibliographical survey(Bulletin).CONCORDANCE12.29Corpus Augustinianum Gissense,ed. C.Mayer. Computerized concordanceof all of Augustine’s writings and bibliography on CD-ROM. Basle,Schwabe, 1996.ENCYCLOPAEDIA12.30 C.Mayeret al., Augustinus-Lexikon.Basle, Schwabe, 1986– .BIOGRAPHIES AND GENERAL SURVEYSAncient12.31 (Possidius) M.Pellegrino (ed.),Possidio, Vita di S. Agostino,Alba, EdizioniPaoline, 1955.Modern12.32 G.Bonner,St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies,Norwich,Canterbury Press, 2nd edn, 1986.12.33 P.Brown,Augustine of Hippo: A Biography,London, Faber & Faber, 1967.12.34 J.Burnaby,Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St Augustine,London,Hodder & Stoughton, 1938 (reprinted Norwich, Canterbury Press, 1991).12.35 H.Chadwick,Augustine,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986.12.36 C.Horn,Augustinus,Munich, C.H.Beck, 1995.12.37 J.J.O’Donnell,Augustine,Boston, Mass., Twayne Publishers, 1985.12.38 J.J.O’Meara,The Young Augustine: The Growth of St Augustine’s Mind upto his Conversion,London, Longmans, Green, 1954.12.39 A.Schindler, ‘Augustin’,Theologische Realenzyklopädie4 (1979) 646–98.AUGUSTINE’S PHILOSOPHY: GENERAL STUDIES, COLLECTIONS OF ARTICLES12.40 G.R.Evans,Augustine on Evil,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.12.41 E.Gilson,Introduction a l’étude de Saint Augustin,Paris, J.Vrin, 4th edn,1969 (Eng. trans. of 1st edn,The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,New York, Random House, 1960).12.42 C.Kirwan,Augustine,London and New York, Routledge, 1989.12.43 R.A.Markus, in A.H.Armstrong (ed.),The Cambridge History of LaterGreek and Early Medieval Philosophy,Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1967, 341–419.12.44 R.A.Markus (ed.),Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays,New York,Doubleday, 1972.12.45 R.J.O’Connell,St Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391,Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.12.46 G.O’Daly,Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind,London, Duckworth, 1987.12.47 O.O’Donovan,The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine,New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1980.12.48 J.M.Rist,Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994.12.49 E.TeSelle,Augustine the Theologian,London, Burns & Oates, 1970.AUGUSTINE AS AUTOBIOGRAPHER12.50 G.Clark,Augustine: The Confessions,Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1993.12.51 P.Fredriksen, ‘Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, OrthodoxTraditions, and the Retrospective Self’, Journal of Theological StudiesNS 37(1986) 3–34.12.52 R.A.Markus,Conversion and Disenchantment in Augustine’s SpiritualCareer,Villanova, Pa., Villanova University Press, 1989.12.53 G.Misch,A History of Autobiography in Antiquity,London, Routledge andKegan Paul, vol. 2, 1950, 625–67.AUGUSTINE’S PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS12.54 A.H.Armstrong, ‘St Augustine and Christian Platonism’, in [12.44] 3–37.12.55 M.Colish,The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages,Leiden, E.J.Brill, vol. 2, 1985.12.56 P.Courcelle,Les Lettres grecques en Occident de Macrobe a Cassiodore,Paris, Boccard, 2nd edn, 1948 (Eng. trans.Late Latin Writers and theirGreek Sources,Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969).12.57 H.Hagendahl,Augustine and the Latin Classics,Göteborg, Institute ofClassical Studies of the University of Göteborg, 2 vols, 1967.12.58 P.Henry,Plotin et l’Occident: Firmicus Maternus, Marius Victorinus, SaintAugustin et Macrobe,Louvain, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934.12.59 H.-I.Marrou,Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique,Paris, Boccard,1938, andRetractatio,Paris, Boccard, 1949.12.60 H.-R.Schwyzer, ‘Bewußt und Unbewußt bei Plotin’,Les Sources de Plotin,Entretiens Fondation Hardt, 5, Vandoeuvres/Geneva, 1960, 343–90.12.61 A.Solignac, ‘Doxographies et manuels dans la formation philosophique de s.Augustin’,Recherches Augustiniennes1 (1958) 113–48.12.62 M.Testard,Saint Augustin et Cicéron,Paris, Etudes Augustiniennes, 2 vols,1958.12.63 W.Theiler, ‘Porphyrios und Augustin’,Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus,Berlin, de Gruyter, 1966, 160–251 (first published 1933).AUGUSTINE’S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY12.64 N.Kretzmann, ‘Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: Augustine’s Charter forChristian Philosophy’, in T.P.Flint (ed.),Christian Philosophy,Notre Dame,Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1990, 1–36.12.65 G.Madec, ‘Augustinus’, in ‘Philosophie’,Historisches Wörterbuch derPhilosophie7 (1989) 630–3.BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE12.66 B.Bubacz,St Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge: A Contemporary Analysis,New York/Toronto, Edwin Mellen, 1981.12.67 M.F.Burnyeat, ‘Wittgenstein and AugustineDe Magistro’,The AristotelianSociety. Supplementary Volume61 (1987) 1–24.12.68 R.Lorenz, ‘Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus’,Zeitschrift fürKirchengeschichte75 (1964) 21–78.12.69 G.B.Matthews,‘Si Fallor Sum’,in [12.44] 151–67.12.70 G.B.Matthews,Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes,Ithaca, NY andLondon, Cornell University Press, 1992.12.71 R.H.Nash,The Light of the Mind: St Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge,Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1969.See also [12.46] 162–216; [12.48] 41–91.SEMANTICS AND HERMENEUTICS12.72 B.D.Jackson, ‘The Theory of Signs in St Augustine’sDe Doctrina Christiana,in A.H.Armstrong (ed.),The Cambridge History of Later Greek and EarlyMedieval Philosophy,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, 92–147(reprinted fromRevue des Etudes Augustiniennes15 (1969) 9–49). And in[12.44].12.73 R.A.Markus, ‘St Augustine on Signs’, in [12.44] 61–91 (reprinted fromPhronesis2 (1957) 60–83).12.74 R.A.Markus,Signs and Meanings: World and Text in Ancient Christianity,Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1996.12.75 C.P.Mayer,Die Zeichen in der geistigen Entwicklung und in der TheologieAugustins,Würzburg, Augustinus-Verlag, 2 vols, 1969 and 1974.12.76 K.Pollmann,Doctrina Christiana. Untersuchungen zu den Anfängen derchristlichen Hermeneutik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Augustinus,De doctrina christiana,Paradosis, 41, Fribourg, Universitätsverlag FreiburgSchweiz, 1996.12.77 B.Stock,Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethicsof Interpretation,Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press,1996.12.78 G.Watson, ‘St Augustine’s Theory of Language’,Maynooth Review6 (1982)4–20.See also [12.48] 23–40.ETHICS, POLITICAL THEORY, AESTHETICS12.79 P.Brown,The Body and Society,London, Faber & Faber, 1989, 387–427.12.80 H.A.Deane,The Political and Social Ideas of St Augustine,New York andLondon, Columbia University Press, 1963.12.81 A.Dihle,Die Goldene Regel,Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962.12.82 D.F.Donnelly (ed.),The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays,NewYork, Peter Lang, 1995.12.83 C.Harrison,Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.12.84 R.Holte,Béatitude et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin del’homme dans la philosophie ancienne,Paris and Worcester, Mass., EtudesAugustiniennes and Augustinian Studies, 1962.12.85 R.A.Markus,Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, revised edn, 1988.12.86 R.A.Markus, ‘Saint Augustine’s Views on the “Just War”’,Studies in ChurchHistory20 (1983) 1–13.12.87 J.Mausbach,Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus,Freiburg im Breisgau,Herder, 2 vols, 2nd edn, 1929.12.88 M.R.Miles,Augustine on the Body,Missoula, Scholars Press, 1979.12.89 O.O’Donovan, ‘Usus and Fruitioin Augustine,De Doctrina ChristianaI’,Journal of Theological StudiesNS 33 (1982) 361–97.12.90 O.O’Donovan, ‘Augustine’sCity of God XIXand Western PoliticalThought’,Dionysius11 (1987) 89–110.12.91 K.Svoboda,L’Esthétique de S. Augustin et ses sources,Paris/Brno,Philosophical Faculty of Masaryk, University of Brno, 1933.12.92 L.J.Swift, ‘Augustine on War and Killing: Another View’,HarvardTheological Review66 (1973) 369–83.12.93 J.Wetzel,Augustine and the Limits of Virtue,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1992.See also [12.48] 203–55.WILL12.94 J.P.Burns,The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace,Paris, Etudes Augustiniennes, 1990.12.95 A.Dihle,The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity,Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1982.12.96 G.O’Daly, ‘Predestination and Freedom in Augustine’s Ethics’, in G.Vesey(ed.),The Philosophy in Christianity,Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989, 85–97.12.97 J.M.Rist, ‘Augustine on Free Will and Predestination’,Journal of TheologicalStudiesNS 20 (1969) 420–47.12.98 J.M.Rist, ‘Plotinus and Augustine on Evil’,Plotino e il Neoplatonismo inOriente e in Occidente,Rome, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1974, 495–508.See also [12.48] 148–202; [12.93].SOUL12.99 P.Henry,Saint Augustine on Personality,New York, Macmillan, 1960.12.100 A.C.Lloyd, ‘On Augustine’s Concept of a Person’, in [12.44] 191–205.12.101 G.B.Matthews, ‘The Inner Man’, in [12.44] 176–90 (reprinted fromAmerican Philosophical Quarterly4/2 (1967) 1–7).12.102 R.J.O’Connell, ‘Pre-existence in the Early Augustine’,Revue des EtudesAugustiniennes26 (1980) 176–88.12.103 R.J.O’Connell,The Origin of the Soul in St Augustine’s Later Works,NewYork, Fordham University Press, 1988.12.104 G.O’Daly, ‘Did St Augustine ever believe in the Soul’s Pre-existence?’,Augustinian Studies5 (1974) 227–35.12.105 G.O’Daly, ‘Augustine on the Origin of Souls’, in H.-D.Blume and F.Mann(eds),Platonismus und Christentum=Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum,Ergänzungsband 10 (1983) 184–91.See also [12.48] 92–147.SENSE-PERCEPTION AND IMAGINATION12.106 F.Solmsen, ‘Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves’,MuseumHelveticum18 (1961) 150–67 and 169–97 (reprinted inKleine Schriften,Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, vol. 1, 536–82.12.107 G.Verbeke,L’Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma du Stoicisme a S. Augustin,Paris/Louvain, Desclée de Brouwer, 1945.12.108 G.Watson,Phantasia in Classical Thought,Galway, Galway UniversityPress, 1988.MEMORY12.109 B.Bubacz, ‘Augustine’s Account of Factual Memory’,Augustinian Studies6(1975) 181–92.12.110 G.B.Matthews, ‘Augustine on Speaking from Memory’, in [12.44] 168–75(reprinted fromAmerican Philosophical Quarterly2/2 (1965) 1–4).12.111 J.A.Mourant,Saint Augustine on Memory,Villanova, Pa., VillanovaUniversity Press, 1980.12.112 G.O’Daly, ‘Remembering and Forgetting in Augustine,Confessions X’,inMemoria. Vergessen und Erinnern=Poetik und Hermeneutik XV,Munich,Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1993, 31–46.TIME12.113 H.M.Lacey, ‘Empiricism and Augustine’s Problems about Time’, in [12.44]280–308 (reprinted fromReview of Metaphysics22 (1968) 219–45).12.114 J.McEvoy, ‘St Augustine’s Account of Time and Wittgenstein’s Criticisms’,Review of Metaphysics38 (1984) 547–77.12.115 C.W.K.Mundle, ‘Augustine’s Pervasive Error concerning Time’,Philosophy41 (1966) 165–8.12.116 G.O’Daly, ‘Time asdistentioand St Augustine’s Exegesis ofPhilippians3,12–14’,Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes23 (1977) 265–71.GOD AND CREATION12.117 A.H.Armstrong, ‘Spiritual or Intelligible Matter in Plotinus and StAugustine’,Augustinus Magister,Paris, Etudes Augustiniennes, vol. 1, 1954,277–83.12.118 G.May,Schöpfung aus dem Nichts,Berlin, de Gruyter, 1978.12.119 H.Meyer,Geschichte der Lehre von den Keimkräften von der Stoa bis zumAusgang der Patristik,Bonn, Peter Hansteins Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914,123–224.12.120 R.Sorabji,Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and theEarly Middle Ages,London, Duckworth, 1983.

augustine—Augustine bersetzunglateinischer Ursprung weibliche Form von Augustin. Bekannt durch Otfried Preulers Kinderbuch Die dumme Augustine....Deutsch namen
augustine—Augustine translation Augustine mu Englishu form of the Latinu name Augustnus a derivative of AUGUSTUS SEE Augustus. Its most famous bearer is St Augustine of Hippo per...First names dictionary
augustine—Augustine translationAugustine of Hippo St...Philosophy dictionary
augustine—[gstn gstn]Огастин Августинавгустинец...Англо-русский большой универсальный переводческий словарь
augustine—n августин августинец монахавгустинец огастин последователь учения августина...Англо-русский словарь Лингвистика-98
augustine—сущ. Огастин Августин мужское имя августинец член нищенствующего ордена основанного в веке устав ложно приписан Августину христианскому теологу и церковному деятелю...Англо-русский словарь общей лексики
augustine—f m em augustin...Большой французско-русский и русско-французский словарь
augustin(e)—[gstngstn] n. Огастин мужское имя. ист. Августин. Augustinian...Новый большой англо-русский словарь
augustin(e)—[gstngstn] n. Огастин мужское имя. ист. Августин. Augustinian...Новый большой англо-русский словарь
augustin(e)—Augustine [gstngstn] ni . Огастин мужское имяi . ист. iАвгустин . Augustinian...Новый большой англо-русский словарь II
augustin(e)—gstngstn n . Огастин мужское имяem . ист. emАвгустин . Augustinian...Новый большой англо-русский словарь под общим руководством акад. Ю.Д. Апресяна
augustine—f m em augustin...Новый французско-русский словарь
augustine—Rzeczownik Augustine Августин...Универсальный польско-русский словарь